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LEVELS OF ABSTRACTION IN LEGAL THINKING 
Michael Evan Gold* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
     [Socrates:] Tell me, then . . . what it is that you affirm that 
Simonides says, and rightly says, about justice. 
     [Polemarchus:] That it is just, he replied, to render to each his 
due.  In saying this, I think he speaks well. 
     I must admit, said I, that it is not easy to disbelieve Simonides. 
For he is a wise and inspired man.  But just what he may mean by 
this, you, Polemarchus, doubtless know, but I do not.  Obviously, 
he does not mean what we were just speaking of [namely, the 
return to a friend of a weapon that he deposited with us when he 
was in his right mind] even if he asks it back when not in his right 
mind.  And yet what the man deposited is due to him in a sense, is 
it not? 
     Yes. 
     . . . 
     It is, then, something other than this that Simonides must, as it 
seems, mean by saying that it is just to render back what is due. 
     Something else in very deed, he replied, for he believes that 
friends owe it to friends to do them some good and no evil. 
     I see, said I.  You mean that he does not render what is due or 
owing who returns a deposit of gold if this return and the 
acceptance prove harmful and the returner and the recipient are 
friends.  Isn’t that what you say Simonides means? 
     Quite so. 
     . . . 
     It was a riddling definition of justice, then, that Simonides gave 
after the manner of poets . . . 
     What else do you suppose?  said he. 
     . . . 
     To do good to friends and evil to enemies, then, is justice in his 
meaning? 
     I think so. 
     . . . 
     . . . But let us consider this point.  Is not the man who is most 
skillful to strike or inflict a blow in a fight, whether as a boxer or 
elsewhere, also the most wary to guard against a blow? 
     Assuredly. 
     Is it not also true that he who best knows how to guard against 
disease is also most cunning to [infect others with] it and escape 
detection? 
     I think so. 
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     . . . 
     Of whatsoever, then, anyone is a skillful guardian, of that he is 
also a skillful thief? 
     It seems so. 
     If, then, the just man is an expert in guarding money, he is an 
expert in stealing. 
     The argument certainly points that way. 
     A kind of thief, then, the just man, it seems, has turned out to 
be, and it is likely that you acquired this idea from Homer.  For he 
regards with complacency Autolycus, the maternal uncle of 
Odysseus, and says, “he was gifted beyond all men in thievery and 
perjury.”  So justice, according to you and Homer and Simonides, 
seems to be a kind of stealing, with the qualification that it is for 
the benefit of friends and the harm of enemies.  Isn’t that what you 
meant? 
     No, by Zeus, he replied.  I no longer know what I did mean.  
Yet this I still believe, that justice benefits friends and harms 
enemies. 
     May I ask whether by friends you mean those who seem to a 
man to be worthy, or those who really are so, even if they do not 
seem, and similarly of enemies? 
     It is likely, he said, that men will love those whom they suppose 
to be good and dislike those whom they deem bad. 
     . . . 
     For those, then, who thus err [thinking the good are bad and the 
bad are good, they believe that] the good are their enemies and the 
bad, their friends? 
     Certainly. 
     But all the same, it is then just for them to benefit the bad and 
injure the good? 
     It would seem so. 
     But again, the good are just and incapable of injustice. 
     True. 
     On your reasoning, then, it is just to wrong those who do no 
injustice. 
     Nay, nay, Socrates, he said, the reasoning can’t be right. 
     Then, said I, it is just to harm the unjust and benefit the just. 
     That seems a better conclusion than the other. 
     It will work out, then, for many, Polemarchus, who have 
misjudged men, that it is just to harm their friends, for they have 
got bad ones, and to benefit their enemies, for they are good.  And 
so we shall find ourselves saying the very opposite of what we 
affirmed Simonides to mean. 
     Most certainly, he said, it does work out so.  But let us change 
our ground, for it looks as if we were wrong in the notion we took 
up about the friend and the enemy. 
     What notion, Polemarchus? 
     That the man who seems to us good is the friend. 
     And to what shall we change it now? said I. 
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     That the man who both seems and is good is the friend, but that 
he who seems but is not really so, seems, but is not really, the 
friend.  And there will be the same assumption about the enemy. 
     Then, on this view, it appears the friend will be the good man 
and the bad, the enemy. 
     Yes. 
     So you would have us qualify our former notion of the just man 
by an addition. We then said it was just to do good to a friend and 
evil to an enemy, but now we are to add that it is just to benefit the 
friend if he is good and harm the enemy if he is bad? 
     By all means, he said, that, I think, would be the right way to 
put it.1 
This article applies the concept of levels of abstraction to legal thinking. 
Perhaps the most important use of the concept is to constrain judicial 
lawmaking in a principled way.2 
 
Level of abstraction refers to: 
 
 the numbers of persons and transactions that generate an 
issue, 
 the numbers of persons and transactions of which a piece 
of evidence is true, 
 the numbers of persons and transactions to which an 
argument applies, and 
 the numbers of persons and transactions that are affected 
by the resolution of an issue. 
 
In general, the more persons and transactions to which an issue and its 
resolution apply, the higher the level of abstraction of the issue and 
resolution; and the more persons and transactions of which a piece of 
evidence is true, or to which an argument applies, the higher the level of 
abstraction of the evidence. 
Levels of abstraction are illustrated in the passage above from the 
beginning of Plato’s Republic.  The topic is justice.  Socrates objects to each 
definition of justice that appeals to Polemarchus by demonstrating that it is 
too broad—it includes too many cases, that is, operates at too high a level of 
abstraction—and Polemarchus responds by proposing a new definition that 
                                                
* Associate Professor of Industrial and Labor Relations, Cornell University.  B.A. University of 
California at Berkeley.  LL.B. Stanford University. © copyright Michael Evan Gold 2017. 
1. Plato, the Republic 580–585 (331e-335b) (Paul Shorey trans. in the Collected Dialogues of Plato, 
Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns eds., Princeton U. Press 1961) (punctuation added; footnote 
omitted). 
2. See text following n. 185 (beginning, “We subscribe to the elementary tenant ...”) and following n. 
277 (beginning, “The third argument examined industrial experience ...”). 
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adds a significant fact, thereby applying to fewer cases and operating at a 
lower level of abstraction.  Thus, when Socrates shows that Simonides’s 
definition (justice as giving each one’s due) includes a case of injustice 
(returning a weapon to a crazed friend), Polemarchus narrows Simonides’s 
definition by adding a significant fact, namely, whether the object of one’s 
act is a friend or an enemy.  Polemarchus’s definition applies to fewer 
persons and transactions and, accordingly, operates on a lower level of 
abstraction than Simonides’s definition.  And when Socrates demonstrates 
that Polemarchus’s definition also includes cases of injustice (calling for one 
to help one’s enemies and hurt one’s friends), Polemarchus accepts 
Socrates’s suggestion to narrow the definition still further by adding another 
significant fact (whether the object of one’s act is a true friend or enemy), 
thereby applying to still fewer cases and, thus, moving down yet another rung 
on the abstraction ladder.
The concept of levels of abstraction was not used only in ancient 
philosophy: the concept is used in many disciplines today, for example, 
modern philosophy,3 history,4 economics,5 and fiction.6  Academic lawyers 
                                                
3. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 16 (1971).  
          Many words have misleading connotations which at first are likely to 
confuse.  The terms “utility” and “utilitarianism” are surely no exception. 
They too have unfortunate suggestions which hostile critics have been 
willing to exploit; yet they are clear enough for those prepared to study 
utilitarian doctrine.  The same should be true of the term “contract” applied 
to moral theories.  As I have mentioned, to understand it one has to keep in 
mind that it implies a certain level of abstraction.  In particular, the content 
of the relevant agreement is not to enter a given society or to adopt a given 
form of government, but to accept certain moral principles. 
4. ANTHONY T. EDWARDS, HESIOD’S ASCRA 10 (2004) (reference omitted).  In the introduction to a 
book about the social structure of Ascra, which was the community in and about which Hesoid 
wrote Works and Days, Professor Edwards stated: 
 This formulation, if applied to evolutionism generally, allows for the unique 
eccentricities and anomalies of specific societies while at the same time 
preserving the possibility of comparison on the basis of larger-scale features. 
In a discussion of criticisms of the concept of directionality, Sanderson, 
relying upon the work of Marvin Harris, presents a continuum of degrees of 
abstraction.  At the lowest level of abstraction it is easy to identify unique 
and unparalleled features of specific societies.  At the highest level are found 
universal features, such as the taboo against nuclear family incest.  In 
between these extremes occurs a middle ground where a few significant 
similarities can be emphasized at the expense of myriad insignificant 
differences. 
5. BENJAMIN M. FRIEDMAN, THE JOYS OF INNOVATION:  FOR PROFIT ONLY, THE NEW YORK REVIEW 
OF BOOKS, vol. 62, No. 18 (Nov. 19, 2015) (reviewing EDMUND PHELPS, MASS FLOURISHING:  
HOW GRASSROOTS INNOVATION CREATED JOBS, CHALLENGE, AND CHANGE (2013)): (All of these 
proposed changes are worthwhile, at least at the level of abstraction at which Phelps, in this book 
writing as much as a philosopher as an economist, offers them.) 
6. VALOM, IRVIN D., WHEN NIETZSCHE WEPT 209 (1992) (“... I asked you to look at yourself from a 
great distance.... A cosmic perspective always attenuates tragedy.  If we climb high enough, we will 
reach a height from which tragedy ceases to look tragic.”).  
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may understand the concept,7 but practicing lawyers and judges seem 
unaware of it.  Yet, by providing a vocabulary for discussing a number of 
aspects of legal argumentation, the concept indicates ways to improve the 
arguments of advocates. The concept also indicates ways to improve the 
decisions of adjudicatory bodies, which we will call “tribunals,” such as 
courts, arbitrators, and administrative agencies in adjudicative mode (as 
distinguished from rule-making mode). 
This article focuses on relative levels of abstraction, that is, the level of 
abstraction of an issue and its resolution as compared to other possible levels 
in the case at hand.  When the issue in a case can be framed at various levels 
of abstraction, framing the issue at a particular level can affect the outcome 
of the issue or its effect on other parties.  But for several purposes, even the 
relative level of abstraction of an issue within a case is not important; rather, 
the advocates and the tribunal need only take the level of the issue into 
account as they present evidence and arguments on it. 
We divide the principles of levels of abstraction into three categories. 
In the first category are observations about practices; these principles are 
empirical.  In the second category are principles of sound argument; these 
principles are normative.  In the third category are principles of good 
judgment; these principles are hortatory. 
Here follows a list of the principles of levels of abstraction that are 
illustrated in the cases discussed in this article and the pages on which the 
principles are discussed. This list is organized according to the foregoing 
categories.  In the following discussion, however, the principles are 
considered in the order in which they apply to the cases that we examine. 
 
                                                
7. FREDERICK SCHAUER, THINKING LIKE A LAWYER 51. (Apr. 27, 2009). 
        If the facts are that Mr. MacPherson [the plaintiff in MacPherson v. Buick 
Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382 (1916)], bought a Buick from a dealer who had 
bought it from the Buick Motor Company and the wheel of the Buick broke, 
causing an injury to Mr. MacPherson, and the outcome is that Mr. 
McPherson [sic] prevailed against the Buick Motor Company, we still do not 
know the level of abstraction, or level of generality, at which to understand 
these facts. . . .  If in such cases the bare statement of the facts and the 
outcome cannot tell us what the precedent case fully “stands for,” then it is 
tempting to say that the question of legal similarity is itself determined by 
the law.  This is why discussions of precedent, including Goodhart’s [see 
Arthur L. Goodhart, Determining the Ratio Decidendi of a Case, 20 Yale L. 
Rev. 161 (1930)], commonly talk not about facts but about material facts.  In 
concluding that the holding of the case . . . is a combination of the material 
facts and the outcome, Goodhart and others solved the level of generality 
problem, but at the cost of undermining the core of their view. 
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Empirical Principles 
1. The same set of facts can generate issues that operate on different levels 
of abstraction, and the rules of law that resolve those issues also operate 
on different levels, p. 131. 
2. A case can be distinguished from an authority by identifying an 
additional legally significant fact in either of them, thereby changing the 
level of abstraction at which the case or the authority is understood, p. 
155. 
3. The level of abstraction of the backing for a proposition indicates the 
level at which the proposition was intended to operate, p. 141. 
4. The level of abstraction of an issue can affect its outcome, p. 178. 
Normative Principles 
5. In a sound argument, evidence and consequential (or “policy”) 
arguments on a lower level of abstraction may not establish facts or 
propositions on a higher level of abstraction.  However, evidence on a 
lower level may illustrate a proposition on a higher level, and evidence 
on a higher level is some proof of a fact on a lower level, p. 136. 
6. An authority may support a proposition that operates on the same level 
of abstraction as the level on which authority operated, or may support a 
proposition on a lower level by force of logic, p. 143. 
7. An authority may not support a proposition that operates on a level of 
abstraction higher than the level on which the authority operated 
(“abstraction shift”) unless a justification is provided, p. 143. 
8. When a case is distinguished from an authority by identifying an 
additional legally significant fact in one of them, the reason that the 
additional fact is significant should be explained, p. 156. 
9. A reply to an argument (including criticism of the argument, a counter-
argument, and so forth) should operate on the same level of abstraction 
as the argument, or an explanation should be provided, p. 210. 
10. Legislative facts must be proved by evidence in the record, p. 164. 
Hortatory Principles 
11. An advocate should frame the issue in a case at the level of abstraction 
that is most likely to produce a favorable outcome for one’s client, p. 
179. 
12. An advocate should normally address, at a single level of abstraction, 
only one of the possible issues which a set of facts can generate. If an 
advocate chooses to address alternative issues which grow out of the 
same facts and which operate on different levels of abstraction, the 
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advocate should make clear which issue a particular argument addresses, 
p. 179. 
13. A tribunal should not frame and resolve an issue at more than one level 
of abstraction, p. 173. 
14. An issue or a case should be decided at the lowest reasonable level of 
abstraction, p. 217. 
 
The cases which we use to illustrate levels of abstraction are drawn 
from the field of labor law.  We have chosen this field because we are familiar 
with it, but we have no reason to think that legal reasoning in other fields 
differs from the reasoning in this field.  We will begin by briefly stating the 
definitions, rules, and procedures of labor law which one needs to know in 
order to understand the following discussion; a reader who knows labor law 
may skip this section. 
 
II. ANALYSIS 
 
A. A Little Labor Law 
 
The principal statute in labor law is the Labor Management Relations 
Act of 1947 (“Labor Act” or “Act”).8  It governs the relations of employers, 
labor unions, and employees who support or oppose unions, or are 
represented by them, in the private sector of the economy.  For the 
convenience of the reader, we quote in one place all the sections of the Labor 
Act which are relevant to this article.9 
                                                
8. Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. ch. 7 (1947). This statute, inter alia, amended and re-
enacted the National Labor Relations Act of 1935, 49 Stat. 449.  It is customary in the field to speak 
of the “National Labor Relations Act” when referring to the portion of the Labor Management 
Relations Act that amended and re-enacted the earlier statute. 
9.   
Section 1 
     The denial by some employers of the right of employees to organize and the 
refusal by some employers to accept the procedure of collective bargaining lead to 
strikes and other forms of industrial strife or unrest, which have the intent or the 
necessary effect of burdening or obstructing commerce by (a) impairing the 
efficiency, safety, or operation of the instrumentalities of commerce. . . . 
     . . . 
     It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the causes 
of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce and to mitigate and 
eliminate these obstructions when they have occurred by encouraging the practice 
and procedure of collective bargaining. . . . 
Section 2(3) 
The term “employee” shall include any employee. . . . 
Section 7 
     Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor 
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own 
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The heart of the Labor Act is section 7.  It guarantees to employees the 
right to concerted activity, which includes organizing into unions, bargaining 
collectively with employers, and striking. 
 Section 9(a) of the Act establishes the principle of majority rule.  The 
majority of employees in an appropriate bargaining unit decide whether to be 
represented by a union.10  Probably the most frequently used means of 
determining the will of the majority is an election conducted by the National 
Labor Relations Board.  If the majority chooses union representation, the 
Board certifies the union as the employees’ agent for dealing with their 
employer regarding the terms and conditions of their employment.  In the 
argot of labor law, an “organized” employer is one whose employees are 
represented by a union. 
Section 8(a)(5) establishes for organized employers and section 8(b)(3) 
establishes for their unions the duty to bargain with one another.  Section 8(d) 
defines the duty as the “mutual obligation [of the parties] to meet at 
reasonable times and confer in good faith . . . .”  Today it is clear that the 
                                                
choosing, and to engage in concerted activities, for the purpose of collective 
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection. . . . 
Section 8(a)(1) 
     It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer to interfere with, restrain, or 
coerce employees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed in section 7. 
Section 8(a)(3) 
It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer by discrimination in regard to 
hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage 
or discourage membership in any labor organization . . . . 
Section 8(a)(5) 
It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer to refuse to bargain collectively 
with the representatives of his employees, subject to the provisions of section 9(a). 
Section 8(b)(3) 
It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents to refuse to 
bargain collectively with an employer, provided it is the representative of his 
employees subject to the provisions of section 9(a). 
Section 8(d) 
[T]o bargain collectively is the performance of the mutual obligation of the 
employer and the representative of the employees to meet at reasonable times and 
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions 
of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising 
thereunder . . . but such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a 
proposal or require the making of a concession . . .  
Section 9(a) 
Representatives designated or selected for the purpose of collective bargaining by 
the majority of employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes shall be the 
exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of 
collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or 
other conditions of employment . . . . 
10. ROBERT A. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW 69 (1976).  An appropriate bargaining unit is 
composed of jobs that share a community of interest.  Community of interest includes factors such 
as similarity of tasks, training and skills, supervision, scale and manner of determining 
compensation, geographic proximity, and interchange of duties.  
2018] Levels of Abstraction 125 
duty has subjective and objective aspects.  The subjective aspect is that to 
confer in good faith means to bargain with a “sincere desire to reach an 
agreement.”11  The objective aspect is that some behaviors violate the duty 
regardless of the party’s state of mind, such as refusing to meet at reasonable 
times.12  However, prior to 1962—and thus during the period in which were 
written all of the opinions discussed below, except the Supreme Court’s— 
tribunals disagreed over whether objective violations of the duty to bargain 
could occur, that is, whether a finding of bad faith was a necessary element 
of a violation of the duty. 
The duty to bargain does not require that a party bargain over every 
subject that the counterparty might wish to incorporate into a collective 
agreement.  Rather, an organized employer or its union is required to bargain 
only over mandatory subjects of bargaining,13 which section 8(d) defines as 
“wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment.”  Other 
subjects, over which parties may bargain if both choose to do so, are known 
as “permissive” (or, as we prefer, “permissible”) subjects.14  A major class of 
permissible subjects is known as “management prerogatives,” which 
comprise subjects that are thought to fall within the discretion of 
management, for example, design of products and financing.15 
The duty to bargain does not require the parties to reach agreement on 
mandatory subjects.  Section 8(d) states that the duty “does not compel either 
party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession.”16 
An organized employer or its union normally may not change a 
condition of employment that is a mandatory subject, such as wages or hours 
of work, without offering to bargain over the change with the counterparty.17 
A change not preceded by an offer to bargain is known as “unilateral 
action.”18  An obvious example is an employer who cancels employees’ 
medical and life insurance without consulting the union.19  But the Act does 
                                                
11. GORMAN, supra n. 10, at 482 (citing NLRB v. Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., 205 F.2d 131, 134 (1st Cir. 
1953), cert. den. 346 U.S. 887 (1953)). 
12. NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 743 (1962) (“Clearly, the duty . . . may be violated without a general 
failure of subjective good faith; for there is no occasion to consider the issue of good faith if a party 
has refused even to negotiate in fact ‘to meet . . . and confer’. . . .”) (italics in the original). 
13. See NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 348–49 (1958). 
14. GORMAN, supra n. 10, at 523.  A third category exists, illegal subjects, which neither party may 
propose or agree to, for example, a clause that would require an act that would violate the Labor 
Act or another statute.  See also PATRICK HARDIN, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 948–54. (3d ed. 
1992). 
15. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
16 . NLRB v. Am. Nat. Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395, 404 (1952). 
17. GORMAN, supra n. 10, at 429–32. 
18. The term “unilateral action” may also be applied to any decision that an employer makes without 
the union’s agreement, even if the employer has bargained, or offered to bargain, with the union 
about the change.  For the sake of economy of expression, however, in this article we will use 
“unilateral action” and its verb forms only in the sense mentioned in the text. 
19. GORMAN, supra n. 10, at 441. 
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not prevent an employer or a union from effecting a change in a mandatory 
subject if the parties cannot reach a settlement after bargaining.  For example, 
if they bargain to the point of impasse over a pay raise, an employer may 
implement a raise that was proposed to the union prior to impasse.20 
A party may bring negotiations to impasse only over mandatory 
subjects.  Likewise, a party may use economic force (such as a strike or a 
lockout) to secure agreement only on mandatory subjects.21  
Section 8(a)(1) makes it an unfair labor practice for any employer 
covered by the Act “to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in their 
exercise of the rights” to concerted activity.  For example, an employer who 
threatens to retaliate against employees if they vote for a union violates 
section 8(a)(1).22  Section 8(a)(3) makes it an unfair labor practice for any 
covered employer to discriminate against an employee because of concerted 
activity.  The idea of discrimination is that an employer acts to disadvantage 
an employee out of the motive called “anti-union animus,” which is defined 
as hostility towards the employee’s concerted activity.  For example, an 
employer who discharges an employee for agitating for a union violates 
section 8(a)(3).23  
Enforcement of the Labor Act begins when someone (the “charging 
party”) goes to a regional office of the National Labor Relations Board (the 
“Labor Board” or the “Board”) and files a charge alleging that a respondent 
(an employer or a union) has committed an unfair labor practice.  The 
General Counsel of the Board, acting through the regional office, investigates 
the charge and, if the charge appears meritorious, files a complaint against 
the respondent.  If the case is not settled, the General Counsel prosecutes the 
respondent at a hearing before an official now known as an “administrative 
law judge,” but known as a “trial examiner” at the time the cases discussed 
in this article were decided.  The charging party may also participate as a 
party in the hearing.  The judge writes findings and recommendations in an 
intermediate report that is filed with the Labor Board in Washington, D.C.; 
the intermediate report is akin to an opinion of a trial court.  The findings and 
recommendations of the judge become the order of the Board unless a party 
aggrieved by the report files exceptions with (appeals to) the Board.  When 
exceptions are filed, as they usually are, the Board receives briefs, reviews 
the intermediate report, occasionally hears oral arguments, and issues a 
decision.  If the Board finds that an unfair labor practice has occurred, it must 
order the respondent to cease and desist from the practice, and may also order 
other affirmative relief such as back pay or restoration of the status quo ante. 
The Board’s order is not self-executing.  Rather, it is enforced (or not) by a 
                                                
20. Id. at 445–46. 
21. See HARDIN, supra n. 14, at 856. 
22. See id. at 108. 
23. See id. at 215. 
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United States Court of Appeals, which has jurisdiction to review the findings 
of fact and conclusions of law of the Board.  The United States Supreme 
Court may review the judgment of a Court of Appeals by writ of certiorari.24 
 
B. Legislative and Adjudicative Facts 
 
Throughout this article we will use the distinction which Professor 
Kenneth Culp Davis drew between legislative and adjudicative facts.25 The 
following definitions and examples are our own, however. 
A legislative fact is a fact that is generally true of many persons and 
transactions.26  We say “generally true” because not many facts are true of 
all persons or transactions, yet a few exceptions do not render a legislative 
fact false.  For example, it is a legislative fact that employers have economic 
power over employees, and use it with some frequency to intimidate 
employees before they vote in an election on whether to be represented by a 
union.  Not all employers have such power over their employees or use it in 
this way, but the fact is true often enough that it could properly be used as 
the basis for creating a program to educate employers about their legal duties. 
A prediction may be a legislative fact; for example, one might predict that an 
educational program will reduce the number of employers who use their 
economic power illegally and the number of employees who are coerced into 
voting against unions.  And a counterfactual statement, either past or present, 
may be a legislative fact.  The ubiquitous but-for test is an example: but for 
employers’ unlawful conduct during election campaigns, unions would win 
more representation elections. 
In contrast, an adjudicative fact is a fact that need be true only of 
specific persons and transactions; whether it is true of any other persons or 
transactions is irrelevant.27  For example, suppose a union is trying to 
organize the employees of employer ER.  UL is the union leader among the 
employees.  ER fabricates charges against and then discharges UL.  Two days 
later, the union loses a representation election by a close vote.  The union 
petitions the Labor Board to re-run the election on the ground that the 
unlawful discharge of UL affected the outcome of the election.  ER’s motive 
for discharging UL would be a relevant adjudicative fact.  A prediction may 
be an adjudicative fact; for example, suppose a supervisor says to the 
                                                
24 . See PATRICK HARDIN and JOHN E. HIGGINS, JR., THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW (4th ed.) 2464–77, 
2569–71.  The enforcement procedures under the Labor Act today are substantially the same as they 
were when the cases discussed in this article were contested. 
25. KENNETH CULP DAVIS, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Administrative Process, 55 
HARV. L. REV. 364, 402–410 (1942) (hereinafter Davis, An Approach), and ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
AND GOVERNMENT 149–51, 283–88 (1960). 
26. See DAVIS, An Approach, supra n. 25, at 403–10.  
27. Id. at 402.  
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employees, “ER will close this business before he will deal with a union.”28 
And a counterfactual statement, either past or present, may be an adjudicative 
fact: a tribunal might find as fact that, but for anti-union animus, ER would 
not have discharged UL.  
 
C. Fibreboard-I 
  
1. The Trial Examiner’s Opinion and the Issue in the Case 
 
We will focus on the decisions of the Labor Board and courts in the 
Fibreboard case,29 including cases cited in those decisions and in the briefs 
of the parties in the Supreme Court.  The legal proceedings began when a 
union filed an unfair labor practice charge against the Fibreboard 
Corporation.30  The General Counsel investigated the charge and issued a 
complaint.  A trial examiner heard the case and filed an intermediate report 
which recommended that the complaint be dismissed.31  The Labor Board 
initially agreed32 but, upon motion for reconsideration, reversed itself and 
found the company guilty.33  The Court of Appeals enforced the Board’s 
order.34  The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals.35 
In this article, when we refer to the Board’s initial decision, we will speak of 
“Fibreboard-I.”  When we refer to the Board’s decision upon 
reconsideration, we will speak of “Fibreboard-II.”  When we refer to the 
case as a whole, to the facts of the case, to the trial examiner’s intermediate 
report, or to the decisions of the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court, we 
will speak simply of “Fibreboard. 
The principles of levels of abstraction can be illuminated by examining 
the opinions and briefs in Fibreboard.  Some of the attorneys and authors of 
the opinions in these cases respected the principles; but some did not, and 
ambiguity or outright confusion resulted. 
The facts were that Local 1304 of the United Steelworkers of America 
began representing fifty of the seventy-three maintenance employees of the 
                                                
28. Such predictions are illegal threats. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 618 (1969) 
(employer may inform employees of a decision that has already been made to close the business if 
the union wins the election, but any implication that the employer may or may not close is an illegal 
threat). 
29. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 130 NLRB 1558, 1565 (1961) (intermediate report); Fibreboard 
Paper Prods. Corp., 130 NLRB 1558 (1961); Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 138 NLRB 550 (1962); 
East Bay Union of Machinists, Local 1304 v. NLRB, 322 F.2d 411 (1963); Fibreboard Paper Prods. 
Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964). 
30. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 379 U.S. at 207.  
31. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 130 NLRB at 1565 (intermediate report). 
32. Id. at 1558. 
33. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 138 NLRB 550. 
34. East Bay Union of Machinists, Local 1304, 322 F.2d at 415. 
35. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 379 U.S. at 217. 
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Fibreboard Corporation in the company’s plant in Emeryville, California in 
1937.36  As the bargaining agent for these employees, the Steelworkers 
negotiated a series of labor contracts with the company over the next two 
decades.37  In 1954 the company became concerned about the rising cost of 
its maintenance operations, and dealt with this concern in two ways.38  The 
company raised the issue of maintenance costs with the union during 
collective bargaining, but made no progress.  The company also began to 
study the possibility of contracting out the maintenance work, that is, 
discharging its maintenance employees and engaging an independent 
contractor to perform maintenance.39  The study revealed that contracting out 
could reduce maintenance costs in the plant by as much as thirty percent.40 
The savings would result from reduction of the work force, reduction or 
elimination of fringe benefits and overtime payments, stricter work quotas, 
and closer supervision.41  Based on this study, the company discharged its 
maintenance employees and engaged Fluor Maintenance, an independent 
contractor, to perform maintenance in the plant.42  Fibreboard implemented 
this decision without bargaining over it with the union.43 
The Steelworkers filed a charge in the Labor Board’s regional office in 
San Francisco, California.44  The General Counsel found the charge 
meritorious and accused Fibreboard of violating sections 8(a)(1), 8(a)(3), 
8(a)(5), and 8(d) of the Labor Act.45  Trial Examiner Howard Myers heard 
                                                
36. See Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 130 NLRB at 1559.   
37. Id.  
38. Id.  
39. At the time of the Fibreboard decisions, according to the General Counsel of the Board, the terms 
“contracting out” and “subcontracting” and their verb forms were often used as synonyms, although 
they had distinguishable meanings.  (1) “Subcontracting” could refer to the practice in the 
construction industry in which a general contractor let portions of a job to sub-contractors, e.g., 
plumbing, or to the similar practice in the defense industry in which a prime contractor arranged for 
sub-contractors to produce parts, e.g., a guidance system for a missile.  (Unions did not seek to 
bargain over this practice.)  (2) Both “subcontracting” and “contracting out” could refer to an 
employer’s letting to an independent contractor work that formerly had been performed with the 
employer’s equipment in the employer’s plant by the employer’s employees.  The independent 
contractor could perform the contracted work either in the employer’s plant or in the contractor’s 
plant.  (Unions did seek to bargain over these practices.)  See Brief of the National Labor Relations 
Board on writ of certiorari in Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964), at 13–
17.  In this article we use “contracting out” to refer to the practices described in meaning (2). 
However, we preserve the original text when a source we quote uses “subcontracting” or one of its 
verb forms to refer to the practices described in meaning (2). 
40. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp, 130 NLRB. at 1572 (intermediate report) (estimated savings of 
$225,000 per year divided by total maintenance cost of $750,000 per year). 
41. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp, 379 U.S. at 206.  
42. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp, 130 NLRB at 1565 (intermediate report).   
43. Id.  We omit issues, and facts relevant to issues, that did not pertain to the duty to bargain over 
contracting out bargaining unit work.  We do the same for most of the other cases discussed in this 
article. 
44. Id.  
45. Id.  
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the case.46  He believed that the central issue was Fibreboard’s motivation: 
did the company contract out the maintenance work and discharge the 
maintenance employees out of anti-union animus?47  Although the General 
Counsel  and  the  Steelworkers argued that the company’s “real motive was 
. . . to oust the Steelworkers from its plant,” the trial examiner found that the 
company’s motive was purely economic and, therefore, the contracting out 
and the discharges were not discriminatory.48  The company’s witnesses 
“testified directly and positively that the contract [with Fluor Maintenance] 
was made solely for economic reasons.”49  The company had been 
considering the feasibility of contracting out for several years, and 
contracting out would save the company 225,000 dollars per year.50 
Therefore, “the credible evidence clearly establishes that the Fluor contract 
was entered into for bona fide business reasons and not as a part of any 
scheme for evading any statutory obligation.”51  Accordingly, the trial 
examiner concluded that the allegations in the complaint had not been 
proved, and he recommended that the complaint be dismissed.52 
The intermediate report did not address the issue of interest to us, 
namely, whether Fibreboard had a duty to bargain with the union over the 
decision to contract out the maintenance work.  The trial examiner’s finding 
that the company had acted for legitimate reasons did not dispose of this 
issue.  To understand this point, consider a slight variation of the facts. 
Suppose the company, without bargaining with the union, had reduced wages 
in order to economize.  The reason for the reduction would have been 
legitimate, but the company would have unquestionably violated the duty to 
bargain.  Therefore, even though Fibreboard had contracted out the 
maintenance work for business reasons, the company might have had a duty 
to bargain with the Steelworkers over the contracting out. 
We will use the term “decision bargaining” to refer to collective 
bargaining over an employer’s desire, for lawful business reasons, to contract 
out bargaining unit work.  Thus, a second way to express the issue in 
Fibreboard is whether the duty to bargain requires decision bargaining.53  
                                                
46. Id. at 1558.  
47. Id. at 1571 (“The primary and principal question presented is whether substantial evidence on the 
record considered as a whole supports the allegations of the complaint, as amended, that 
[Fibreboard’s] change of operations and the discharge of about 50 maintenance employees because 
of such change were illegally motivated.”). 
48. Id. at 1572–73. 
49. Id. at 1571. 
50. Id. at 1559. 
51. Id. at 1573. 
52. Id. at 1574. 
53. Although the ordinary English meaning of the words in the term “decision bargaining” permits it 
to be applied to many other situations (indeed, to any decision an employer might make), in this 
article we will use the term as indicated in the text.  The requirement of decision bargaining is 
twofold: the duty to offer to bargain with the union over contracting out, and the duty to engage in 
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The duty to bargain attaches only to mandatory subjects.  Consequently, a 
third way to express this issue is whether contracting out is a mandatory 
subject of bargaining.  These versions of the issue differ only semantically. 
All three are encountered in the literature, and we will follow suit. 
The issue of decision bargaining in Fibreboard illustrates the most 
basic principle of levels of abstraction. 
 
Principle 1 
 
The same set of facts can generate issues that operate on different levels 
of abstraction, and the rules of law that resolve those issues also operate on 
different levels. 
This is an empirical principle, which is justified by observations, one of 
which follows. 
The question in Fibreboard was whether the company had a duty to 
engage in decision bargaining with the union.  The advocates and tribunals 
in Fibreboard took two approaches to this question, one via the common law, 
the other via statement and application of a standard,54 and thereby generated 
the following issues and possible rules. 
On the approach of stating and applying a standard, the issues and 
possible rules were: 
 
Issue A 
Is collective bargaining required over any lawful topic which 
either party raises? 
Rule A(1) 
Collective bargaining is required only over some lawful 
topics. 
Rule A(2) 
Collective bargaining is required over any lawful topic. 
 
Rule A(2) operated at the highest possible level of abstraction regarding 
the duty to bargain, for the rule would apply to all organized employers and 
their unions, all of the transactions between these parties, and even to 
transactions not involving the party wishing to bargain (e.g., the union wishes 
to bargain over the employer’s financing arrangements).  As we mentioned 
                                                
bargaining with the union if it accepts the offer to bargain.  Because unions rarely if ever decline 
the offer, the two requirements merge for practical purposes.  For convenience, therefore, we will 
speak of the duty in terms of the second requirement. 
54. Which of these approaches a tribunal should take is implicitly an issue in many cases, but is rarely 
discussed.  (Sometimes an advocate or member of a tribunal adopts a common law approach and 
another advocate or member of a tribunal adopts a standard, but nearly never do they debate the 
merits of the two approaches.)  We omit discussion of this issue because it was not discussed by 
any of the advocates or tribunals in Fibreboard. 
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above, the Supreme Court had previously rejected this rule and had limited 
the duty to bargain to mandatory subjects,55 but we present the rule here 
because in the Supreme Court the General Counsel of the Labor Board 
alluded to it, as did the concurring opinion in the Supreme Court. 
Assuming Rule A(1), Issue B arises. 
 
Issue B 
When is decision bargaining required? 
Rule B(1) 
Decision bargaining is required in no cases. 
Rule B(2) 
Decision bargaining is required in all cases. 
Rule B(3) 
Decision bargaining is required in some cases but not in 
others. 
 
Issue and Rules B operated at a lower level of abstraction than Issue 
and Rules A because the latter applied to all collective bargaining whereas 
the former applied only to decision bargaining.  Nonetheless, Issue and Rules 
B operated on a fairly high level because they applied to any employer who 
wished to contract out bargaining unit work. 
Under Rules B(1) and B(2), application of law to fact was mechanical: 
decision bargaining was never required or was always required.  Under Rule 
B(3), when a standard was used, the advocates and tribunals in Fibreboard 
used various standards.  Thus, the issue arose: 
 
Issue C 
What is the appropriate standard (or combination of 
standards) in decision bargaining cases? 
 
This issue operated at a high level of abstraction within this set of issues 
because the resulting rule would apply to every organized employer that 
wished to contract out bargaining unit work.  The various standards that were 
proposed, however, operated on different levels according to the number of 
transactions in which the standard required decision bargaining.  In 
approximately ascending order of their level of abstraction, the following 
standards (as well as combinations of them) were used in Fibreboard.  
 
 
 
 
                                                
55. See supra text accompanying nn. 13–15 (beginning, “The duty to bargain does not require ...”).  
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Rule C(1) 
Decision bargaining is required when an employer wishes to replace 
bargaining unit employees with contracted workers who would perform 
the same tasks in the same workplace at a lower cost. 
 
 Rule C(1) was so tailored to the facts of Fibreboard that the case would 
have been effectively limited to its facts.  Few similar cases were likely to 
arise in the future, with the result that Rule C(1) operated at a very low level 
of abstraction. 
Rule C(2) 
Decision bargaining is required when the contracting out is 
motivated by labor costs. 
Rule C(3) 
Decision bargaining is required when the contracting out 
would jeopardize jobs in the bargaining unit, either at once 
or in the foreseeable future. 
 
Both of these rules operated at a higher level of abstraction than Rule 
C(1) because putting contracted workers into the shoes of displaced 
employees is infrequent.  Rule C(3) operated at a higher level than Rule C(2) 
because most contracting out reduces jobs in the bargaining unit whereas 
several reasons besides labor costs motivate contracting out (e.g., a desire not 
to replace obsolescent machinery). 
 
Rule C(4) 
Decision bargaining is required when negotiations over 
contracting out might succeed. 
 
Success in bargaining could mean that the parties agree on an 
alternative to contracting out, that the employer convinces the union that 
contracting out is necessary, or that some other accommodation of interests 
is reached.  Perhaps the keys to determining whether negotiations might 
succeed are, first, the employer’s reasons for desiring to contract out and, 
second, the proposals the union has made or might reasonably make.  It is 
not clear whether Rule C(4) applied to more transactions than Rule C(3) did. 
On the one hand, probably most cases of contracting out reduce the number 
of jobs in the bargaining unit.  On the other hand, the range of proposals a 
union might make is broad; for example, it would include proposals which 
other unions have advanced, or at least proposals to which other unions and 
employers have agreed. 
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Rule C(5) 
Decision bargaining is required when all or part of a business 
operation is closed or relocated. 
 
 Rule C(5) operated at a high level of abstraction because it applied not 
only to contracting out bargaining unit work, but also to other forms of 
discontinuing an operation (such as moving a business, selling it, or closing 
it down altogether). 
 
Rule C(6) 
Decision bargaining is required unless it would infringe on 
management prerogatives. 
 
 Rule C(6) sat at the top of the abstraction ladder that pertained 
exclusively to decision bargaining.  Management prerogatives are, by 
definition, non-mandatory subjects of bargaining.  Thus, Rule C(6) held that 
decision bargaining is required over any mandatory subject. 
 
Rule C(7) 
Collective bargaining is required on all issues that affect 
employees’ vital interests, including contracting out. 
 
Rule C(7) operated at the highest level of abstraction of these standards. 
It captured all of the preceding standards: employees have a vital interest in 
their compensation, in keeping their jobs, and in management’s considering 
their proposals.  In addition, Rule C(7) required collective bargaining in 
many cases besides contracting out, for example, an employer’s advertising 
policy. 
 After the appropriate standard was chosen, it had to be applied to the 
facts of the case.  Thus, Issue D arose: 
 
Issue D 
Under the appropriate standard, is decision bargaining a 
mandatory subject of bargaining (did the employer in the 
case at bar have a duty to engage in decision bargaining with 
the union)? 
Rule D(1) 
Under the appropriate standard, decision bargaining is not a 
mandatory subject of bargaining (the employer had no duty 
to engage in decision bargaining with the union in the case 
at bar). 
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Rule D(2) 
Under the appropriate standard, decision bargaining is a 
mandatory subject of bargaining (the employer had a duty to 
engage in decision bargaining with the union in the case at 
bar). 
 
 Issue and Rules D called for application of law to fact and, therefore, 
they operated at a low level of abstraction: they applied only to the parties to 
the case at bar and to only one transaction between them. 
On the common law approach, the issue and possible rules were: 
 
Issue E 
Did the employer have a duty to bargain because the case at 
bar is analogous to a precedent in which decision bargaining 
was required? 
Rule E(1) 
The employer in the case at bar did not have a duty to bargain 
because (i) this case was analogous to a precedent in which 
decision bargaining was not required or (ii) this case was not 
analogous to any precedent in which decision bargaining 
was required. 
Rule E(2) 
The employer in the case at bar had a duty to bargain because 
this case was analogous to a precedent in which decision 
bargaining was required. 
 
The level of abstraction of an analogy depends on the number of facts 
in the comparison.  For example, if one argued that contracting out is a 
mandatory subject of bargaining because contracting out is like wages, the 
level of abstraction of the analogy would be high: wages are always a 
mandatory subject, and contracting out would be as well.56  But if one argued 
that the contracting out in Fibreboard was a mandatory subject because it 
was analogous to discharging employees and hiring new ones to perform the 
same work in the same workplace at lower pay, the level of abstraction of the 
analogy would be low.57 
A precedent may be cited as the source of a standard for use in the case 
at bar and, if a party invokes a precedent for its standard, the opposing party 
may seek to distinguish the precedent for the purpose of demonstrating that 
the standard does not apply to the case at bar.  Nonetheless, we do not 
                                                
56. The General Counsel drew such an analogy in his brief in the Supreme Court.  See infra text 
accompanying n. 248 (beginning, “He analogized contracting out to . . .”). 
57. Justice Stewart drew such an analogy in his concurring opinion in Fibreboard.  See infra text 
following n. 335 (beginning, “all that is involved is the substitution . . .”). 
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consider drawing and applying a standard from a precedent as an instance of 
the common law approach to resolving an issue.  Rather, the precedent is 
simply the source of the standard, much as a statute might be a source.  In the 
common law approach, the outcome of the case at bar must be the same as 
the outcome of an analogous precedent.  In contrast, in the approach of stating 
and applying a standard that is drawn from a precedent, the outcome of the 
case at bar depends on how the standard is applied, not on the outcome of the 
case in which the standard was announced.  For example, suppose employer 
Voldemort has raised pay shortly before a representation election.  The 
appropriate standard to apply to this case comes from National Labor 
Relations Board v. Exchange Parts because the employer in that case 
announced overtime and vacation benefits shortly before a representation 
election;58 thus, at a certain level of abstraction, the facts of Exchange Parts 
and of Voldemort’s case are analogous.  That the employer lost in Exchange 
Parts, however, does not dictate that Voldemort will lose.  Rather, the 
standard from Exchange Parts will be applied to Voldemort’s case.  That 
standard is that an employer may not increase benefits before a representation 
election for the purpose of inducing employees to vote against the union.59 
This standard includes more facts and operates at a lower level of abstraction 
than the level on which the appropriate standard was identified.  Voldemort 
will win his case if the facts show that he raised pay, not to influence the 
election, but to meet competitors’ raises. 
Advocates and tribunals in Fibreboard and associated cases addressed 
all of the foregoing issues and used all of the standards as well as some 
combinations of them.  Within the same tribunal, one member may have 
addressed one issue, and another member may have addressed another issue. 
In a few instances, the same member switched between issues, apparently not 
realizing the difference between them.  To judge from their briefs in the 
Supreme Court, much the same was true of the advocates. 
 
2. The Opinion of the Labor Board in Fibreboard-I 
 
The General Counsel filed exceptions with the Labor Board to the trial 
examiner’s intermediate report.  As we examine the opinions of the majority 
and the dissent in the case, another principle of levels of abstraction will be 
relevant: 
 
Principle 5 
In a sound argument, evidence and consequential (or 
“policy”) arguments on a lower level of abstraction may not 
                                                
58. NLRB v. Exch. Parts, Co., 375 U.S. 405 (1964). 
59. See GORMAN, supra n. 10, at 167. 
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establish facts or propositions on a higher level of 
abstraction.  However, evidence on a lower level may 
illustrate a proposition on a higher level, and evidence on a 
higher level is some proof of a fact on a lower level. 
 
The resolution of an issue must be based on evidence, and on arguments 
that contain evidence, that applies to the persons and transactions to which 
the resolution will apply.  Thus, when deliberating policies and rules of law, 
a tribunal (or a legislature) may properly take into consideration legislative 
facts, and arguments built on legislative facts, but not adjudicative facts or 
arguments built on adjudicative facts.  The reason is that the result of the 
deliberation will apply to many persons and transactions.  For example, 
suppose Congress is debating whether to establish, or a court is deciding 
whether it was constitutional for Congress to establish, a program to educate 
employers about their duties and employees about their rights during union 
organizing campaigns.  Congress or the court could properly consider the 
legislative fact that employers have economic power over employees and 
sometimes use it to influence the outcome of representation elections. 
Congress or a court should not be affected by the adjudicative fact that ER 
discharged UL in order to win an election.  One swallow does not a summer 
make.60  (Of course, evidence that thousands of employers have done what 
ER did would be a legislative fact.)  In contrast, a tribunal that is resolving 
issues of fact or of application of law to fact between particular parties should 
usually restrict itself to the adjudicative facts of the case and arguments built 
on those facts.  The reason is that the judgment will apply only to these parties 
and their transactions.  For example, whether the election in ER’s case should 
be re-run ought to be decided on the basis of what ER thought and did and 
how it affected ER’s employees, not on the basis of what other employers 
have thought or done or the effects on their employees. 
Two qualifications to this principle are in order.  The first qualification 
is that sometimes a legislative fact can help in finding an adjudicative fact. 
The reason is that what is true in general is usually true in a given case.  For 
example, it is a legislative fact that the discharge of a prominent union 
supporter shortly before a representation election often influences employees 
to vote against unionization.  This fact is some evidence that the employees 
in ER’s case were illegally influenced.61 
                                                
60. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS bk. I (G.P. Goold ed., H. Rackham trans., Harvard Univ. Press 
rev. ed. 1934) (c. 384 B.C.E.). 
61. To be sure, this legislative fact could be outweighed by the adjudicative facts of the case.  In ER’s 
case, suppose that in the days before the election the union’s president was convicted of embezzling 
money from the union’s treasury and the union’s organizer resigned to become a supervisor for the 
employer.  These facts might be a better explanation of the outcome of the election than ER’s 
behavior is. 
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The second qualification is that the adjudicative facts of an individual 
case may properly be used as an illustration of a legislative fact on which a 
rule is grounded.  To illustrate a fact, however, is not to prove it, but only to 
make it clear.  We will present instances of such illustrations below.62 
Let us turn now to the majority and dissenting opinions in Fibreboard-
I.  We will find that the majority honored Principle 5, but the dissent did not. 
Since 1947, the Labor Board has comprised five members.  It normally 
decides cases in panels of three members, but occasionally sits en banc.63  It 
decided Fibreboard-I en banc.64  Members Philip Ray Rodgers, Boyd 
Stewart Leedom, Joseph Alton Jenkins, and John Harold Fanning65 agreed 
with the finding that Fibreboard had acted for a legitimate reason.66  They 
disagreed among themselves over whether an employer has a duty to engage 
in decision bargaining. 
The General Counsel contended that an employer who contemplates 
contracting out bargaining unit work must negotiate with the union over the 
decision.67  It appears, therefore, that the General Counsel presented Issue B 
to the Board.  The majority of the Board, composed of Members J. Jenkins, 
Leedom, and Rogers, rejected the General Counsel’s contention.  The 
majority held that the duty to bargain pertains to matters “presently affecting 
employees within an existing bargaining unit,”68 but after the work had been 
contracted out “no employees remained in the unit to be represented by the 
Union.”69  The majority held that the duty to bargain does not pertain to the 
question of whether the employment relationship will persist.  “Although the 
determination of that question obviously affects employees, that 
determination does not relate to a condition of employment, but to a 
precondition necessary to the establishment and continuance of the 
relationship from which conditions of employment arise.”70  Also, argued the 
majority, the text of the statute cannot be interpreted to mean that Congress 
                                                
62. See infra text accompanying n. 219 (beginning, “The good consequences of a rule . . .”), n. 254 
(beginning, “Principle 5 holds that . . .”), n. 285 (beginning, “At this point in section I . . .”), and n. 
288 (beginning, “We will call this the ‘Labor Costs Passage’”). 
63. See HARDIN et al., supra n. 24, at 2443–44.  
64. Chairman Frank W. McCulloch did not participate; he had joined the Board only two weeks before 
the decision was issued.  The official report of the Board’s decision is unsigned, Fibreboard Paper 
Products Corp., 130 NLRB 1558 (1961), but does state that Chairman McCulloch did not 
participate, id. at 1565.  
65. The Bureau of National Affairs report of the decision states that Members Rodgers, Leedom, 
Jenkins, and Fanning heard the case, 47 L.R.R.M. 1547, 1547 (1961), and this report is consistent 
with the terms of office of Board members as listed on the Board’s web site, 
https://www.nlrb.gov/who-we-are/board/members-nlrb-1935.  Joseph Jenkins should not be 
confused with Howard Jenkins, Jr., who served on the Board from 1963 to 1983.  Ibid. 
66. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 130 NLRB 1558, 1558 (1961). 
67. Id. at 1560. 
68. Id. at 1559–60. 
69. Id. at 1561. 
70. Id. at 1561. 
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intended to compel bargaining over basic managerial decisions.  Although 
the majority did not use the terms “mandatory subject of bargaining” or 
“management prerogatives,” it effectively held that the decision to contract 
out bargaining unit work is not a mandatory subject, but instead falls within 
the scope of management prerogatives, regarding which an employer has no 
duty to bargain. 
The opinion of the majority addressed Issue B. The opinion did not 
comment on the scope of the issue which the General Counsel had presented, 
but we have no doubt that Members J. Jenkins, Leedom, and Rogers, as 
experts in the law of labor relations and as experienced practitioners in the 
field, fully appreciated the scope of the issue.  The majority wrote: 
 
It is the position of the General Counsel that the Respondent was 
under a statutory duty to bargain with the Steelworkers about its 
decision to contract out the maintenance work. . . . [He argues] that 
the duty to bargain “includes the obligation to notify the collective-
bargaining representative and to give such representative a chance 
to negotiate with respect to a contemplated change concerning the 
tenure of the employees. . . .”71 
 
Although the first sentence applied only to Fibreboard and the Steelworkers, 
the second sentence plainly applied to all employers: for the parties in the 
second sentence were all employers subject to the duty to bargain and all 
representatives of employees, and the act was any contracting out, not merely 
contracting out maintenance work.  Such breadth of application is a hallmark 
of a high level of abstraction.  Similarly, the members in the majority must 
have appreciated the scope of their resolution of the issue: “the establishment 
by the Board of an appropriate bargaining unit does not preclude an employer 
acting in good faith from making changes in his business structure, such as 
entering into subcontracting arrangements, without first consulting the 
representative of the affected employees.”72  The determiner “an” in the term 
“an employer” shows that the sentence applied to all employers; the 
determiner “any” could have replaced “an” without changing the meaning of 
the passage.  And the majority appreciated the scope of its interpretation of 
the intent of Congress: “although the statutory language is broad, we do not 
believe it is so broad and all inclusive as to warrant an inference that the 
Congress intended to compel bargaining concerning basic management 
decisions, such as whether and to what extent to risk capital and managerial 
effort.”73  If Congress did not intend “to compel bargaining concerning basic 
management decisions,” that intent must have applied to all employers.  
                                                
71. Id. at 1559–60 (italics in the original; internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
72. Id. at 1560. 
73. Id. at 1561. 
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Thus, the majority meant its ruling to exempt from the duty to bargain the 
decision of any employer to contract out bargaining unit work. The majority 
adopted Rule B(1). 
The majority’s opinion presented evidence and arguments on the level 
of abstraction appropriate to Issue B.  Thus, the majority consistently 
observed Principle 5.74  Member Fanning’s dissent did so only in part. 
Member Fanning argued that an employer has a duty to bargain over 
the decision to contract out bargaining unit work.  Although it appears that 
he intended, as did the majority, to address Issue B, some of the arguments 
which he advanced and some of the authorities on which he relied were 
inappropriate to his purpose. 
Member Fanning framed the issue at a high level of abstraction: 
“Simply stated, the issue here is whether an employer, absent any 
discriminatory motivation, violates Section 8(a)(5) of the Act when he 
refuses to discuss with the union his decision to subcontract the work 
previously done by union-member employees and unilaterally subcontracts 
that work.”75  He stated the resolution of the issue which he desired at the 
same high level: “In my opinion, Section 8(d) . . . imposes on an employer 
the duty to bargain about its decision to subcontract work performed by 
employees represented in a collective-bargaining unit.”76  The term “an 
employer” in these passages meant “any employer” and thus applied to all 
employers.  Nothing in these passages suggested that Member Fanning 
believed that bargaining should be required in some cases but not in others. 
In addition, Member Fanning was as expert in the law and as experienced in 
                                                
74. To say that the majority’s rule of law and arguments operated on the same level of abstraction is 
not to say that the arguments were sound.  We are troubled by the argument that the union had no 
right to demand decision bargaining because “no employees remained in the unit to be represented 
by the Union.”  This argument suffered from the logical fallacy of begging the question.  The 
argument assumed that the decision had already been made and the contracting out had already 
occurred, at which time it would have been true that the employees had been discharged and no 
employees remained whom the union represented.  But this assumption relied on the implicit 
assumption that the employer had the right in the first place to discharge the employees without 
bargaining with the union.  The fallacy of the argument was that the implicit assumption was the 
very proposition which the argument was intended to prove.  Any correct argument would have 
focused on the state of affairs before the contracting out had occurred, indeed, before the final 
decision had been made.  At this time, no employees would have been discharged and the union 
would have had an interest in bargaining about their future.  We are also troubled by the majority’s 
argument that the decision to contract out bargaining unit work is not a mandatory subject of 
bargaining because the decision “does not relate to a condition of employment, but to a precondition 
. . . of the relationship from which conditions of employment arise.”  Other preconditions of the 
employment relationship are mandatory subjects, for example, hiring and recall and (on the 
argument that whether employment will continue is a precondition to, and not an aspect of, the 
conditions of employment) layoff, discharge, and retirement.  See HARDIN, supra n. 14 at 891.  No 
member of the Board nor any judge mentioned either of these arguments in the record of the 
subsequent progress of the case. 
75. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 130 NLRB at 1562 (Member Fanning, dissenting). 
76. Id. at 1564–65. 
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the field as were his colleagues on the Board, which facts suggest that he too 
appreciated the breadth of the issue that he addressed and of the resolution 
that he favored.  These facts show that Member Fanning intended to address 
and resolve Issue B. 
Member Fanning advanced two consequential arguments.  The first 
operated on the correct level of abstraction.  The argument assured that the 
duty he advocated would do no harm because, if bargaining led to impasse, 
an employer could contract out the work without the union’s consent: 
“Clearly, this duty to bargain is not an order restraining the employer from 
subcontracting such work.  The duty to bargain does not include an obligation 
to yield.”77  This argument operated at a high level of abstraction because 
every employer has the right to contract out following impasse;78 thus, the 
argument, which was offered in support of a rule requiring decision 
bargaining in all cases, was appropriate to Issue B. 
Member Fanning’s second consequential argument presents an 
opportunity to consider another principle of levels of abstraction: 
 
Principle 3 
The level of abstraction for the backing of a proposition 
indicates the level at which the proposition was intended to 
operate. 
 
Sometimes it is difficult to determine whether a rationale in the opinion 
of a tribunal is a standard intended for use in future cases, or is simply a 
statement of the tribunal’s reasons for its decision.  Whether a rationale is a 
reason or a standard affects how it will be used in subsequent cases.  When a 
rationale is a standard, the tribunal intends that the standard will be applied 
to determine the outcome of relevant subsequent cases.  When a rationale is 
a reason for decision, if that reason does not apply to a subsequent case, the 
force of the decision as a precedent is diminished if not vitiated altogether. 
The concept of levels of abstraction can help to distinguish between 
reasons and standards.  If the level of the rationale is low (the facts in it are 
adjudicative), the rationale is probably a standard that was applied in the case 
at bar and was meant for use in subsequent cases.  Suppose a tribunal wrote, 
“Decision bargaining is required in the case at bar because (a) contracting 
out would eliminate jobs from the bargaining unit and (b) the desire to 
contract out is motivated by labor costs.”  We may infer that the tribunal 
intended to articulate the standard that decision bargaining is required when 
(a) and (b) occur.  In contrast, if the level of the rationale is high (the facts in 
                                                
77. Id. at 1565. 
78. In Re Calmat Co., 331 NLRB 1084, 1097 (2000) (“after bargaining to an impasse an employer does 
not violate the Act by making unilateral changes that are reasonably comprehended within his pre-
impasse proposals.”). 
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it are legislative), the passage is probably a statement of the tribunal’s reasons 
for a rule that operates at a high level.  Suppose a tribunal wrote, “Decision 
bargaining is required because a union has a strong interest in protecting jobs 
in a bargaining unit.  In the case at bar, however, no jobs were lost or even 
threatened.  Rather, the company, a grocery store, decided to add a cafeteria 
to the operation and, instead of cooking all of the food in the store, contracted 
out the cooking.  As compared to protecting existing jobs, a union has a lesser 
interest in representing employees in future jobs.”  The reason for the general 
rule does not apply, and neither does the rule. 
This reasoning assumes that authors usually honor the principles of 
levels of abstraction, though the authors may not be able to articulate those 
principles.  Applying this assumption to a particular argument, we may infer 
the level at which an author intends the proposition or argument to operate 
from the level at which operate the evidence and arguments which the author 
advances in support of the proposition.  When the levels of abstraction of a 
proposition and its backing do not coincide, doubt arises as to the level at 
which the author intended the proposition to operate and, sometimes, as to 
whether the rationale is a reason or a standard.  Member Fanning’s second 
consequential argument created such doubt. 
The argument was a prediction (correctly based on the facts at the time 
that Fibreboard decided to contract out the work) that the duty to bargain over 
contracting out might have done some good: “Had the employer bargained 
about its decision to subcontract the maintenance work in the instant case, it 
is entirely possible that the parties could have arrived at a solution to the 
problem short of subcontracting the entire maintenance operation.”79  The 
reference to “the maintenance work in the instant case” makes plain that the 
prediction referred only to Fibreboard and the Steelworkers.  Nonetheless, 
two readings of the prediction are plausible. 
The first reading is that Member Fanning used the prediction as 
evidence in support of Rule B(2) (decision bargaining is required in all 
cases), which operated on a high level of abstraction.  On this reading, the 
prediction was a reason for the rule: decision bargaining is required because 
it can avert contracting out.  If this reading is correct, the reason operated on 
an inappropriate level because the facts of this case could not justify a rule 
requiring decision bargaining in all cases.  Evidence on a lower level of 
abstraction cannot justify a principle of a higher level.  To justify Rule B(2), 
Member Fanning needed a legislative fact, not an adjudicative fact. 
The second reading is that Member Fanning used the prediction to argue 
that decision bargaining was appropriate in the case at bar: these parties in 
these circumstances might have averted the contracting out.  On this reading, 
the prediction was a standard: decision bargaining is required in cases in 
                                                
79. Fibreboard Paper Products, Corp., 130 NLRB at 1565 (Member Fanning, dissenting). 
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which it can avert contracting out.  Two problems beset this reading.  The 
first problem pertains to how Member Fanning knew the prediction was true. 
It was an adjudicative fact, yet he did not cite a finding (or even evidence) in 
the record that the parties might have bargained to a solution short of 
contracting out.80  Perhaps, however, he believed, based on his experience, 
that any parties in this position might bargain to a solution (a legislative fact) 
and, therefore, the Steelworkers and Fibreboard might.81  If so, the second 
problem arises.  If decision bargaining was required in this case because the 
bargaining might have succeeded, Member Fanning changed the issue he was 
addressing from Issue B (is decision bargaining required in all cases) to Issue 
C (what is the standard for determining whether decision bargaining is 
appropriate in a given case) and resolved the new issue with Rule C(4) 
(decision bargaining is required when it might succeed). 
We have belabored Member Fanning’s second consequential argument 
because a lawyer often uses the reasons for a rule of law to interpret the rule, 
and thus ambiguity in the reasons fosters confusion about the rule. Member 
Fanning’s second consequential argument was ambiguous as to its level of 
abstraction and purpose.82 If he had been writing for the majority of the 
Board, needless litigation would have ensued because in subsequent cases 
opposing parties could have argued, the one that the case requires decision 
bargaining of all employers, the other that the case requires decision 
bargaining only when it might succeed in the case at bar. 
Member Fanning also cited precedents in support of Rule B(2).83 His 
use of those precedents, as well as the reasoning in one of them, allow us to 
illustrate two further principles of levels of abstraction: 
 
Principle 6 
An authority may support a proposition that operates 
on the same level of abstraction as the level on which 
authority operated, or may support a proposition on a lower 
level by force of logic. 
 
Principle 7 
An authority may not support a proposition that 
operates on a higher level of abstraction than the level on 
which the authority operated (“abstraction shift”) unless a 
justification is provided. 
                                                
80. See id. at 1562. 
81. We will argue below that a member of a tribunal should not base a finding of a legislative fact on 
the member’s experience, but that evidence of the fact must appear in the record of the case.  See 
infra text accompanying n. 186 (beginning, “We subscribe to the elementary tenant . . .”). 
82. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp, 130 NLRB at 1564–65 (Member Fanning, dissenting). 
83. See id. 
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These are normative principles and require justification. 
As an advocate can, from the same set of facts, frame the issue in a case 
at various levels of abstraction, so an advocate can characterize or interpret 
the holding of a precedent at various levels of abstraction.  Such 
interpretation is routine in legal arguments and is not improper.  Thus, an 
advocate may use an authority, the result of which was justified on its 
adjudicative facts, as precedent in a subsequent case with analogous 
adjudicative facts.  The cases operate on the same level of abstraction, and 
like cases should be treated alike.  An advocate may use an authority which 
announced a rule of law as the basis for deciding subsequent cases.  The rule 
operated on a high level of abstraction in that case, and the tribunal that 
announced the rule (and presumably justified it) intended that it would be 
applied to many cases.  And an advocate may examine a group of authorities, 
each decided on its adjudicative facts; abstract a rule of law that explains all 
the cases in the group; and use that rule to decide a subsequent case.  “The 
life of the law . . . has been experience,” wrote Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.,84 
and the genius of the common law has been its use of experience to generate 
and revise rules of law. 
But an advocate may not, without justification, use an authority, the 
result of which was justified on its adjudicative facts—and therefore operated 
on a low level of abstraction—as precedent for a general rule of law at a 
higher level of abstraction that will decide many subsequent cases. One 
reason for this principle is that the tribunal that decided the authority had no 
such use in mind.  The tribunal found certain facts were legally significant 
and understood that certain persons and transactions would be affected.  If 
other facts had been significant, and other persons and transactions had been 
affected, the advocates in the case might have proved other facts and 
presented different arguments; other parties might have participated; and the 
tribunal might have ruled differently.  A second reason is that a single case 
rarely provides sufficient experience on which to base a rule of wide 
application.  A third reason is that, absent justification, a mismatch between 
the level of abstraction of a proposition and of a precedent cited in support of 
the proposition opens the proposition to attack (“Right v. Wrong should be 
overruled because its outcome was not supported by the precedents it cited”) 
and sows confusion as to the interpretation of the law (“Here v. There seems 
to hold λ ω λ; but, in light of the precedents on which it relied, which held ω 
μ λ, Here v. There must be understood to hold ω μ λ”).85 
                                                
84. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Common Law, 1, lecture 1 (1881). 
85. An example of the third reason occurred in Fibreboard-I.  See infra text accompanying n. 135 
(beginning, “The majority argued that Shamrock Dairy . . .”). 
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Therefore, if an advocate shifts the level of abstraction of an authority, 
the advocate must justify the shift.  Such justification varies across cases, but 
typically requires an argument that the outcome of the authority would have 
been the same at the new level of abstraction and that the rationale presented 
by the tribunal that decided the authority is consistent with the shift. 
Member Fanning relied on two Labor Board cases which, he said, had 
found employers guilty of refusing to bargain over the decision to contract 
out, and on a Supreme Court case that arose under the Railway Labor Act.86 
As we discuss his use of these precedents, we will find that two of them 
served his purpose well, but one did not. 
The first Board case on which Member Fanning relied was Timken 
Roller Bearing Company.87  The Timken Company and the Steelworkers 
Union initially signed a collective bargaining agreement covering production 
and maintenance employees in Timken’s plants in Ohio in 1937, and one or 
more collective agreements ensued.88  Timken had been contracting out 
certain production and maintenance jobs since at least 1920.89  At the time of 
the hearing before the trial examiner in 1946, approximately 200 employees 
of at least six independent contractors were working inside Timken’s plants, 
and the value of the contracted work appeared to be increasing.90  A 
substantial number of the contracted jobs required skills that were similar to 
the skills of employees who were represented by the Steelworkers.91  The 
contracting out, however, had not reduced the work of the bargaining unit or 
cost any member of the unit his job.92  In 1945 the union requested to bargain 
about contracting out; Timken denied the request on the ground that (in 
today’s terms) contracting out falls within the scope of management 
prerogatives and is not a mandatory subject of bargaining.93 
The Steelworkers filed a charge of refusal to bargain in the regional 
office of the Labor Board in Cleveland, Ohio.94  The General Counsel issued 
a complaint, which Timken answered, and the case was tried in Canton, Ohio 
before Trial Examiner Horace Ruckel.95  He recommended that the Board 
sustain the General Counsel’s allegation regarding contracting out,96 and the 
Board adopted his recommendation “[f]or the reasons stated in the 
                                                
86. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp, 130 NLRB at 1561. 
87. Timken Roller Bearing Co., 70 NLRB 500 (1946). 
88. Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. NLRB, 161 F.2d 949, 951 (6th Cir. 1947). 
89. Timken, 70 NLRB at 515, n. 10 (intermediate report). 
90. Id. 
91. See id. 
92. Id. 
93. Id. 
94. Id. at 509. 
95. Id. 
96. Id. at 523. 
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Intermediate Report.”97  Therefore, the trial examiner’s opinion in Timken 
Roller Bearing became the opinion of the Board. 
Trial Examiner Ruckel identified factors that influenced many 
subsequent discussions of contracting out: 
 
[I]t seems apparent that the respondent’s system of subcontracting 
work may vitally affect its employees by progressively 
undermining their tenure of employment in removing or 
withdrawing more and more work, and hence more and more jobs, 
from the unit. . . . It is the respondent’s duty to sit down and discuss 
these matters with the Union when requested to do so.  During such 
discussion it may develop, for example, that the Union will engage 
to supply sufficient skilled labor in the crafts in question, so that 
more work may be done by the respondent’s employees and less 
by employees outside the unit; it might be that the respondent will 
convince the bargaining representative that there is no reasonable 
alternative to a continuation of the respondent’s present practice in 
this respect; or some other and presently unthought of solution 
agreeable to both parties may suggest itself.98 
 
For three reasons, we believe that the trial examiner did not hold that decision 
bargaining is required in all cases of contracting out, but dealt with the case 
at a low level of abstraction.  First, he spoke of “the respondent’s [Timken’s] 
system of subcontracting work,” not of contracting out in general.99  Second, 
he referred twice to the “Union.”100  In opinions of the Labor Board, 
capitalization of this word indicates a reference to the party in the case at bar, 
not to every union in the nation.  Third, his suggestion that the Steelworkers 
might guarantee Timken a supply of skilled labor pertained only to this 
company’s reason for contracting out.101  Had he intended a rule that applied 
to all contracting out, he would also have discussed other, more typical 
causes of contracting out, such as the cost of labor (saying, for example, that 
the union might offer wage concessions).  Thus, Trial Examiner Ruckel 
understood the facts he stated to be adjudicative facts, not legislative facts or 
examples of legislative facts, and he implicitly adopted Rules B(3) (decision 
bargaining is required in some cases) and C(7) (bargaining is required on 
issues that affect employees’ vital interests). 
                                                
97. Id. at 504. 
98. Id. at 518. 
99. Id. (stating, “the respondent’s system of sub-contracting work may vitally affect its employees…”). 
100. Id.  
101. Id. (stating that when bargaining, “it may develop . . . that the Union will engage to supply sufficient 
skilled labor in the crafts in question, so that more work may be done by the respondent’s employees 
and less by workers outside the unit.”). 
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Let us turn now to the role that Timken Roller Bearing played in 
Member Fanning’s opinion in Fibreboard-I.  Member Fanning wrote: 
 
In the Timken Roller Bearing case . . . the Board specifically 
adopted the Trial Examiner’s conclusion that “. . . the 
Respondent’s system of subtracting work may vitally affect its 
employees by progressively undermining their tenure of 
employment in removing or withdrawing more and more work and 
hence more and more jobs from the unit.”  This reasoning applies 
with considerably more vigor where, as in the instant case, the 
entire complement of employees were rendered jobless in a single 
transaction.”102 
 
Member Fanning committed an abstraction shift in this passage.  He argued 
that if Timken had a duty to engage in decision bargaining, a fortiorari so did 
Fibreboard.  The argument depended on the adjudicative facts of the two 
cases and, therefore, operated on a low level of abstraction.  The argument 
would have been successful if it had been offered in support of a rule at the 
same level, that is, Rule E(2) (the case at bar is analogous to a precedent).  If 
Member Fanning had been arguing that decision bargaining should be 
required in some cases but not in others, a case-by-case approach would have 
been appropriate: for if decision bargaining were required on the adjudicative 
facts of one case, it should be required on the adjudicative facts of another 
case in which the argument for decision bargaining was even stronger.  The 
problem was that Member Fanning advanced this argument in support of a 
proposition at a higher level of abstraction, Rule B(2).  For this purpose, a 
comparison of the adjudicative facts of two cases was irrelevant.  One might 
agree that contracting out had a greater effect on the employees of Fibreboard 
than on the employees of Timken, but a comparison of the adjudicative facts 
of two cases cannot justify a rule of law that would apply to all cases.  An 
authority at a lower level of abstraction does not justify a rule of law at a 
higher level of abstraction. 
The second precedent on which Member Fanning relied was Shamrock 
Dairy.103  The International Brotherhood of Teamsters represented a unit of 
drivers and other employees of Shamrock Dairy, and the Teamsters and 
Shamrock entered into a two-year labor contract scheduled to expire in 
October of 1955.104  Shamrock decided for business reasons to convert its 
drivers from employees into independent distributors (who would buy their 
                                                
102. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 130 NLRB 1558, 1562 (1961) (Member Fanning, dissenting) 
(footnote omitted). 
103. Id. at 1563.  The Board had previously decided Shamrock Dairy, Inc., 119 NLRB 998 (1957), but 
the Court of Appeals refused to enforce the Board’s order and remanded the case.  See Shamrock 
Dairy, Inc., 124 NLRB 494, 494 (1959).  On remand, the Board heard the case de novo, id. at 495. 
104. Shamrock Dairy, 124 NLRB at 504. 
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trucks and their routes from Shamrock, be compensated by the difference 
between the prices Shamrock charged them and the prices they charged their 
customers, and so forth).105  Shamrock did not bargain over this decision with 
the Teamsters before implementing it,106 and the Teamsters charged 
Shamrock with refusing to bargain.107  After the General Counsel issued a 
complaint, the case went to trial before Trial Examiner Wallace Royster in 
Tucson, Arizona.108  He did not discuss the law as to whether Shamrock had 
a duty to bargain about the decision, but he recommended that Shamrock be 
held guilty of violating section 8(a)(5) for having converted its drivers into 
independent contractors without bargaining with the union.109  This 
conversion was tantamount to contracting out bargaining unit work. 
The Labor Board accepted Trial Examiner Royster’s 
recommendation.110  The Board’s discussion of decision bargaining plainly 
stated a rule of law at a high level of abstraction: 
 
The Respondent [Shamrock] adopted the so-called independent 
distributorship plan without notice to the Union and entered into 
individual contracts with the drivers without giving the Union, the 
exclusive bargaining representative, a chance to negotiate with 
regard to the tenure of the employees to be affected by the alleged 
independent distributorship plan. . . . By this course of conduct, 
the Respondent failed to perform fully its duty to bargain 
collectively.  This duty includes the obligation to notify the 
collective-bargaining representative and to give such 
representative a chance to negotiate with respect to a contemplated 
change concerning the tenure of the employees and their 
conditions of employment. Brown Truck and Trailer 
Manufacturing Company, Inc., 106 NLRB 999.111 
 
The last sentence of this passage stated a rule of general application: an 
employer must give a union “a chance to negotiate with respect to the 
contemplated change concerning the tenure of the employees and their 
conditions of employment,”112 that is, a chance to engage in decision 
bargaining.  As stated, the rule applied to all employers who contemplated 
contracting out or closing part of a business and, therefore, was Rule B(2). 
Accordingly, Member Fanning in Fibreboard-I appropriately relied on 
                                                
105. Id. at 509 (intermediate Report). 
106. See id.  
107. Shamrock Dairy, 119 NLRB 998, 1019 (1957) (intermediate report). 
108. Id. 
109. Id. at 1024. 
110. Shamrock Dairy, 124 NLRB at 498. 
111. Id. (minor typographical error corrected).  See also infra text accompanying n. 138 (beginning, “Let 
us evaluate this argument”)(providing a discussion of Brown Truck and Trailer Mfg. Co., Inc.).  
112. Shamrock Dairy, 124 NLRB at 498 (citing Brown Truck & Trailer Mfg. Co., Inc., 106 NLRB 999 
(1953). 
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Shamrock Dairy to support his proposed resolution of the issue at a high level 
of abstraction.113 
The case on which Member Fanning mainly relied was Order of 
Railroad Telegraphers v. Chicago & North Western Railway Company.114 
Although the case arose under the Railway Labor Act, this statute and the 
National Labor Relations Act are similar enough that precedents under the 
one sometimes provide guidance for issues under the other.  In particular, as 
Member Fanning noted, the definitions of the duty to bargain in the two 
statutes are highly similar.115 
In Railroad Telegraphers, the Chicago & North Western railroad 
wished to reduce the number of stations on its lines.  Fewer stations would 
have led to layoffs of employees who were represented by the Telegraphers 
Union.116  When the Telegraphers learned of the plan, they notified the 
railroad that they desired to amend the existing labor contract with a clause 
that would prevent the abolition of jobs (and, as a practical matter, the closing 
of stations) unless both parties agreed to it.117  The railroad replied that its 
plan did not create a “bargainable issue” under the Railway Labor Act (in the 
parlance of the National Labor Relations Act, that the plan was not a 
mandatory subject of bargaining) because the plan did not concern rates of 
pay, rules, or working conditions.118  Nonetheless, without waiving its 
position, the railroad did discuss the plan with the union, but no agreement 
was reached.119  Mediation was unsuccessful, and both parties declined to 
submit the controversy to arbitration: whereupon the union announced its 
intention to strike.120  The day before the strike was scheduled to begin, the 
railroad petitioned the United States District Court for the Northern District 
of Illinois for an injunction to stop the strike.  The union opposed the 
injunction on the ground that the court lacked jurisdiction due to section 4 of 
the Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932,121 which read, “No court of the United 
States shall have jurisdiction to issue any . . . injunction in any case involving 
or growing out of any labor dispute to prohibit any person or persons . . . 
from . . . (a) Ceasing or refusing to perform any work [i.e., striking] . . . .”122 
                                                
113. The Board in Shamrock Dairy cited only Brown Truck for Rule B(2), and offered no other reasons 
for the rule, thereby committing an abstraction shift.  See infra text following n. 143 (beginning, 
“Nonetheless, the majority in Fibreboard-I . . .”). 
114. See Fireboard Paper Prods. Corp., 130 NLRB 1558, 1563 (1961) (Member Fanning, dissenting) 
(citing Order of Railroad Telegraphers v. Chicago & N. W. Railway Co., 362 U.S. 330 (1960)). 
115.  Id. at 1564 (“Section 2, First of the Railway Labor Act is substantially identical in its pertinent 
provisions to Section 8(d) of the National Labor Relations Act. . . .”). 
116. Order of Railroad Telegraphers v. Chi. & N. W. Railway Co., 362 U.S. 330, 332 (1960). 
117. Id. 
118. Id. at 333. 
119. Id. at 349 (Whittaker, J., dissenting). 
120. Id. 
121. See id. at 350–51. 
122. Id. at 331 (citing 47 Stat. 70, 29 U.S.C. § 104). 
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The railroad replied that the court had jurisdiction because the plan to close 
stations was not a bargainable issue and that, in consequence, no labor 
dispute existed and the Norris-LaGuardia Act did not apply.123 
The District Court agreed with the union; the Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit agreed with the railroad; and the Supreme Court took the 
case.124  The Supreme Court found: 
 
the controversy here relates to an effort on the part of the union to 
change the “terms” of an existing collective bargaining agreement. 
The change desired just as plainly referred to “conditions of 
employment” of the railroad’s employees who are represented by 
the union. The employment of many of these station agents 
inescapably hangs on the number of railroad stations that will be 
either completely abandoned or consolidated with other stations. 
And, in the collective bargaining world today, there is nothing 
strange about agreements that affect the permanency of 
employment. . . . 
 
We cannot agree with the Court of Appeals that the union’s effort 
to negotiate about the job security of its members “represents an 
attempt to usurp legitimate managerial prerogative in the exercise 
of business judgment with respect to the most economical and 
efficient conduct of its operations.” The Railway Labor Act and 
the Interstate Commerce Act recognize that stable and fair terms 
and conditions of railroad employment are essential to a well-
functioning national transportation system. . . . 
 
. . . Furthermore, the whole idea of what is bargainable has been 
greatly affected by the practices and customs of the railroads and 
their employees themselves. It is too late now to argue that 
employees can have no collective voice to influence railroads to 
act in a way that will preserve the interests of the employees. . . .125 
 
Accordingly, the Court held “that this case involves or grows out of a labor 
dispute within the meaning of the Norris-LaGuardia Act and [therefore] the 
District Court was without jurisdiction permanently to enjoin the strike.”126 
Only three facts constituted the issue: a railroad wanted to close parts 
of its operation; the closures would have jeopardized jobs in the craft or class 
                                                
123. Id. at 345. 
124. Id. at 333–35. 
125. Id. at 336–38 (citations omitted).  Note that the Court, as it interpreted the duty to bargain, took into 
account the practice in the industry, id. at 338.  See infra the text following n. 277 for the view 
expressed by the majority of the Supreme Court in Fibreboard regarding the proper role of 
industrial practices in defining the duty to bargain (beginning, “The third argument examined 
industrial experience . . .”) and accompanying n. 310 for the view expressed by Justice Stewart 
(beginning, “Justice Stewart’s first criticism . . .”). 
126. Id. at 335. 
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(the equivalent under the Railway Labor Act of a bargaining unit under the 
National Labor Relations Act); and the union wanted to bargain.  These facts 
could have been true of any other railroad and union.127  In arguing how the 
issue should be resolved, the Court did not rely on adjudicative facts that 
were peculiar to the Chicago & North Western, the Telegraphers, or this 
transaction; instead, the Court relied upon the intent of Congress for the 
industry and upon a legislative fact, namely, the practices of railroads and 
unions across the country.128  And the Court did not state or imply a standard 
that would require bargaining in this case but not in other cases.129  The Court, 
therefore, framed and resolved the issue at a high level of abstraction.130  The 
holding that the railroad’s plan, and the union’s proposed amendment to the 
labor contract, created a bargainable issue, was a square ruling that closing 
part of a business is a mandatory subject of bargaining under the Railway 
Labor Act.131  It follows that Member Fanning used Railroad Telegraphers 
correctly because it operated on the same level of abstraction as the level on 
which Rule B(2) would have operated.132 
What can we conclude about Member Fanning’s dissent in Fibreboard-
I?  Some of his reasoning was sound, and some was not.  Perhaps he intended 
to discuss the issue at a single level of abstraction, but lost sight of his 
purpose.  Perhaps he kept the level of abstraction in mind, but did not write 
with sufficient care.  Perhaps he did not appreciate the difference between 
the levels of abstraction at which he wrote and, therefore, moved indifferently 
between them.  Whatever the explanation, his opinion exemplifies a pitfall 
of failing to keep in the front of one’s mind the level of abstraction of the 
issue one intends to address.  If his opinion had been the opinion of the Board, 
it would have sown confusion in the field and spawned unnecessary 
litigation. 
Let us recur to the majority’s opinion in Fibreboard-I.  It reported that 
the General Counsel relied on Shamrock Dairy for the proposition that the 
Labor Act requires decision bargaining.133  As we have seen above, Member 
Fanning also relied on Shamrock Dairy.  This case was plainly troublesome 
for the majority and for good reason, as it seemed to hold squarely that the 
                                                
127. Id. at 331–33.  
128. Id. at 336–42. 
129. Id. at 338–42. 
130. Id. 
131. Id. at 336–37. 
132. Of course, whether one case is an apt precedent for a subsequent case depends on more than whether 
the cases operate on the same level of abstraction.  For example, Member Fanning added that if 
closing part of a business was a bargainable subject in Railroad Telegraphers, a fortiori continuing 
part of a business through contracting out was a mandatory subject of bargaining in Fibreboard-I. 
See Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 130 NLRB 1558, 1564 (1961) (Member Fanning, dissenting). 
This proposition is debatable; at a minimum, steps in the argument were omitted. 
133. Id. at 1560. 
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Labor Act requires decision bargaining.  The majority dealt with this problem 
in two ways. 
The first way was to accuse the General Counsel and, by implication, 
Member Fanning, of urging a proposition without supporting precedent.134 
The majority argued that Shamrock Dairy did not require decision 
bargaining, but required only “effects bargaining.”135  In the present context, 
the subjects of effects bargaining are the effects on employees of a decision 
to contract out bargaining unit work, such as order of layoffs, severance pay, 
and transfer and recall rights.  Effects bargaining presupposes that the 
decision, based on lawful reasons, has already been made to contract out 
bargaining unit work (or to eliminate it or close the business).                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
The majority argued that Shamrock Dairy had relied on Brown Truck and 
Trailer Manufacturing Company, Inc. as a precedent; that Brown Truck had 
held only that the Act requires effects bargaining; and, therefore, that 
Shamrock Dairy also required only effects bargaining.136 
The majority effectively accused the General Counsel and Member 
Fanning of an abstraction shift.137  A rule requiring decision bargaining in all 
cases operated on a higher level of abstraction than a rule requiring effects 
bargaining.  The former rule applied to every case in which an employer 
wished to contract out bargaining unit work.  If the bargaining succeeded and 
contracting out were averted, effects bargaining would be unnecessary. 
Therefore, a rule requiring effects bargaining would apply to only some of 
the parties to whom and the transactions to which a rule requiring decision 
bargaining would apply.  Also, in decision bargaining one of the union’s 
principal means to avert contracting out would be concessions regarding the 
terms and conditions of employment, for example, reduced compensation 
and more stringent work rules.  Thus, the issues in decision bargaining could 
include many of the usual subjects of collective bargaining.  The issues in 
effects bargaining would be considerably narrower.  The decision to contract 
out having already have been made, the only issues in effects bargaining 
would pertain to what the employer might do for the employees who would 
be displaced, touching subjects such as severance pay and transfer rights, but 
not other subjects.  Thus, the number of parties and the number of 
transactions (topics of bargaining) that would be affected by decision 
bargaining in this case would be substantially greater than the numbers of 
parties and transactions that would be affected by effects bargaining and, 
therefore, a rule requiring decision bargaining would operate on a higher 
level of abstraction than a rule requiring effects bargaining.  The majority of 
                                                
134. Id. 
135. Shamrock Dairy, Inc., 124 NLRB 494, 498 (1959) (citing Brown Truck and Trailer Mfg. Co., Inc., 
106 NLRB 999 (1953). 
136.   Id. 
137. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp, 130 NLRB at 1561. 
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the Labor Board accused the General Counsel and Member Fanning of 
violating Principle 7 by using an authority at a lower level of abstraction as 
a precedent for a proposition at a higher level of abstraction. 
Let us evaluate this argument.  In Brown Truck, the Brown Company 
closed its plant in Charlotte, North Carolina and moved its work to a new 
plant not far away in Monroe.  The Labor Board wrote:  
 
the good-faith discharge of the Brown Company’s obligation to 
the employees’ statutory bargaining representative required the 
former, at least, to advise the Union of the contemplated move and 
to give the Union the opportunity to bargain with respect to the 
contemplated move as it affected the employees, such as the 
placement of the Charlotte employees in positions at Monroe138 
 
and 
 
We have found that the Brown Company unlawfully deprived the 
Union of any opportunity to bargain respecting the relocation of 
the Charlotte plant employees at the Monroe plant.  We shall 
therefore order the Respondents to bargain with the Union for the 
purpose of reaching an agreement as to the method, terms, and 
conditions by which the employees employed in the following 
unit, on or after July 3, 1952, may, if they desire, obtain 
employment at the Monroe plant.139 
 
Thus, the majority of the Board in Fibreboard-I was correct that Brown Truck 
had held that the employer had a duty to engage in effects bargaining, not 
decision bargaining.140  The majority in Fibreboard-I argued that Shamrock 
Dairy’s reliance on Brown Truck as a precedent meant that the issue in the 
two cases was the same, that is, that Shamrock’s violation, like Brown’s, lay 
in Shamrock’s refusal to bargain over the effect of contracting out on its 
drivers and not in its refusal to bargain over the decision to convert them into 
independent contractors.  The majority’s argument, then, was that the 
General Counsel was distorting Shamrock Dairy: whereas the Board had 
meant the holding to apply only to effects bargaining (the Board’s intention 
being proved by the citation to Brown Truck), the General Counsel was trying 
to raise the level of abstraction of the holding to apply to decision bargaining 
as well. 
                                                
138. Brown Truck and Trailer Mfg. Co., Inc., 106 NLRB at 1000 (footnote omitted). 
139. Id. at 1003. 
140. Id. at 1000, 1003, 1004. 
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The majority was mistaken.  It was true that Brown Truck had held only 
that the employer had failed to engage in effects bargaining.  It was false, 
however, that the Labor Board had intended Shamrock Dairy to apply only 
to effects bargaining.  In characterizing Shamrock Dairy in this way, the 
majority ignored the passage from the case which stated unequivocally that 
the duty to bargain “includes the obligation to notify the collective-
bargaining representative and to give such representative a chance to 
negotiate with respect to a contemplated change concerning the tenure of the 
employees and their conditions of employment.”141  The majority also 
ignored an earlier passage in the opinion which stated that Chairman Leedom 
found that Shamrock had “violated section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act in that 
it failed to bargain with the Union as to whether the independent contractor 
system of distribution should be adopted.”142  And, perhaps most telling of 
all, the majority ignored the Board’s order in the case: the Board ordered 
Shamrock to bargain with the Teamsters “with respect to adoption or 
continuance of a system of product distribution known as the independent 
distributorship plan insofar as it affects the tenure of its employees.”143  Thus, 
the General Counsel and Member Fanning were justified in relying on 
Shamrock Dairy as a precedent that the Labor Act requires decision 
bargaining. 
Nonetheless, the majority in Fibreboard-I was not far from the truth. 
The majority simply chose the wrong target.  The General Counsel and 
Member Fanning in Fibreboard-I had not committed an abstraction shift in 
their use of Shamrock Dairy; rather, the Labor Board in Shamrock Dairy had 
committed an abstraction shift in its use of Brown Truck. 
The Labor Board in Shamrock Dairy shifted the level of abstraction of 
an authority without providing a justification.  By means of an equivocation, 
the Board interpreted Brown Truck to hold that the Labor Act requires 
decision bargaining (a rule that operates on a high level of abstraction) 
whereas Brown Truck held only that the Act requires effects bargaining (a 
rule that operates on a lower level of abstraction).  The equivocation occurred 
in the words which the Board used in Shamrock Dairy to characterize the 
holding of Brown Truck: 
 
. . . Respondent failed to perform its duty to bargain collectively. 
This duty includes the obligation to notify the collective-
bargaining representative and to give such representative a chance 
to negotiate with respect to a contemplated change concerning the 
tenure of the employees and their conditions of employment. . . . 
                                                
141. Shamrock Dairy, 124 NLRB at 498. The passage is quoted more fully supra at n. 111 (beginning, 
“The Respondent [Shamrock] adopted . . .”). 
142. Id. at 496. 
143. Id. at 503. 
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Here, as in Brown Truck, the employer did not give the Union an 
opportunity to bargain with respect to the contemplated change as 
it affected the tenure of the employees. The Union was entitled to 
such an opportunity. . . .144 
 
Neither this passage nor anything like it appeared in Brown Truck.145  In 
particular, the phrase “tenure of the employees” appeared only in Shamrock 
Dairy’s characterization of Brown Truck.146  Our point is not that the 
characterization was inaccurate, but that it was equivocal.  The 
characterization was accurate because the phrase “the tenure of the 
employees” did capture the effects bargaining that was required of the Brown 
Company: effects bargaining would affect the tenure of the employees by 
addressing whether the affected employees would be transferred, given recall 
rights, and so forth.  The characterization was equivocal because the phrase 
also captured the decision bargaining that was required of Shamrock Dairy: 
decision bargaining would affect the tenure of the employees by addressing 
whether the employer would contract out the employees’ work and eliminate 
their jobs.  Thus, the term which the Board used in Shamrock Dairy to 
characterize Brown Truck had two meanings.  This equivocation allowed the 
Board in Shamrock Dairy to interpret Brown Truck to hold bargaining was 
required whenever “the tenure of the employees” was affected, whether the 
bargaining would pertain to a decision or to the effects of a decision. 
We stated above that the majority dealt with Shamrock Dairy in two 
ways.  The first way was to argue (mistakenly, as we have just demonstrated) 
that the case required only effects bargaining.  The second way was to 
distinguish the case.  Member Fanning’s dissent having also relied on Timken 
Roller Bearing and Railroad Telegraphers, the majority of the Board in 
Fibreboard-I distinguished those cases as well.  As we discuss the majority’s 
distinctions, an empirical and a related normative principle of levels of 
abstraction come to the fore: 
 
Principle 2 
A case can be distinguished from an authority by identifying 
an additional legally significant fact in either of them, 
thereby changing the level of abstraction at which the case 
or the authority is understood. 
 
 
 
                                                
144. Id. at 498 (italics added). 
145. The entire discussion of the refusal-to-bargain issue in Brown Truck is quoted in the text supra at 
nn. 138-39 (beginning, “the good-faith discharge . . .” ). 
146. Shamrock Dairy, 124 NLRB at 498. 
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Principle 8 
When a case is distinguished from an authority by 
identifying an additional legally significant fact in one of 
them, the reason that the additional fact is significant should 
be explained. 
 
Any given case comprises many facts.  Most are immaterial; it is usually 
insignificant who the plaintiff’s relatives are or what color the defendant’s 
hair is.  The facts that are significant—the facts that can affect the outcome 
of the case—are called the “material facts” or, as we prefer, the “legally 
significant facts.”  To say the same thing, the facts of a claim (the prima facie 
case) and the facts of an affirmative defense are the legally significant facts. 
Because the following principles are the same for both claims and affirmative 
defenses, we need refer only to claims. 
Either party to a case may seek to raise or lower the level of abstraction 
of the case at bar or of an authority by adding or subtracting a legally 
significant fact.  Without exploring all the possibilities, we offer two common 
examples in abstract form.  Suppose the plaintiff in case 1 proves facts A, B, 
C, and the court grants relief.  The plaintiff in case 2 proves facts A, B, and 
C and, based on the precedent of case 1, argues that she should win case 2. 
The defendant, however, proves fact D, argues that D is legally significant 
and, therefore, case 1 does not control case 2.  In conventional parlance, the 
defendant seeks to distinguish case 2 from case 1 on the basis of fact D.  If 
successful, our defendant lowers the level of abstraction of case 2.  It 
comprises more legally significant facts than case 1 did.  Cases 1 and 2 are 
no longer analogous, and the additional fact reduces the numbers of persons 
and transactions to which case 2 will apply as a precedent. 
Now suppose the plaintiff in case 3 proves facts E, F, G, and H and 
wins the case.  The plaintiff in case 4 proves facts E, F, and G and invokes 
case 3 as a precedent.  The defendant contends that the absence of fact H 
distinguishes case 3 and nullifies its force as a precedent in the case at bar. 
The plaintiff argues that fact H is not legally significant, that is, that case 3 
would have been decided the same way without fact H.  If successful, the 
plaintiff raises the level of abstraction of case 3 because, with fewer legally 
significant facts, it applies to more persons and transactions (including his 
case). 
By citing Shamrock Dairy, Timken Roller Bearing, and Railroad 
Telegraphers as precedents, Member Fanning implied that the legally 
significant facts of these precedents and of Fibreboard were the same, 
namely, a union represented a bargaining unit of employees and the employer 
contracted out their work without bargaining with the union.  At this level of 
abstraction, the cases were analogous.  The majority of the Labor Board in 
Fibreboard-I, however, sought to show that these authorities and Fibreboard 
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operated on different levels of abstraction and were distinguishable.  The 
majority wrote: 
 
We do not agree with our dissenting colleague that the Timken, 
Shamrock, and Railroad Telegraphers cases compel a contrary 
conclusion.  In each of those cases, the union continued and would 
continue to be the representative of employees in the preexisting 
unit, and the decisions which the employers might make, in 
Timken and Shamrock with respect to subcontracting and in 
Railroad Telegraphers with respect to abolition of positions, had 
or might have an impact on the conditions of employment of 
employees remaining in the unit.  For that reason the employees’ 
representative was entitled to bargain with respect to such 
decisions.  Here, however . . . no employees remained in the unit 
to be represented by the Union, and thus there necessarily could be 
no impact on the employment conditions of employees remaining 
in the unit.  Those cases, therefore, do not support the proposition 
which our colleague urges that a union which will not represent 
any of the employer’s employees is entitled to compel the 
employer to bargain about matters which will have an impact only 
when it ceases to be a representative.147 
 
The majority distinguished all three of Member Fanning’s precedents in the 
same way—by identifying an additional legally significant fact in them that 
justified treating them differently from Fibreboard.  The additional fact was 
that some employees in each of the bargaining units of the precedents had 
not been displaced, whereas in Fibreboard all of the employees in the 
bargaining unit had been displaced.148 
An advocate who seeks to distinguish a precedent by adding or 
subtracting a fact must explain why that fact is or is not legally significant. 
Therefore, the majority needed to explain the significance of the fact that 
some employees in the bargaining units in the precedents had not been 
displaced.  To this end, the majority argued that the contracting out in the 
precedents “had or might have an impact on the conditions of employment 
of employees remaining in the unit” and, because the union continued to 
represent the remaining employees, the union had the right to bargain “with 
respect to such decisions.” In contrast, no one remained in the bargaining unit 
after Fibreboard contracted out the maintenance work to Fluor, and thus the 
                                                
147. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 130 NLRB 1558, 1561 (1961) (footnotes omitted). 
148. The contracting out in Timken Roller Bearing would bring non-union employees into the plant, but 
the Steelworkers continued to represent employees who were already employed there.  All the 
drivers in Shamrock Dairy lost their jobs (became independent contractors), but the bargaining unit 
included other jobs and the Teamsters continued to represent the employees in those jobs.  The 
union in Railroad Telegraphers would have continued to represent the employees in the stations 
which the railroad did not close. 
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union represented no one whose conditions of employment were affected by 
the decision.149 
By adding a legally significant fact to the precedents, the majority 
moved the holdings of these cases to a lower level of abstraction than the 
level of Fibreboard-I.  They no longer served as precedents because a case 
at a lower level of abstraction may not serve as precedent for a case at a 
higher level. This move illustrates Principle 2: a case can be distinguished 
from an authority by identifying an additional legally significant fact in either 
of them. By providing an explanation of why the additional fact mattered, the 
majority honored Principle 8.150 
 
D. Town & Country 
 
After deciding (but before reconsidering) Fibreboard-I, the Labor 
Board heard Town & Country Manufacturing Company,151 a case that raised 
the same issue as Fibreboard.  In Town & Country the company 
manufactured mobile home trailers that needed to be hauled to customers 
from its plant in Lawton, Oklahoma.152  The mode of hauling had varied over 
time.153  Town & Country used an independent contractor until 1956.154  Then 
the company purchased its own trucks and hired drivers.155  It thereby 
stumbled into the domain of the Interstate Commerce Act, and the Interstate 
Commerce Commission soon determined that Town & Country had fallen 
out of compliance with the Commission’s regulations.156  The company tried 
to escape the clutches of the Commission by changing its mode of hauling 
                                                
149. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp , 130 NLRB at 1565. 
150. Of course, a distinction may be proper in form but unsound in substance.  The factual predicate of 
the majority’s distinction was that the union in each of the precedents continued to represent 
employees who remained in the shop after the contracting out.  This fact would have provided full 
justification for effects bargaining, as the contracting out was likely to affect the remaining 
employees; but the fact provided no justification for decision bargaining over the contracting out. 
The majority’s reasoning was tantamount to the proposition that the right to effects bargaining 
entailed the right to decision bargaining, obliterating the distinction between effects and decision 
bargaining. 
  The distinction was part and parcel of the earlier argument that the employer had no duty to 
bargain because no employees were left in the bargaining unit.  The argument was erroneous 
because it determined whether the duty to bargain arose according to the facts after the decision to 
contract out had been made, whereas  the judgment should have been made according to the facts 
before the decision was made.  
  In the printed record of the subsequent progress of the case, no member of the Board, no judge, 
and no advocate in the Supreme Court mentioned this distinction. 
151. Town & Country Mfg Co., 136 NLRB 1022 (1962), enforced, 316 F.2d 846 (5th Cir. 1963). 
152. Id. at 1036. 
153. Id. at 1036–37. 
154. Id. 
155. Id. 
156. Id. at 1023. 
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once again: it sold its trucks to the drivers.157  But federal regulations required 
the company to retain title to the trucks, and the Commission again found the 
company out of compliance.158  The company repurchased the trucks and 
rehired the drivers.159  Understandably, the drivers turned to a union, in 
particular, Local 886 of the General Drivers, Chauffeurs and Helpers Union, 
which was certified as bargaining agent on October 1, 1957.  Collective 
bargaining began and ended on October 19th.  The Drivers Union made an 
offer.160  Town & Country requested a recess to prepare a counteroffer.161 
Two weeks later, without notifying the union, the company discontinued its 
trucking operation, discharged the drivers, and engaged a common carrier to 
haul the trailers.162  The union asked to bargain over the decision, but the 
company refused.163 
The Drivers Union brought charges against Town & Country.  Like the 
Steelworkers in Fibreboard, the Drivers Union charged that the company had 
been motivated by anti-union animus because the company had terminated 
the hauling operation and discharged the drivers in order to retaliate against 
the drivers for unionizing.  Unlawful motivation would have tainted both the 
discharges, violating section 8(a)(3), and the termination of hauling, violating 
sections 8(a)(3) and 8(a)(5).  Also like the Steelworkers in Fibreboard, the 
Drivers Union charged that the decision to contract out the hauling of trailers 
was unilateral action in violation of section 8(a)(5), even if the motive for the 
change had been lawful, because Town & Country had refused to bargain 
with the union over the decision.  It is unclear whether the Drivers Union 
intended the second charge to raise Issue B or Issues B and C. 
The General Counsel found the charges meritorious and issued a 
complaint.  Town & Country answered the complaint; the case was not 
settled, and it went to trial in Lawton before Trial Examiner Paul Bisgyer.164 
He treated the issue raised by the first charge as arising at a low level of 
abstraction.  He was correct because adjudicative facts determined whether 
Town & Country had contracted out the hauling and discharged its drivers 
because of anti-union animus or because of troubles with the Interstate 
Commerce Commission, and the resolution of this issue applied only to this 
company, these drivers, and this transaction.  He ruled for the company on 
                                                
157. Id. 
158. Id. 
159. Id. 
160. Id. at 1024. 
161. Id. 
162. Id. 
163. The facts are drawn from the opinion of the Labor Board in Town & Country Mfg. Co., 136 NLRB 
1022 (1962), and from the intermediate report of the trial examiner in that case, id. at 1036 
(intermediate report). 
164. Id. at 1022. 
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this charge, finding that the company had terminated the hauling operation 
because of problems with the government.165 
The second charge raised the issue of contracting out.  Trial Examiner 
Bisgyer did not rule explicitly on whether the Labor Act requires decision 
bargaining, but in the following passage from his intermediate report he 
treated decision bargaining as a term or condition of employment, that is, a 
mandatory subject of bargaining. 
 
     It is settled law that an employer’s obligation to bargain in good 
faith encompasses the duty to afford his employees’ bargaining 
agent an opportunity to negotiate about any contemplated change 
in any term or condition of employment.  Plainly, the Respondent 
has not done so here; instead, under the guise of management 
prerogative, it presented the Union with a fait accompli, leaving 
nothing over which the Union could bargain.  Such action was a 
clear rejection of the collective-bargaining principle and 
constituted conduct in derogation of the Union’s status as the 
majority representative of the Respondent’s truck drivers.166 
 
Trial Examiner Bisgyer assumed Rule B(2).  The facts that constituted 
the rule were the same as the facts that mattered to the trial examiner, namely, 
an employer had decided to contract out bargaining unit work without 
affording the union an opportunity to bargain about the decision.  We know 
that he did not intend to resolve Issues C, D, or E because he did not state or 
imply that decision bargaining was required in some cases but not necessarily 
in others; did not state a standard for determining whether decision 
bargaining was required; did not suggest that Town & Country would have 
had a duty to bargain if the facts of the case had been different; and did not 
compare the case at bar to precedents. 
The General Counsel filed with the Labor Board an exception to the 
finding that Town & Country had been lawfully motivated by trouble with 
the Interstate Commerce Commission.  The Board heard the case en banc.167 
The majority (Chairone McCulloch and Members Fanning and Gerald A. 
Brown) found merit in the exception because Town & Country had acted out 
of anti-union animus: “we are convinced that the Respondent seized upon a 
pretext when it assigned its I.C.C. difficulties as the reason for subcontracting 
                                                
165. Id. at 1041–42 (intermediate report). 
166. Id. at 1040 (intermediate report) (italics in the original) (footnote omitted) (minor typographical 
errors corrected). 
167. The official report does not list the members of the Board who heard the case.  The report by the 
Bureau of National Affairs states that Chairone McCulloch and Members Rodgers, Leedom, 
Fanning, and Brown heard the case.  49 L.R.R.M. 1918, 1918 (1962).  The BNA report is confirmed 
by the dissent of Members Leedom and Rogers, who argued that contracting out is not a mandatory 
subject of bargaining, Town & Country Mfg. Co., 136 NLRB at 1022 n. 1, and it follows that the 
majority on this issue must have been composed of the other members of the Board. 
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and discharging its drivers, and that its true motive for doing so was because 
the men had joined and selected the Union as their bargaining 
representative.”168  The Board’s finding of fact (Town & Country’s motive) 
occurred at a low level of abstraction, which was appropriate for an issue 
turning on a party’s state of mind. 
Town & Country also filed an exception with the Labor Board. The 
company excepted to the finding that it had violated the duty to bargain by 
refusing to negotiate over the decision to discontinue the hauling.169  The 
company might have been ambivalent about its chance of success.  The 
reason for optimism was that Trial Examiner Bisgyer’s ruling was 
inconsistent with the Board’s holding in Fibreboard-I.170  The reason for 
pessimism was that the Board that had issued Fibreboard-I had been 
dominated by Republicans, who tend to favor the interests of employers, 
whereas the majority of the Board that would hear Town & Country would 
be Democrats, who tend to favor the interests of unions.171  Pessimism would 
have been more prescient: the Board overruled Fibreboard-I on April 13, 
1962.172 
The opinion of the majority in Town & Country adopted the doctrinal 
analysis of Member Fanning’s dissent in Fibreboard-I: 
 
In our opinion the precedents cited and discussed by the majority 
and minority decisions in [Fibreboard-I] support the conclusion 
that the elimination of unit jobs, albeit for economic reasons, is a 
matter within the statutory phrase “other terms and conditions of 
employment” and is a mandatory subject of collective bargaining 
within the meaning of section 8(a)(5) of the Act.173 
 
The Labor Board addressed Issue B and provided the same assurance 
and prediction as had Member Fanning in Fibreboard-I; unlike him, 
however, the Board in Town & Country was univocal as to the level of 
abstraction: 
 
Moreover, the duty to bargain about a decision to subcontract work 
does not impose an undue or unfair burden upon the employer 
involved.  This obligation to bargain in nowise restrains an 
                                                
168. Town & Country Mfg. Co., 136 NLRB at 1026. 
169. Id. at 1022 n. 1. 
170. Trial Examiner Bisgyer had not disregarded a precedent of the Board.  He had issued his 
intermediate report on May 3, 1960, Town & Country Mfg. Co., 136 NLRB at 1022 (1962), which 
was ten months before the Board announced its decision in Fibreboard-I.  See Fibreboard Paper 
Prods. Corp., 130 NLRB 1558, 1558 (1961). 
171. It is no accident that the list on the Board’s web site of its past and present members identifies the 
political party in control of the Board.  See http://www.nlrb.gov/members-nlrb-1935. 
172. Town & Country Mfg. Co., 136 NLRB at 1028. 
173. Id. at 1027. 
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employer from formulating or effectuating an economic decision 
to terminate a phase of his business operations.  Nor does it 
obligate him to yield to a union’s demand that a subcontract not be 
let, or that it be let on terms inconsistent with management’s 
business judgment.  Experience has shown, however, that candid 
discussion of mutual problems by labor and management 
frequently results in their resolution with attendant benefit to both 
sides.  Business operations may profitably continue and jobs may 
be preserved.  Such prior discussion with a duly designated 
bargaining representative is all that the Act contemplates. . . .174 
 
In this passage, the Board discussed decision bargaining at a high level 
of abstraction, not in any particular context.  Also, the terms “an employer,” 
“a union,” “labor,” “management” and “a duly designated bargaining 
representative” made the assurance and prediction applicable to all 
employers, not merely the employer in the case at bar.  Thus, the Board 
resolved Issue B with Rule B(2). 
A statement of the relief that the Labor Board ordered in Town & 
Country will be helpful in understanding the concurring and dissenting 
opinions, the decision of the Court of Appeals in the case, and the subsequent 
progress of the Fibreboard case, all of which we discuss below.  First, the 
Board ordered Town & Country to reestablish its hauling department, make 
the drivers whole for their lost pay, and offer them reinstatement to their 
jobs.175  Second, the Board ordered the company to bargain with the union 
upon request and to refrain from changing any conditions of employment 
without consulting the union.176  The Board’s opinion having made clear that 
closing the hauling department was a condition of employment, the order 
effectively required the company to engage in decision bargaining before 
closing the department.  Each of the Board’s findings—that the company had 
violated section 8(a)(3) by closing its hauling operation and engaging a 
common carrier out of anti-union animus, and that the company had violated 
section 8(a)(5) by refusing to engage in decision bargaining—was a 
sufficient predicate for both of these orders. 
Member Rogers dissented on both issues before the Labor Board.  He 
found that Town & Country was not guilty of discrimination because he 
believed the company had closed the hauling operation for business reasons. 
Also, he adhered to his view in Fibreboard-I that an employer has no duty to 
engage in decision bargaining.177 
Member Leedom concurred and dissented.  He concurred in the result 
of the case because he agreed that Town & Country had closed the hauling 
                                                
174. Id. 
175. Id. at 1032. 
176. Id. at 1031–32. 
177. Id. at 1033–34 (Member Rogers, dissenting). 
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operation out of anti-union animus; thus he agreed that the Labor Board’s 
orders, including the order to engage in decision bargaining, were justified. 
This ruling having disposed of the case, he thought the Board had no need to 
address the issue of whether the company would have had a duty to engage 
in decision bargaining if it had terminated the hauling for legitimate reasons. 
However, because the majority had addressed this issue, he added that he 
dissented from the overruling of Fibreboard-I.178 
Principle 14, which is discussed below,179 holds that an issue or a case 
should be decided at the lowest reasonable level of abstraction.  The issue of 
whether Town & Country had acted out of anti-union animus operated at a 
low level of abstraction because it affected only the parties to the case and 
only one transaction.  The issue of whether contracting out is a mandatory 
subject of bargaining operated at a high level of abstraction because it 
affected many employers and unions and every decision to contract out 
bargaining unit work.  Member Leedom’s preference to decide Town & 
Country on the basis of the former issue honored Principle 14. 
Town & Country petitioned the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 
to set aside the Labor Board’s orders, and the General Counsel cross-
petitioned to enforce the orders.180  As we have noted, the order that Town & 
Country engage in decision bargaining stood on two bases: the Board’s ruling 
that the Labor Act requires decision bargaining, and the Board’s finding that 
the company had closed the hauling operation out of anti-union animus. It 
appears from the opinion of the Court of Appeals, written by Judge Joseph 
Chappell Hutcheson and joined by Judges Walter Pettus Gewin and Richard 
Taylor Rives, that the company contested the legitimacy of the former basis. 
Judge Hutcheson wrote that Town & Country “insists that the dissenting 
member of the Board [Member Rogers] was right in his view that the order 
was beyond the power of the Board to make. . . .”181  We cannot determine 
from the opinion whether the General Counsel argued for the former basis, 
but we know that he defended the order on the latter basis: “The Board, 
earnestly insisting: that, whatever might be said with respect to [the 
company’s] contention that this part of the order intruded upon its 
unquestioned right of management . . . urges upon us that the evidence is so 
overwhelming that [the company’s] action was motivated by anti-union 
sentiment and a desire to rid itself of the union, that it is quite clear in the 
                                                
178. Id. at 1028 n. 10.  Member Leedom’s position makes clear that the Board’s order had two 
independent bases.  He concurred in the order on the basis of the finding of anti-union animus, a 
violation of § 8(a)(3), even though he would have dissented from the order were it grounded only 
on a duty under § 8(a)(5) to engage in decision bargaining. 
179. See infra text following n. 343 (beginning, “Principle 14”). 
180. Town & Country Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 316 F.2d 846, 846–47 (5th Cir. 1963). 
181. Id. at 847. 
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state of the record that the Board’s order, is unimpeachable. . . .”182  The court 
enforced the order upon the latter basis: 
 
we think it is clear that the evidence permits no other reasonable 
conclusion than that the determination to subcontract its work and 
to discharge its drivers from employment was the result in part at 
least of the company’s determination to rid itself of the union, and 
that the order of the Board should, therefore, be enforced 
throughout.183 
 
By holding that the Town & Country’s anti-union animus justified the 
order, the court, as Member Leedom would have done, disposed of the case 
at a low level of abstraction, honoring Principle 14. 
  
E. Fibreboard-II 
 
Let us recur to Fibreboard.  The Labor Board issued its decision in 
Fibreboard-I on March 27, 1961.184  Shortly thereafter, the Steelworkers 
petitioned the Board to reconsider the decision. Surely they were counting on 
the recently inaugurated President, John Fitzgerald Kennedy, who was a 
Democrat, to appoint new members to the Board who would be more 
sympathetic to organized labor.  The General Counsel also filed a motion for 
reconsideration and clarification of the decision.  Fibreboard replied to the 
petition and the motion by June 15, 1961: whereupon the Board held the case 
in abeyance for fifteen months, during which the political balance of the 
Board did indeed shift from Republican to Democratic and the Board decided 
Town & Country.  When it returned to Fibreboard-I, the Board denied the 
General Counsel’s motion, granted the Steelworkers’ petition, and delegated 
the case to a panel composed of Chairone McCulloch and Members Fanning 
and Rodgers.185  The first two of these men were Democrats, the third, a 
Republican.  The outcome was predictable. 
Our consideration of the Labor Board’s decision in Fibreboard-II 
provides an opportunity to state and apply a hortatory principle of levels of 
abstraction: 
 
Principle 10 
Legislative facts must be proved by evidence in the record. 
 
                                                
182. Id. 
183. Id. 
184. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 130 NLRB 1558, 1558 (1961). 
185. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 138 NLRB 550, 550 (1962). 
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We subscribe to the elementary tenet that a court should be constrained 
by the record in the case.  Thus, a court should resolve an issue only if the 
argument supporting the resolution is based on facts that have been found by 
the trier of fact or are subject to judicial notice.186  We believe that responsible 
courts rarely err in this regard with respect to issues at a low level of 
abstraction.  The pertinent facts are the adjudicative facts that are necessary 
for application of the relevant rule of law.  If a pertinent adjudicative fact is 
not proved, a prima facie case or affirmative defense fails according to the 
burden of proof.  But tribunals do err with respect to issues at high levels of 
abstraction.  The pertinent facts are the legislative facts that justify the rule 
that resolves the issue.  Except in the rare event that a legislative fact is 
subject to judicial notice, a tribunal should base a rule of law only on 
legislative facts that are proved by credible evidence that appears in the 
record and was open to the adversarial process.  (Also permissible are 
legislative facts found by the legislature or properly found in a previous case.) 
Otherwise, the tribunal will be legislating.  A judge’s notions of legislative 
facts are not a proper basis for a rule of law.  Unconstrained by evidence and 
argument, a judge is too likely to be influenced by one’s social, economic, or 
political beliefs, or to make a mistake.  If a court is urged to adopt, or sua 
sponte contemplates adopting, a rule of law that would rest on a legislative 
fact which is not proved in the record, the court should forgo adopting either 
the rule or its opposite.  If the need for a decision on the issue is pressing, a 
trial court should instruct the parties to present evidence on the appropriate 
legislative fact and an appellate court should remand the case for this 
purpose.187  Similarly, a tribunal should accept as true a legislature’s findings 
                                                
186. We include within the scope of judicial notice the results of using the traditional tools of statutory 
construction, such as the meaning of the text, the purpose of the act, and its legislative history.  We 
exclude predictions that a given interpretation will serve or disserve the purpose of the act; such 
predictions are legislative facts over which reasonable persons can differ and, therefore, such facts 
must be proved. 
187. This article is not the occasion to elaborate procedural rules regarding the finding of legislative facts 
by tribunals, but we can offer some thoughts with which a discussion might begin.  The first pertains 
to witnesses to legislative facts.  We do not think it necessary that every author upon whose research 
a party or a tribunal relies must be called as a witness.  We do think, however, that a party must be 
notified by another party  or by the tribunal that a study may be used as the basis for the finding of 
a legislative fact in sufficient time that the former party has an opportunity to do appropriate 
research and call as a witness the author of the study or other experts. 
      Our second thought pertains to the burden of proving legislative facts.  When an adjudicative 
fact is material to the resolution of a dispute between the parties to a case, a standard for proving 
that fact exists.  The party who carries the burden of proving such a fact must establish it by 
preponderance of the evidence, clear and convincing evidence, or evidence beyond reasonable 
doubt.  How odd it is that when a legislative fact is material to a rule of law, which will govern not 
merely the parties to the case at bar, but many other persons and perhaps other transactions, no 
standard for proving such a fact exists.  We wish to offer two preliminary comments on this 
anomaly. 
      The first comment is elaborated in the text: legislative facts should be proved with evidence in 
the record, whether placed there by a party or by the tribunal.  Our second comment is that proof 
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of legislative facts as long as they are supported by substantial evidence in 
the records of the legislature. 
We hold the same views regarding specialized agencies like the Labor 
Board.188  Although one of the criteria for appointment to such an agency is 
                                                
by preponderance of the evidence may be a sufficient basis for a tribunal to resolve a dispute 
between two parties, but does not seem to be a sufficient basis for a tribunal to create a rule of law 
that applies to all persons in the jurisdiction.  The resources which a legislature can commit to 
finding a legislative fact are substantial.  The ability of competing interests to present their evidence 
and points of view provides a meaningful check on findings of legislative facts by a legislature. 
And a legislature is composed of many persons of diverse experience who can evaluate facts from 
different perspectives.  The same is largely true of an administrative agency in rule making mode. 
      In contrast, the resources which a court, or an administrative agency in adjudicative mode, may 
commit to finding a legislative fact are insubstantial.  The ability of the parties to a case to gather 
and present evidence on legislative facts is limited by the finances of the parties (and perhaps their 
allies) and by the resourcefulness of a few lawyers; it is no match for the ability of lobbyists to 
present evidence to a legislature or administrative agency.  And an appellate court or an agency 
such as the Labor Board comprises only a handful of persons, usually of similar backgrounds.  A 
legislature finds a legislative fact based on volumes of testimony, documents, and scholarship.  All 
too often, a tribunal finds a legislative fact based on the members’ experience alone or on one or 
two sources.  For an example, see infra the text following n. 192 (beginning, “The second variety 
was industrial experience”).  These facts suggest that a tribunal’s finding of a legislative fact should 
meet the standard of clear and convincing evidence in the record. 
188. The Supreme Court adopted a different approach in Republic Aviation v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 
(1945).  The employer prohibited workers from soliciting on company property at all times, 
including their break times, and discharged a worker for distributing union applications on company 
property during his lunch break.  The Board held the rule interfered with the worker’s right to 
engage in concerted activity.  The company objected on the ground that no evidence showed that 
the no-solicitation rule interfered with or discouraged union organization in the employer’s plant. 
The Court rejected this argument.  Although an order of the Board must  
be based upon evidence which is placed before the Board by witnesses who are 
subject to cross-examination by opposing parties . . . [s]uch a requirement does not 
go beyond the necessity for the production of evidential facts . . . and compel 
evidence as to the results which may flow from such facts.  An administrative 
agency . . . may infer within the limits of the inquiry from the proven facts such 
conclusions as reasonably may be based upon the facts proven.” 
 Id. at 800 (citations omitted).  The Labor Board’s argument that the no-solicitation rule interfered with 
concerted activity, which the Court quoted in n. 10, id. at 803, appeared in Peyton Packing Co., 49 NLRB 
828, 844 (1943): 
The Act, of course, does not prevent an employer from making and enforcing 
reasonable rules covering the conduct of employees on company time.  Working 
time is for work.  It is therefore within the province of an employer to promulgate 
and enforce a rule prohibiting union solicitation during working hours.  Such a rule 
must be presumed to be valid . . . . It is no less true that time outside working hours, 
whether before or after work, or during luncheon or rest periods, is an employee’s 
time to use as he wishes without unreasonable restraint, although the employee is 
on company property.  Such a rule must be presumed to be an unreasonable 
impediment to self-organization . . . . 
This argument can be analyzed into a quasi syllogism: 
 MAJOR PREMISE 
      No-solicitation rules that are applied to conduct occurring outside of working hours interfere 
               with concerted activity. 
 MINOR PREMISE 
      Republic Aviation applied a no-solicitation rule to conduct that occurred outside of working 
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a person’s expertise in the field, the use of that expertise must be carefully 
circumscribed.  A member should not find a legislative fact based solely on 
one’s expertise, for a member is at least as likely as a judge to be influenced 
by one’s beliefs; and in the polarized state of today’s politics, partisanship is 
not a small risk.  The proper role of expertise lies in contributing to an 
informed judgment regarding conflicting evidence pertaining to adjudicative 
and legislative facts.  Therefore, like a court, a specialized agency should 
promulgate a rule of law at a high level of abstraction only if the rule is 
grounded on appropriate legislative facts that have been proved in the 
adversarial process.189 
                                                
               hours. 
 CONCLUSION 
     Republic Aviation’s no-solicitation rule interfered with workers’ concerted activity. 
The Court held that the major premise, which was a legislative fact, did not need to be proved by evidence 
in the record because “[o]ne of the purposes which lead to the creation of . . . [agencies such as the Labor 
Board] is to have decisions based upon evidential facts under the particular statue made by experienced 
officials with an adequate appreciation of the complexities of the subject which is entrusted to their 
administration.” Id. at 800. 
189. Professor Davis held a different view.  He mentioned with approval the famous “Brandeis brief,” 
which contained legislative facts upon which the Supreme Court relied in Muller v. Oregon, 208 
U.S. 412 (1908), and added: 
After Brandeis became a justice [of the Supreme Court] he continued his extensive 
factual studies and wrote many opinions saturated with facts brought to light 
through his own researches.  In his celebrated opinion in Jay Burns Baking Co. v. 
Bryan [264 U.S. 504 (1924)] he went outside the record to acquaint himself with 
“the art of bread-making and the usages of the trade; with the devices by which 
buyers of bread are imposed upon and honest bakers or dealers are subjected by 
their dishonest fellows to unfair competition; with the problems which have 
confronted public officials charged with the enforcement of the laws prohibiting 
short weights, and with their experience in administering those laws.” 
 KENNETH CULP DAVIS, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Administrative Process, 55 
HARV. L. REV. 364, 403–04 (1942) (footnote omitted).  Professor Davis’s view of the finding of 
legislative facts by administrative agencies was similar: “the agency must be free to go outside the 
record and beyond the limits of judicial notice in informing itself of facts which enter into its 
judgment in molding law and formulating policy. . . . Briefs and oral arguments are often (though 
not always) better vehicles for presentation of legislative facts than testimony and documents.” id. 
at 408–10 (footnoted omitted).  Professor Davis recognized that tribunals might err in their findings 
of legislative facts, but thought that errors could be corrected: “And when a court or administrative 
tribunal makes its own investigation, the safeguard usually lies in the petition for re-argument (new 
briefs and oral arguments) rather than in the petition for a rehearing (new evidence).” id. at 410, n. 
95. 
      Professor Davis had more confidence than we have in the neutrality of judges and members of 
administrative agencies.  Also, his recommendation that a tribunal entertain a petition for re-
argument does not take into account the reluctance of a tribunal to retreat from a decision that has 
already been announced (unless the membership has changed, a fact that reinforces our fear of 
partisanship). 
      We hasten to add that we do not disapprove of a Brandeis brief.  A brief may certainly contain 
legislative facts.  But we do disapprove of any legal document, be it a decision or a brief, that relies 
on legislative facts that are not tested by the adversarial process and found as fact in the record of 
the case.  
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 In Fibreboard-II, the Labor Board, as it had done in Fibreboard-I 
and in Town & Country, framed the issue at a high level of abstraction: 
 
     In its original Decision and Order, a majority of the Board 
concluded that the Respondent did not violate Section 8(a)(5) 
when it unilaterally subcontracted its maintenance work for 
economic reasons without first negotiating with the duly 
designated bargaining agent over its decision to do so. In their 
view, Respondent’s decision to subcontract was a management 
prerogative having no impact on the conditions of employment 
within the existing maintenance unit. . . . 
 
     In the recent Town & Country Manufacturing Company, Inc., 
the Board had occasion to reexamine this issue.  A majority of the 
Board in that case concluded that a management decision to 
subcontract work out of an existing unit, albeit for economic 
reasons, was a mandatory subject of bargaining.  To the extent that 
the majority opinion in Fibreboard[-I] held otherwise, that 
holding was overruled.  Accordingly, for the reasons and 
considerations expressed in Town & Country, and in the dissenting 
opinion in the original Fibreboard case, we find that Respondent’s 
failure to negotiate with the [Steelworkers] concerning its decision 
to subcontract its maintenance work constituted a violation of 
Section 8(a)(5) of the Act.190 
 
The opinion then gave two varieties of reasons for its conclusion. The 
first variety was precedent.  The Board cited its own decision in Town & 
Country191 and the Supreme Court’s in Railroad Telegraphers.192  The 
second variety was industrial experience, evidence of which the Board found 
in cases and articles: 
 
[I]n the Warrior & Gulf case14 . . . the Supreme Court held that a 
union complaint against an employer’s contracting out of work 
was subject to the contract grievance procedure, including 
arbitration . . . . The Court pointed out that “Contracting out work 
is the basis of many grievances; and that type of claim is grist in 
the mills of the arbitrators.”15 
 
. . . As the Supreme Court has noted, subcontracting or contracting 
out is a subject extensively dealt with in today’s collective 
bargaining.16 The present decision does not innovate; it merely 
                                                
190. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 138 NLRB 550, 550–51 (1962) (citation omitted). 
191. Id. at 551. 
192. Id. at 552–53.  The Board’s opinion also relied on Local 24, Int’l Brotherhood of Teamsters, 
Chauffeurs, Warehousemen, and Helpers of America v. Oliver, 358 U.S. 283 (1959), which we 
discuss below at n. 280 (beginning, “The issue in Oliver was . . .”) and n. 285 (beginning, “The 
Board also relied . . .”). 
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recognizes the facts of life created by the customs and practices of 
employers and unions.17 Contrary to our dissenting colleague, we 
are confident that those employers and unions who are bargaining 
in good faith will find it neither difficult nor inconsistent with 
sound business practices to include questions relating to 
subcontracting in their bargaining conferences. 
__________ 
     14 United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Company, 363 
U.S. 574 [1960]. 
     15 363 U.S. at 584. 
     16 See Lunden, “Subcontracting Clauses in Major Contracts,” 85 Monthly Labor 
Rev. 579-584, 715-723; note, “Arbitration of Subcontracting Disputes: 
Management Discretion vs. Job Security,” 37 New York University Law Rev. 523. 
     17 See International Union, United Automobile, Aircraft & Agricultural 
Implement Workers, Local 391 v. Webster Electric Co., 299 F.2d 195 (C.A. 7), 
where a court held that an employer violated its collective-bargaining contract by 
subcontracting janitorial work and laying off its janitorial employees even though 
the contract contained no prohibition against subcontracting.  The court implied 
such an agreement from the union shop clause in the contract [sic] is applicable to 
janitors.193 
 
The Board’s reasons in Fibreboard-II, like the holding of the case, applied 
to employers and unions generally and were cast at a high level of 
abstraction.  All signs indicate that the Board meant to adopt Rule B(2). 
To the extent that the Labor Board based its decision on its own 
precedent in Town & Country, the holding of Fibreboard-II was justified.  
To the extent that the Board based its decision on industrial experience, the 
holding was unjustified.  The Board asserted contracting out is “extensively 
dealt with in today’s collective bargaining.”  This assertion was a legislative 
fact, but the Board cited no evidence in the record to support this fact.  
Instead, the Board cited decisions of the Supreme Court and the Seventh 
Circuit Court of Appeals, a study in a journal, and a note in a law review.  Let 
us examine those citations. 
The case in the Supreme Court was Warrior & Gulf, in which a union 
had demanded arbitration of a grievance over the company’s contracting out 
of bargaining unit work.  The company refused to submit the grievance to 
arbitration on the ground that the grievance procedure in the labor contract 
excluded “matters which are strictly a function of management.”194  The 
Court took the union’s side based on two adjudicative facts: the exclusion 
applied only to matters over which the agreement gave the company 
unfettered control, and the contract did not give unfettered control over 
contracting out to the company.195  These facts were meaningful in light of a 
legislative fact: “[c]ontracting out work is the basis of many grievances; and 
                                                
193.   Id. at 554 (footnotes and citation omitted). 
194. United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 575 (1960). 
195. Id. at 584. 
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that type of claim is grist in the mills of the arbitrators.”196  Because 
bargaining over contracting out was so widespread, only strong evidence (i.e, 
adjudicative facts such as specific words in the agreement or other forceful 
proof of the parties’ intent) could demonstrate that the grievance procedure 
did not include contracting out. 
The important point for our purpose was the backing for the legislative 
fact on which the Court’s argument depended.  As proof that contracting out 
was the subject of many grievances, the Court cited Celanese Corporation of 
America, an arbitration decision in which the arbitrator, G. Allan Dash, had 
asserted that he had found sixty-four published arbitrators’ decisions dealing 
with contracting out.197  The Supreme Court was apprised of Arbitrator 
Dash’s assertion in the brief of the petitioner in Warrior & Gulf.198  However, 
Arbitrator Dash had not testified, and Celanese Corporation had not been 
introduced as evidence in the hearing before the District Court, nor had any 
other witness or attorney mentioned the decision.199  The opinion of the 
District Court had not referred to the decision,200 and neither had the opinions 
of the majority or the dissent in the Court of Appeals.201  In short, the 
evidence for a crucial legislative fact was not part of the record of the case 
and had not been tested in the crucible of the adversarial process.  For all the 
respect we have for the opinions of arbitrators, we believe that Arbitrator 
Dash’s assertion should have played no role in the reasoning of the Supreme 
Court in Warrior & Gulf; and for all the respect we have for the opinions of 
the Supreme Court, we believe the Court’s “finding” of legislative fact 
should have played no role in the reasoning of the Labor Board in 
Fibreboard-II. 
As further “proof” that contracting out was a widespread topic of 
collective bargaining, the Labor Board cited an article by Leon E. Lunden of 
the Division of Wages and Industrial Relations, Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
and a student note in a law review.  But, as far as we can determine, neither 
Mr. Lunden’s article nor the student’s note had been introduced as evidence 
or mentioned by a witness or an attorney in the hearing before the trial 
examiner.202  Certainly, the trial examiner’s opinion in Fibreboard had not 
mentioned the article or the note.  Even competent researchers at respected 
institutions can make mistakes.  Accordingly, we believe that the article and 
                                                
196. Id. (footnote omitted). 
197. Id. at 584, n. 8 (citing Celanese Corporation of America, 33 Lab. Arb. Rep. 925, 941 (1959)). 
198. Brief of for Petitioner at 58–9, Warrior & Gulf, 363 U.S. 574 (1960) (No. 443). 
199.   Transcript of Recording 31-101, Warrior & Gulf, 363 U.S. 574 (1960) (No. 443).  
200. United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 168 F. Supp. 702 (S.D. Ala. 
1968). 
201. United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 269 F.2d 633, 637 (5th Cir. 
1959). 
202. Transcript of Testimony Before the National Labor Relations Board in Transcript of Record at 63-
166, Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964). 
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the note should have played no role in the reasoning of the Board in 
Fibreboard-II.203 
Finally, the Labor Board asserted its holding “merely recognize[d] the 
facts of life created by the customs and practices of employers and unions,” 
and in support of this assertion cited the decision of the Court of Appeals for 
the Seventh Circuit in International Union, United Automobile, Aircraft & 
Agricultural Implement Workers, Local 391 v. Webster Electric Company.204 
In that case, the company unilaterally contracted out bargaining unit work. 
The union exhausted the grievance procedure in the labor contract, which did 
not provide for arbitration as the culmination of the procedure, and the union 
sued the company for breach of contract.205  The union argued that the case 
was controlled by Warrior & Gulf, which had held, according to the union, 
that an employer may not unilaterally contract out bargaining unit work 
absent an express provision in the contract.  The Court of Appeals disagreed. 
It reasoned, correctly, that Warrior & Gulf had held only that, where a labor 
contract provides for arbitration, the issue of whether contracting out is 
prohibited by the contract is a question for the arbitrator, not the court.206 
There being no arbitration clause in the case at bar, the court found it was not 
bound by Warrior & Gulf, and proceeded to interpret the contract.  The court 
held, questionably, that the union shop clause in the contract implied an intent 
to prohibit contracting out.207 
                                                
203. The import of Mr. Lunden’s study would have been questionable even if it could properly have 
established legislative facts.  First, the study excluded the railroad and airline industries. Leon 
Lunden, Subcontracting Clauses in Major Contracts, MONTHLY LABOR REVIEW, 581 (June 1961). 
Second, the study examined only collective bargaining agreements that covered 1,000 or more 
workers, thus excluding approximately half of organized workers outside of railroads and airlines. 
Id.  Third, the study found that “fewer than one out of four” of the agreements covered by the study 
“made any reference to subcontracting.”  Id. at 579.  Thus, the Board had no information about two 
major industries, had no information about half of the remaining workers in the labor force, and 
(taking Mr. Lunden’s study to be reliable) knew only that (½ of all organized workers x ¼ of those 
workers =) one-eighth of non-railroad, non-airline workers were covered by collective agreements 
that addressed contracting out.  Was this a sufficient number to prove that bargaining over 
contracting out was widespread and successful?  The prevalence of bargaining over contracting out 
might better be determined, for example, by considering, not the number of workers whose 
agreements had a clause on contracting out, but the number of agreements that had such clauses.  It 
is certain that the number of agreements covering fewer than 1,000 workers each exceeded 1,671, 
and it seems likely that few of those agreements, many of which covered small numbers of workers, 
addressed contracting out.  Was not the prevalence of bargaining over contracting out a question of 
fact that should have been resolved through the adversarial process? 
               The student’s note, Asher Rabinowitz, Arbitration of Subcontracting Disputes: Management 
Discretion vs. Job Security, 37 NYU Law. Rev. 523 (1962), which relied on Mr. Lunden’s data, 
perceived this problem: “The real difficulties stem from the fact that most collective bargaining 
agreements are silent on this subject.”  
204.  Int’l Union v. Webster Elec. Co., 299 F.2d 195 (7th Cir. 1962). 
205. Id. at 196–97. 
206. Id. 
207. Id. at 197.  The court did not quote the union shop clause.  Such clauses typically provide that, upon 
demand by the union, the employer will discharge a worker who has not paid the initiation fee and 
172 Southern Illinois University Law Journal [Vol. 42 
Webster Electric held that a single labor contract prohibited contracting 
out, an adjudicative fact.  We do not accuse the Labor Board of an abstraction 
shift; the Board did not use Webster Electric as a precedent for the rule that 
the Labor Act requires decision bargaining.  We do accuse the Board of 
violating Principle 5, that evidence should operate on the same level of 
abstraction as the issue to which the evidence applies.  Webster Electric did 
not support the assertion that contracting out is a custom or practice of 
employers or unions across the country.  The best that can be said for the 
Board is that, if the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning were applied generally, 
contracting out would be barred by every labor contract with a union shop 
clause; and many contracts have such clauses.  But the Board did not 
articulate this doubtful theory, and we will not speculate as to the Board’s 
thinking.  
The Labor Board ordered Fibreboard to engage in decision bargaining 
and to offer the discharged employees reinstatement to their maintenance 
jobs (or to substantially equivalent jobs).  As for back pay, the Board held 
that, because it had held in Fibreboard-I that the company had no duty to 
engage in decision bargaining, applying the usual remedy (back pay from the 
date of the discharges to the date of an offer of reemployment) would be 
inequitable; accordingly, the Board ordered back pay only from the date of 
its order in Fibreboard-II to the date of an offer of reemployment.208 
 The reader will not be surprised to learn that Member Rogers, who had 
voted with the majority in Fibreboard-I and had dissented in Town & 
Country, dissented in Fibreboard-II. He distinguished Railroad 
Telegraphers (though not in the way the majority had attempted in 
Fibreboard-I): 
 
Unlike my colleagues, I can find no authority for such a ruling as 
this in the statute which guides our labors.  Reliance on Order of 
Railroad Telegraphers v. Chicago & Northwestern Railway Co., 
which turned on the construction of the Railway Labor Act and the 
Interstate Commerce Act, is, I believe, completely misplaced.  By 
the statutes there involved, Congress sought to, and did, place 
certain monopolistic industries in a status of being “impressed with 
a public interest.”  No such concepts were embodied in, or even 
seriously suggested for embodiment in, either the Wagner Act or 
the Taft-Hartley Act.  Nor, in my opinion, does this Board have 
the power, as a matter of policy, to place such a “public interest” 
                                                
joined the union within thirty days of hire or who, after joining, fails to pay regular dues.  The 
Supreme Court has held that the worker need not actually join the union, but may instead pay 
initiation fees and dues.  See GORMAN, supra n. 10, at 644–53. 
208. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 138 NLRB 550, 555–56, 555 n. 21 (1962). 
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imprimatur on every business enterprise in the United States, 
without the prior approval of Congress and the courts.209 
 
Member Rogers distinguished Railroad Telegraphers by interpreting it 
at a lower level of abstraction than Fibreboard.  He added to the precedent 
the fact that railroads were monopolies that were “impressed with the public 
interest.”  At best, however, this fact only began to explain why decision 
bargaining should be required for railroads but not for other businesses. 
Principle 8 requires that a distinction explain why the additional fact is 
legally significant, that is, why the fact justifies treating the precedent and 
the case at bar differently.  Member Rogers did not honor this principle. 
 
F. Fibreboard in the Court of Appeals 
 
All of the parties marched to the Court of Appeals.210  The General 
Counsel wanted the court to enforce the Labor Board’s order.  Fibreboard 
wanted the court to refuse to enforce the Board’s order.  The union wanted 
more back pay.211  The opinion of the court provides us an opportunity to 
state another principle of levels of abstraction: 
 
Principle 13 
A tribunal should not frame and resolve an issue at              
more than one level of abstraction. 
 
This principle needs little justification.  An issue, the rule of law that 
resolves the issue, and the evidence in the arguments that support the rule, 
should all operate on the same level of abstraction.  (Principle 5 is closely 
related: evidence and consequential arguments must operate on the same 
level of abstraction as the issue to which the evidence and arguments are 
directed.)  If the levels of these elements in an opinion are disharmonious, 
confusion must follow. 
Warren Earl Burger, then a judge of the Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia, writing on behalf of himself and Judges John Anthony 
                                                
209. Id. at 555–56. 
210. East Bay Union of Machinists, Local 304 v. NLRB, 322 F.2d 411 (D.C. Cir. 1963). 
211. The Board in Fibreboard-II found that the company had refused to bargain in good faith.  As a 
result, as we mentioned in the text above, see supra text preceding n. 208, the Board in Fibreboard-
II awarded back pay to the displaced workers commencing on the date of its decision in the case, 
which was September 13, 1962.  The Board did not find that the company had contracted out for 
discriminatory reasons; but if the Board had made such a finding, the workers would have been 
entitled to considerably more back pay because it would have commenced (as it did for the workers 
in Town & Country, 136 NLRB 1022, 1029–30 (1962)) on the date the workers were displaced, 
which was July 30, 1959.  See Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 130 NLRB at 1565 (intermediate 
report).  Of course, the union also wanted to defend the Board’s holding on decision bargaining. 
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Danaher and Walter Maximilian Bastian, summarily upheld the Labor 
Board’s finding that Fibreboard had acted from a legitimate motive.212  “The 
evaluation of . . . evidence is a process peculiarly within the seasoned 
experience of the Board . . . .”213  As a result, the issue became whether the 
Labor Act requires decision bargaining.  Unfortunately, Judge Burger’s 
opinion was ambiguous regarding the level of abstraction of the issue and, 
therefore, ambiguous as to the holding of the case.  For the most part, the 
opinion addressed Issue B; Judge Berger provided institutional and doctrinal 
arguments for adopting Rule B(2), and these arguments operated 
appropriately at a high level of abstraction.  But the opinion also proffered a 
consequential argument that operated inappropriately at a low level, and the 
conclusion of the opinion was ambiguous as to its level. 
The institutional argument was, “Congress left it to the Board, in the 
first instance, to give content to the statutory language . . . .”214  Congress 
gave the Labor Board “broad powers” and the courts a “limited scope of 
review,”215 and the Board had taken the position that contracting out was a 
mandatory subject of bargaining.  The doctrinal argument was, “the statutory 
definition [in Section 8(d)] of those subjects about which the parties were 
required to bargain was of necessity framed in the broadest terms possible: 
wages, hours, terms and conditions of employment.”216  Congress knew that 
“the act [sic] covered a wide variety of industrial and commercial activity” 
and recognized “that collective bargaining must be kept flexible” so that “the 
Act [sic] could be administered to meet changing conditions.”217  These 
arguments operated on a high level of abstraction.  They applied to all 
employers that might wish to contract out and to all unions that represented 
the employees whose jobs would be affected and, therefore, supported Rule 
B(2). 
Then, as though Trial Examiner Ruckel of Timken Roller Bearing were 
whispering in his ear, Judge Berger stated a consequential argument: 
 
It is enough [to find a violation of the duty to bargain] that 
management’s reasons for its proposal might have been deemed 
satisfactory by and have been acceptable to the Union. It is not 
necessary that it be likely or probable that the union will yield or 
supply a feasible solution but rather that the union be afforded an 
opportunity to meet management’s legitimate complaints that its 
                                                
212. East Bay Union of Machinists, Local 1394, 322 F.2d at 412 (D.C. Cir. 1963). 
213. Id. at 414.  That the court addressed this issue at all, rather than simply noting Fibreboard’s motive 
as a fact, suggests that the Steelworkers’ brief, which we have not had the opportunity to read, 
argued that the company had acted out of anti-union animus. 
214. Id. 
215. Id. at 415. 
216. Id. at 414. 
217. Id. 
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maintenance was unduly costly.  By way of illustration, the union, 
after hearing management’s side of the problem, might concede 
the justice of the claims and agree to invoke union discipline to 
increase productivity and reduce costs.  Specifically it might 
proffer a six months trial period in which either productivity would 
be increased with the existing force of 73 men or maintained with 
a reduced force to effect the economies desired by management.218 
 
Given the high level of abstraction of the preceding arguments, we would 
expect that this passage would also have operated on a high level.  Instead, 
we find that the level of abstraction of the passage was open to two different 
interpretations, and thus its meaning and the holding of the case were 
ambiguous. 
The first interpretation of the passage requires us to resolve an apparent 
contradiction between the first two sentences.  The first sentence stated that 
the duty to bargain was violated because the union might have found 
management’s proposal satisfactory and accepted it, but the second sentence 
stated that the duty was violated regardless of whether the union was likely 
to have found the proposal satisfactory and accepted (“yield[ed” to] it or to 
have offered a feasible alternative. The contradiction can be resolved as 
follows.  Judge Burger meant that decision bargaining is a mandatory subject 
of bargaining because a union might find an employer’s proposal satisfactory 
or offer a feasible alternative and (we complete the argument) thus the 
union’s role as representative of the employees is respected and industrial 
warfare may be averted.  This rule applies to all cases; a case-by-case 
approach in which the issue would be the likelihood that the union will yield 
or supply an alternative is inappropriate because the governing policy is the 
need for all employers to respect their workers’ unions as the workers’ 
bargaining agents. 
On this interpretation, the first two sentences of the passage adopted 
Rule B(2), which operated at a high level of abstraction.  Decision bargaining 
is required in all cases.  This interpretation is strengthened by two other 
considerations.  First, the Labor Board had adopted Rule B(2), and the court 
enforced the Board’s order.  Second, nowhere in Judge Burger’s opinion, in 
the opinion of the Board, or in the trial examiner’s intermediate report, was 
there a finding that the Steelworkers might have found Fibreboard’s reasons 
for contracting out satisfactory or might have proposed a feasible alternative. 
Indeed, the evidence pointed in the opposite direction, for previous rounds of 
bargaining between the company and the union over labor costs had been 
fruitless.  Thus, the rule that Judge Burger stated did not depend on the facts 
                                                
218. Id. at 414–15 (footnote omitted).  Judge Berger referred to “73 men” because that number of 
employees performed maintenance work.  The union represented only 50 of them. 
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of the case at bar.  The judge was thinking of employers and unions across 
the nation.  He believed that some unions might accept proposals to contract 
out, and some unions might offer feasible alternatives.  Holding this belief, 
he endorsed a rule for all employers and unions. 
The good consequences of a rule at a high level of abstraction may be 
illustrated at a low level, typically with the facts of the case at bar (Principle 
5).  The first interpretation continues that the third and fourth sentences of 
the passage were such an illustration.  Judge Burger began the third sentence 
with the phrase “By way of illustration” and then suggested a proposal which 
the Steelworkers might offer during decision bargaining, namely, a six-
month trial in which the union would promise to increase productivity via 
union discipline.  This proposal illustrated the possible fruits of decision 
bargaining.219 
The first interpretation holds that the passage operated on a high level 
of abstraction and promulgated a rule at the same level, namely Rule B(2). 
The second interpretation of the passage is that it operated on a low level of 
abstraction, adopting Rule C(4) (decision bargaining is required when 
negotiations over contracting out might succeed).  Support for the second 
interpretation begins with three arguments based on form.  First, the word 
“Union” in the initial sentence was capitalized, a plain reference to the union 
in the case at bar.  To be sure, Judge Burger was not consistent in the 
capitalization of words.  He wrote “union” without capitalizing it three 
additional times in the passage,220 and in a single sentence elsewhere in the 
opinion, from which we quoted above,221 he referred to the Labor Act as both 
the “act” and the “Act.”  Nonetheless, the rest of the passage consistently 
referred to “the union.”  The passage did not refer to “a union,” “any union,” 
or “unions,” which would have been references at a high level of abstraction. 
Second, the word “management” and the pronouns for which it is the 
antecedent are singular and plainly referred to Fibreboard alone.  If Judge 
Burger had been writing at a high level of abstraction, he would have used 
words that referred to employers across the country, for example, “an 
employer” or “employers.”  Third, the second clause of the initial sentence 
was cast in the past perfect tense, subjunctive mood (“management’s reasons 
for its proposal might have been deemed satisfactory by and have been 
acceptable to the Union”), thereby alluding to events involving Fibreboard 
and the Steelworkers that might have transpired in the past; such facts are 
adjudicative facts of the case at bar (albeit hypothetical) and do not support 
                                                
219. Chief Justice Warren probably interpreted this passage similarly.  See Fibreboard Paper Prods. 
Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 214 (1964), infra the text following n. 267 (beginning, “Chief Justice 
Warren stated . . .), and n. 293 (beginning, “The third possibility . . .”). 
220. He also wrote “union discipline,” but we do not count this instance because in it “union” functions 
as an adjective. 
221. See supra text at n. 217 (beginning, “Congress knew . . .”). 
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a rule of law at a high level of abstraction.  If the aim of the sentence had 
been to state legislative facts applicable to all unions and employers, the 
clause would have been cast in the present tense, subjunctive mood 
(managements’ reasons for their proposals may sometimes be deemed 
satisfactory by and acceptable to unions). 
The second interpretation continues with arguments based on content. 
The second sentence referred specifically to the adjudicative facts of the case 
at bar: “the union [must] be afforded an opportunity to meet management’s 
legitimate complaints that its maintenance was unduly costly” (our italics). 
The excessive cost of labor in maintenance was an adjudicative fact, true of 
the case at bar but not necessarily of other cases. The terms of a rule that 
applied to all unions and employers would have taken into account the 
legislative facts that employers across the country are motivated by many 
reasons to contract out, not merely by labor costs; and that, even when labor 
costs are the reason, they can be excessive in any phase of the business, not 
merely in maintenance.  If Judge Burger had intended to state a rule at a high 
level of abstraction, he need only have omitted the words that we italicized. 
Also, he would have needed to support the rule with legislative facts about 
the benefits of decision bargaining, but he mentioned none.  
Another argument based on content for the second interpretation is that 
the first interpretation harmonizes the first and second sentences incorrectly. 
A better reading is that they stated a refinement of Rule C(4): decision 
bargaining is required in the case at hand if it is possible that the union would 
accept the company’s need to contract out, or that the union would offer a 
feasible alternative, but the standard does not require that either possibility 
rise to the level of likelihood or probability.  Such a standard would usually 
be satisfied.  In unusual cases, however, the union might be so recalcitrant 
that it would never accept contracting out or offer an alternative, in which 
event decision bargaining would be futile.  In addition, the spirit of the case-
by-case approach of this version of Rule C(4) would allow it to except cases 
in which management’s need to contract out is so strong or so immediate that 
decision bargaining would be futile or even harmful to the business. 
Applying this standard to the facts, the third and fourth sentences of the 
passage held that the case at bar satisfied Rule C(4) because the union in this 
case might recognize the need to reduce labor costs in maintenance and 
propose a trial of six months in which in which the union would promise to 
increase productivity via union discipline. 
Which interpretation of the passage is more plausible?  Our view is that 
the first interpretation is correct.  If Judge Burger had intended the second 
interpretation, he should have ruled against the union because its 
recalcitrance in previous years indicated that another round of bargaining was 
unlikely to succeed.  But the answer does not matter.  Both interpretations 
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are plausible enough that an advocate could use either, depending on the 
interest of one’s client. 
Then Judge Berger stated the conclusion of the court: “we conclude on 
this record that the Board was warranted in its determination that the 
employer violated Section 8(a)(5) by refusing to bargain before terminating 
the employment of all the members of its maintenance force.”222  This 
conclusion was as ambiguous as the preceding passage.  The Labor Board’s 
decision and order had framed the issue at a high level of abstraction: 
contracting out is always a mandatory subject of bargaining.  The court found 
that the Board’s order “was warranted,” implying that the court endorsed the 
Board’s approach.  Yet the court based its judgment “on this record” and 
mentioned that Fibreboard had refused to bargain “before terminating the 
employment of all the members of its maintenance force.”  Did these words 
mean that the court found, at a low level of abstraction, only that this 
company violated the duty to bargain given the facts of this particular case? 
Our analysis of Judge Berger’s opinion reveals that it paid insufficient 
heed to the principles of levels of abstraction.  The statement of the issue and 
institutional and doctrinal arguments operated on a high level, but the rule 
that resolved the issue, a consequential argument, and the conclusion of the 
opinion were ambiguous as to their level.  This sort of opinion generates 
confusion and additional litigation. 
 
G. Fibreboard in the Supreme Court 
 
1. The Petition for Certiorari 
 
Fibreboard petitioned the Court of Appeals for rehearing before the 
panel and for rehearing en banc; the petitions were denied.223  Fibreboard 
then petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari; the writ was 
granted.224  Examination of the briefs of the parties will reveal examples of 
principles we have discussed above as well as examples of three further 
principles of levels of abstraction. 
 
Principle 4 
The level of abstraction of an issue can affect its outcome. 
 
 
 
 
                                                
222. East Bay Union of Machinists, Local 1394, 322 F.2d at 415 (D.C. Cir. 1963). 
223. See id. at 411. 
224. See id. 
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Principle 11 
An advocate should frame the issue in a case at the level of 
abstraction that is most likely to produce a favorable 
outcome for one’s client. 
 
Principle 12 
An advocate should normally address, at a single level of 
abstraction, only one of the possible issues which a set of 
facts can generate.  If an advocate chooses to address 
alternative issues which grow out of the same facts and 
which operate on different levels of abstraction, the advocate 
should make clear which issue a particular argument 
addresses. 
 
The level of abstraction of an issue can affect its outcome, indeed, the 
outcome of the case.  A party may be able to present a more appealing 
argument at one level of abstraction than at another level.  For example, 
imagine a debate over whether use of performance-enhancing drugs by 
professional athletes should be outlawed.  A proponent of such a ban will 
have a poor chance of success if the issue is cast as, should the government 
interfere with private behavior?  The proponent will have a much better 
chance of success if the issue is cast as, should professional athletes be 
banned from using drugs A, B, and C, which are harmful to young persons? 
Accordingly, an advocate should normally frame an issue at the single most 
appealing level of abstraction.  But sometimes an advocate wants to offer 
alternative arguments that operate on different levels of abstraction; for 
example, the advocate frames the issue at one level, then one’s opponent 
frames the issue at a different level, and the advocate needs to address both 
issues.  In this event, the advocate must take special care to keep each 
argument, and the evidence supporting the argument, at the appropriate level 
of abstraction. 
Like any other losing party in the Court of Appeals, Fibreboard must 
have had two purposes in mind as it wrote its petition for certiorari: persuade 
the Supreme Court to accept the case, and frame the issue at the level of 
abstraction at which the company had the best chance of winning the case. 
Fortunately for Fibreboard, these purposes coincided.  In regard to 
persuading the Court to accept the case, the Labor Board and (perhaps) the 
Court of Appeals had adopted Rule B(2), which operated at a high level of 
abstraction.  Surely it is easier to persuade the Supreme Court to grant 
certiorari on an issue at the level of abstraction decided below than on an 
issue at another level of abstraction.  Also, a decision at a high level of 
abstraction has a broad effect on society.  The Court may be particularly 
interested in reviewing such decisions. 
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In regard to winning the case, the deck was stacked against Fibreboard 
at a low level of abstraction because the facts of the case satisfied the rules 
that operated at that level.  Perhaps the company had a fifty-fifty chance 
under Rule C(4): bargaining might have failed because the union had not 
yielded in previous bargaining over labor costs, yet might have succeeded if 
the union had been confronted with the risk that the maintenance work would 
be contracted out.  Fibreboard had little chance to win under Rule C(2) 
because the company’s motivation was labor costs, or under Rule C(3) 
because maintenance jobs were in the bargaining unit were lost.  The 
company had no chance whatsoever at the lowest level of all, Rule C(1), 
under which decision bargaining is required when an employer wishes to 
replace bargaining unit employees with contracted employees who would 
perform the same tasks in the same workplace at a lower cost.  (We must 
admit that this last judgment of ours may be influenced by hindsight; see the 
discussion of Justice Stewart’s concurring opinion in the Supreme Court, 
discussed infra beginning at n. 299.)  As for a common law approach, 
although the Labor Board’s views had varied over time, its present position 
was clear, and this position was consistent with the purpose of the Labor Act, 
which is to “encourage[] the practice and procedure of collective 
bargaining.”225  Also, the decision of the Court of Appeals was a precedent 
(though of course not binding on the Supreme Court).  These considerations 
should have influenced Fibreboard not to frame the issue at a low level of 
abstraction but, instead, to frame the issue at a high level. 
Additional reasons might have influenced Fibreboard to frame the issue 
at a high level of abstraction.  Issues framed at the higher levels favored 
Fibreboard’s appeal.  Rule B(2) was a major inroad on management 
prerogatives, and would affect many employers and unions.  The Court might 
balk at such a great change in the law.  Also, if Court decided not to adopt 
the one-size-fits-all approach of Rule B(2), but instead to identify and apply 
a standard, the standards that operated on the highest levels had frightening 
implications.  Rule C(5) mandated decision bargaining about closure of all 
or part of a business.  Should an employer be required to bargain with a union 
about whether to stay in business?226  Rule C(7) mandated bargaining about 
any issue that vitally affected employees.  Should an employer be required to 
                                                
225. National Labor Relations Act, Pub L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935). 
226. It must have seemed unlikely that the federal courts would require bargaining over the decision to 
close a business.  The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit had held squarely that, under the 
Labor Act, an employer may close a business for any reason, including hostility to labor unions. 
See Darlington Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 325 F.2d 682, 685 (4th Cir. 1963).  The court cited several 
decisions of other Courts of Appeals and a passage in a decision of the Supreme Court that 
expressed the same view, id. at 686.  In the term following the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Fibreboard, the Court held that, absent a desire to gain an advantage in labor relations elsewhere, 
an employer may close a business even out of anti-union animus.  See Textile Workers Union v. 
Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263, 268 (1965). 
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bargain about the design of a product or its marketing because, if poorly 
designed or marketed, a product will not sell and employees who made it 
could be laid off? 
Fibreboard’s petition for a writ of certiorari stated the question 
presented as, “Was Petitioner required by the National Labor Relations Act 
to bargain with a union representing some of its employees about whether to 
let to an independent contractor for legitimate business reasons the 
performance of certain operations in which those employees had been 
engaged?”227  This question was ambiguous because it could have been 
resolved by any of the rules we have discussed.  The Court granted certiorari 
on exactly the question which the company had presented.  The parties, then, 
were free to choose the level of abstraction at which they would answer the 
question. 
 
2. The Parties’ Briefs on the Merits 
 
In its own interest, Fibreboard should have kept its arguments and its 
answer to the question presented at a high level of abstraction, but in fact the 
arguments and the answer wandered among rules at different levels. At the 
outset, the company’s brief stated, “The Act does not by its terms require 
bargaining about whether an employer shall carry on particular business 
operations, but requires only that he bargain about the ‘wages, hours, and 
other terms and conditions’ upon which men are to be employed in the 
operation upon which he decides.”228  This sentence was artfully composed. 
The first clause suggested Rule C(5) (an employer must bargain over the 
decision to discontinue any operation).  This rule operated at a considerably 
higher level of abstraction than Rule B(2) because a duty to bargain at the 
level of Rule C(5) would encompass not only contracting out work, but also 
other forms of discontinuing an operation (for example, ceasing to produce a 
product).  Although no party or tribunal in the case had suggested Rule C(5), 
nor was it encompassed by the writ of certiorari, invoking this rule worked 
powerfully for Fibreboard: what could be more a function of management 
than the decision of whether to maintain or close an operation?229 
Apparently confident in scare tactics, Fibreboard then nudged the issue 
to an even higher level of abstraction.  The company argued that, until Town 
                                                
227. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, cert. granted 375 U.S. 963 (1964); 379 U.S. 203, 209 
(1964) (also stating another issue, not discussed in this article, pertaining to the Labor Board’s 
remedial power). 
228. Brief of Fibreboard at 10, Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964) (No. 14). 
229. See Textile Workers Union v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263 (1965) (ruling an employer may 
close a business even out of anti-union animus) and First Nat’l Maint. Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 
666 (1981) (ruling an employer has no duty to bargain over partial closing of a business), but cf. 
Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co., 362 U.S. 330 (1960) (holding a railroad 
had a duty to bargain over closing stations). 
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& Country, “it was settled Board doctrine . . . that an employer is not required 
to bargain about a decision, motivated by legitimate business considerations, 
to contract out work or close or move his plant.”230  Now the issue embraced 
not only discontinuing an operation, but also moving a business or 
restructuring it. 
The brief then switched to a common law approach, discussing a 
number of cases.231  Ignoring the ones that were irrelevant,232 we find that the 
cases operated at different levels of abstraction.  For example, Fibreboard 
cited Brown-McLaren Manufacturing Company,233 in which the Labor Board 
held that an employer had no duty to bargain over the decision to move an 
operation to another location for legitimate business reasons, and National 
Labor Relations Board v. Rapid Bindery,234 in which the Second Circuit 
reached the same conclusion.  Moving an operation is contracting out writ 
large.  Other cases operated at the level of Issue B. In Adams Dairy, the 
employer discharged its drivers and engaged them as independent contractors 
without bargaining with the union.235  Although the Board had held the dairy 
had violated the duty to bargain, the Eighth Circuit refused to enforce the 
Board’s order because the dairy had acted in good faith.236  Of course, the 
brief also discussed Fibreboard-I.  
Fibreboard was wise to avoid the lower levels of abstraction.  The 
company would have been wiser still to have focused on an issue at a single 
level of abstraction and to have stated that issue clearly.  The company’s brief 
does not appear to have had any effect on the majority or concurring opinions 
of the Court. 
The General Counsel of the Labor Board237 could also choose the level 
of abstraction of the issue he would address; but (the reverse of Fibreboard) 
his chance of victory decreased as the level of the issue rose: for the higher 
the level, the greater the potential expansion of the duty to bargain.  If the 
Court were willing to expand the duty at all, the justices were most likely to 
                                                
230. Brief of Fibreboard at 30, Fibreboard, 379 U.S. 203 (1964) (No. 14). 
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235. NLRB v. Adams Dairy, Inc., 322 F.2d 553 (8th Cir. 1963); vacated, 379 U.S. 644 (1965), aff’d on 
reh’g, 350 F.2d 108 (8th Cir. 1965). 
236 . The Board petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari.  After deciding Fibreboard, the 
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237. The brief was signed not only by the General Counsel of the Labor Board, but also by the Solicitor 
General of the United States.  In the belief that the General Counsel probably took the lead in writing 
the brief, we refer to all the signatories to this brief as the “General Counsel.” 
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adopt a version of Rules C, either stating a standard for determining in which 
cases decision bargaining would be required or comparing the case at bar to 
precedents.  The Board, however, had promulgated a rule at a higher level, 
Rule B(2), and so the General Counsel would have felt obliged to defend this 
rule. Perhaps his best strategy was to address Issue B and Issue C in the 
alternative, making clear the difference between them.  We can think of no 
reason why the General Counsel should have addressed any of the issues at 
higher levels of abstraction.  Yet he did and, as he did, he wandered from one 
level to another. 
The General Counsel stated the “question presented” as “[w]hether an 
employer’s ‘contracting out’ of maintenance work being done by employees 
in the bargaining unit is a statutory subject of collective bargaining under 
section 8(d) and 9(a) of the National Labor Relations Act.”238  This statement 
of the issue specified the work as maintenance.  The word “maintenance” 
functioned as an adjective that modified or limited the noun “work.”  If the 
General Counsel had meant to limit the issue to whether decision bargaining 
was required over maintenance (but not other kinds of) work, he would have 
been addressing Issues C and D (what is the standard, and does it require 
bargaining in the case at bar, but not necessarily in other cases?).  Was the 
General Counsel trying to frame the issue strategically?  Maintenance work 
usually involves less investment than production, delivery, and so on. 
Decision bargaining over maintenance, therefore, would likely center, not on 
the commitment of capital, which is at the core of management prerogative, 
but on the cost of labor, which is a traditional subject of collective bargaining. 
Also, maintenance work is normally performed where the equipment is 
located.  Therefore, when maintenance is contracted out, the contractor’s 
employees perform the maintenance in the very plant in which the discharged 
employees formerly worked.  A plant is always destabilized when union 
members see their fellow union members lose their jobs; a plant becomes 
explosive when union members are forced to work alongside of non-union 
employees who have replaced union members.  For these reasons, the 
General Counsel might have believed that he had a better chance to win a 
case about decision bargaining over the contracting out of maintenance work 
in particular than over the contracting out of work in general. 
Nonetheless, for four reasons we believe that the General Counsel did 
not intend his statement of the issue to limit it to decision bargaining over 
maintenance work alone.  First, he had argued for Rule B(2) without this 
limitation before the Labor Board.  Also, the Board had not limited the issue 
in this way; for example, the contracted work in Town & Country was 
transporting mobile homes, and this work involved capital (the ownership of 
trucks) and could not have been performed in the employer’s plant.  Second, 
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nowhere in the brief did the General Counsel’s argument focus on the 
specific characteristics of maintenance work.  Third, changing the issue in a 
case would have been a heavy burden to place on a single word in a sentence, 
especially an adjective; the change could easily have gone unnoticed.  And 
finally, although Fibreboard’s brief addressed issues at various levels of 
abstraction, those levels were generally high, and the General Counsel 
probably intended his statement of the question to operate on a similar level. 
Accordingly, the General Counsel probably intended the word 
“maintenance,” not to lower the level of abstraction of the issue, but merely 
to describe the work that was lost in the case at bar. 
The General Counsel would have been wiser to prevent confusion by 
not referring to the specific type of work in the case at bar, and this lapse of 
judgment prefigured more serious lapses later in the brief.  Nonetheless, we 
conclude that he represented to the Court that he would address Issue B. 
Accordingly, his evidence and arguments should have been at the same level 
of abstraction as Issue B.  They were not. 
In his first argument following his statement of the question presented, 
the General Counsel flirted with an issue at a vastly higher level of 
abstraction than Issue B, namely, whether the duty to bargain requires a party 
to negotiate over any subject which the counterparty lays on the table.  The 
flirtation occurred as follows.  The General Counsel argued that Congress 
used the phrase “terms and conditions of employment” in its broadest sense. 
As proof, he pointed out that the definitions of “terms” and “conditions” in 
the dictionary were broad.  Further, he reminded the Court that in the Taft-
Hartley amendments of 1947 Congress enshrined the duty to bargain in 
section 8(d) of the Act.  During the debates, proposals were advanced that 
would have narrowed the breadth of the section by making “nonmandatory a 
number of subjects, including subcontracting, which were ‘traditionally the 
subject matter of collective bargaining in some industries or in certain regions 
of the country; but Congress rejected these proposals.’”239  “Thus,” he 
concluded, “the ‘terms and conditions of employment’ to which sections 8(d) 
and 9(a) refer are any stipulations under which employees agree to be 
employed. . . . [T]hey verbally embrace any provisions which either party 
wishes to put in the agreement” (our italics).240 
This legislative history supported Rule A(2) (the duty to bargain 
requires a party to negotiate over any issue that the counterparty wishes to 
discuss), but the General Counsel immediately repudiated such a rule.  He 
wrote that, although a literal reading of the statute would give unions a right 
to bargain over a host of subjects that are generally regarded as management 
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prerogatives, the Labor Board had confined mandatory subjects to 
employees’ “vital interests.”241  Contracting out touches such an interest and 
is of “intense concern”242 to employees: “Every time management arranges 
to buy parts or otherwise subcontracts work of the kind usually done by the 
company’s own employees, fear among the employees for their income and 
employment security is generated by the danger that the subcontracting will 
reduce the amount of work available to them.”243  Thus did the General 
Counsel move down a rung or two on the abstraction ladder to the level of 
Rule C(7).  Not any conceivable subject on which unions might wish to 
bargain, but only subjects that affect employees’ vital interests, such as 
contracting out, are mandatory subjects of bargaining.  The standard for 
identifying mandatory subjects (whether employees’ vital interests are 
affected) applied to all parties in all cases, and the reason that contracting out 
satisfied the standard (namely, that contracting out generated fear among 
employees for their income and employment security) was a legislative fact 
of which he believed (but we do not244) a court could properly take judicial 
notice. 
So far, the General Counsel had mentioned, but eschewed a standard at 
one level of abstraction (Rule A(2)) and had advanced another standard at a 
somewhat lower level (Rule C(7)).  In the very next sentence he presented an 
argument at the very lowest level, Rule C(1): “The threat is the greater and 
the more immediate when the contract brings men from another firm into the 
plant to take over the jobs of the employer’s own employees.”245  In this 
sentence, the General Counsel no longer referred to the variety of contracting 
out in which employees’ vital interests are affected, but only to the variety in 
which bargaining unit employees are replaced by contracted workers in the 
employer’s shop.  Although contracting out nearly always removes jobs from 
a bargaining unit, much less commonly is the contracted work performed in 
the same shop by employees of the independent contractor.  Principle 5 
reminds us that a fact which is true only of a subset of cases should usually 
have little or no influence on whether to make a law that will apply to all of 
the cases in the set.  Thus, the greater threat that arose in atypical cases like 
the one at bar was largely irrelevant to whether the duty to bargain applied to 
contracting out of all varieties or of the variety that affects employees’ vital 
interests.  The argument in the quoted sentence, therefore, pertained only to 
the subset of the cases covered by Rule C(1).  This argument operated on a 
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243. Id. (minor typographical error corrected). 
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245. Brief of the National Labor Relations Board at 23, Fibreboard, 379 U.S. 203 (1964) (No. 14).  This 
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true, other consequences are possible; for example, workers in the plant might consider contracted 
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lower level of abstraction than was appropriate for Issue B, which the General 
Counsel purported to address. 
The General Counsel’s descent to the lowest level of abstraction was 
only temporary.  His next argument was a warning based on legislative facts 
that he believed (but did not prove) were true across the country:  
 
“The fear [of the threat to job security] is reflected in collective 
bargaining practice and arbitration. . . . The only question, 
therefore, is whether the problems shall be resolved within the 
framework of collective bargaining established by national policy 
or left outside to fester without negotiations and then to break out 
in economic warfare. . . .”246  
 
We will refer to this passage as the General Counsel’s “Warning 
Argument.”  It applied to employees and employers across the country and, 
therefore, operated on the appropriate level of abstraction for Issue B. 
Then the General Counsel used points already made to distinguish 
contracting out from genuine management prerogatives; in the process, he 
descended the ladder of abstraction from Issue B.  The distinction was that 
contracting out affected employees’ jobs and, unlike management 
prerogatives, was widely accepted as a topic of collective bargaining.247  This 
distinction suggested Rules C(3) and C(4) (decision bargaining is required 
when the contracting out would affect employees’ jobs and might be 
successful). 
The General Counsel’s next argument took a common law approach 
and climbed back up the ladder to Issue B.  He analogized contracting out to 
“other matters directly involving tenure of employment [which] have long 
been held within sections 8(d) and 9(a),”248 including layoffs, recalls, 
compulsory retirement, disciplinary discharges, hiring halls, and 
automation.249  If contracting out is the equivalent of layoffs, decision 
bargaining is a mandatory subject of bargaining.  But then the General 
Counsel slid down the ladder. 
The General Counsel had only toyed with a low level of abstraction so 
far.  Here he turned in earnest to a level even lower than Rule C(7) by 
combining standards: 
 
Nor can the “contracting out” involved in this case be excluded 
from section 8(d) and 9(a) upon the ground that the step dealt with 
matters often left to managerial determination . . . . The plant 
maintenance would have to be done in any event.  It would be done 
                                                
246. Id. 
247. Id. at 24–25. 
248. Id. at 25. 
249. Id. at 25–26. 
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in the plant.  It would be directed, even scheduled, by petitioner. 
No capital investment was at stake, nor anything that could be said 
to affect the scope or character of the petitioner’s business.  With 
this kind of contracting out the whole weight of the problem, from 
the standpoint of management as well as labor, is on the questions, 
who will work and who will determine wages, hours, and working 
conditions?  Nothing of practical importance is involved in the 
area conventionally left to management decisions.20a 
_________ 
20a. . . [I]t is not unlikely that the present employees and their representative would 
be able, if the subject were placed on the bargaining table, to work out an 
arrangement under which those employees could continue to perform the 
maintenance services.250 
 
In this passage, the General Counsel implicitly addressed Issue C, implying 
that the standard for determining whether decision bargaining is required has 
three, or perhaps four, elements: the contracted work would continue to be 
performed in the plant; decision bargaining would not affect investment of 
capital or the scope of the business; the focus of bargaining would be the 
usual subjects of collective bargaining (who will work, for how much money, 
and under what conditions); and, perhaps, collective bargaining would have 
a reasonable chance of success. 
After which, the General Counsel climbed back up the ladder to Issue 
B by elaborating arguments previously stated: mandatory subjects of 
bargaining should be defined by “industrial experience [because it] is the best 
test both of the depth of the employees’ interest in managerial practices 
affecting them and also of their amenability to labor-management 
relations.”251  Such experience reveals that bargaining over contracting out 
has been widespread and successful, he concluded, and courts and arbitrators 
have upheld labor contracts that limit an employer’s right to contract out.252 
And then the General Counsel reached for the stars.  He repeated his 
Warning Argument about the risk to industrial peace.  In the process, he 
stated a rationale of decision that would justify Rule C(3) and more: 
 
The Issue before the Court, therefore, is not whether contracting 
out and other measures reducing the volume of work available to 
employees will be an issue between labor and management, nor 
whether unions may make such subcontracting the subject of 
collective action.  The affirmative answers to those questions are 
established facts. . . . What the Court’s interpretation of sections 
8(d) and 9(a) will determine, is whether the problems will be 
resolved within or without the statutory framework.253 
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“[R]esolved within or without the statutory framework” meant resolved 
within the framework by collective bargaining or without the framework by 
strikes, lockouts, or worse.  The warning applied not only to contracting out, 
but also to “other measures reducing the volume of work available to 
employees” (our italics).  Thus, the General Counsel argued that the Court 
should require decision bargaining because sections 8(d) and 9 of the Labor 
Act require bargaining over any act of an employer that might reduce jobs in 
a bargaining unit including, we suppose, closing the plant, investing (or not 
investing) in it, dropping or modifying a product, and so on.  Although the 
facts of the case at bar concerned only contracting out, a rationale for 
mandatory subjects of bargaining that was aimed at resolving disputes over 
any loss of jobs would operate on a level of abstraction well above 
contracting out. 
Principle 5 holds that the adjudicative facts of a case may be used as an 
illustration of a legislative fact that is part of an argument at a high level of 
abstraction.  Even though he wandered across levels of abstraction, the 
General Counsel knew how to use the facts of the case at bar to illustrate 
legislative facts: 
 
There are many solutions to the question whether particular work 
shall be contracted out, as in the present case. . . . Confronted with 
a choice between losing their jobs and increasing their 
productivity, the employees might have agreed to cooperate in 
finding ways of meeting the problem of costs. . . .No one can say 
whether a mutually satisfactory solution would have been found in 
this case or will be found in any other, but the national labor policy 
is founded upon the Congressional conclusion that the chances are 
good enough to warrant subjecting such issues to the process of 
collective negotiation.254 
 
Overall, however, the General Counsel seems to have been unable to 
decide whether the facts of the case at bar simply served as one instance of 
many similar cases, or were crucial to the outcome of the case.  He asserted 
that the issue in the case was Issue B, but the bulk of his argument pertained 
to issues higher and lower on the abstraction ladder. 
The Steelworkers’ interest in the case was to enforce the Labor Board’s 
order, but their choice of strategy was difficult.  They had argued in the Court 
of Appeals for more back pay on the ground that Fibreboard had acted out of 
anti-union animus.255  They could not make this argument in the Supreme 
Court because the writ of certiorari specified that Fibreboard had acted for 
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legitimate business reasons.256  Thus, the company’s motive was no longer 
an issue,257 and so the question presented in the writ gave the Steelworkers 
the same choice as the other parties had about the level of abstraction at 
which to cast their arguments.  But the Steelworkers’ choice was the most 
difficult because they served three masters.  
Fibreboard’s attorneys had a single interest: win this case.  The General 
Counsel had two interests: win this case and make good law for future cases. 
Although the Labor Board’s best chance of winning this case may have been 
at the level of Rule B(3) (decision bargaining is required in some cases but 
not in others), the Board wanted the Court to endorse Rule B(2) for the future. 
But the Steelworkers’ attorneys had to cater to three interests.  They answered 
to the employees whom Local Union 1304 represented at Fibreboard, to the 
hundreds of thousands of employees whom the national union represented 
across the country, and, in a significant way, to the entire American labor 
movement.  Accordingly, the Steelworkers may have been influenced partly 
by a desire to win this case and partly by broader considerations, and these 
influences could have led to arguments on various levels of abstraction. 
Rule A(2) probably did not tempt the Steelworkers.  Although any 
union would have relished being able to demand that an employer bargain 
over any topic that employees might wish to discuss, and to use economic 
force to secure concessions on any topic, the Steelworkers surely knew that 
Rule A(2) would be a two-way street: employers would have the same rights; 
and because employers typically have more economic power than unions, the 
net of such a rule might well favor employers.  Also, the Steelworkers surely 
foresaw that the Court would not reverse its own precedent and abandon the 
distinction between mandatory and permissible subjects of bargaining. 
Rule C(7) might have tempted the Steelworkers.  The labor movement 
would have been well satisfied with the right to bargain over any topic that 
vitally affects the interests of employees.  Such a right would include most 
of the topics that employees might want to discuss, and would allow unions 
to use economic force to secure concessions.  Employers’ reciprocal right to 
bargain over union actions that affected employers’ vital interests would be 
meaningless: employers would never exercise it, preferring to act unilaterally 
behind the shield of management prerogatives as much as possible; but if 
employers did exercise the right, unions would be delighted to bargain about 
things like investment and new products.  Also, Rule C(7) would not disturb 
the distinction between mandatory subjects and permissible subjects, though 
the rule would considerably expand the former and contract the latter.  But it 
was unlikely that the Court would adopt a rule that went so far beyond the 
Labor Board’s holding. 
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The Steelworkers may have believed that Issue C(3) was a better 
possibility.  The inequity of employees’ losing their jobs and being denied 
the right even to discuss the matter with their employer was obvious to 
unions, probably obvious to ordinary citizens as well, and perhaps obvious 
even to judges.  The Steelworkers could remind the Court that the duty to 
bargain is not a duty to agree and, if bargaining were unsuccessful, the 
employer could proceed without the union’s consent.  If this strategy 
succeeded, the Steelworkers would win a major victory for the labor 
movement: employers would have to bargain not only over contracting out, 
but also over topics such as automation, scaling back production, and perhaps 
closing the business.  Attractive as such an outcome may have been to them, 
however, the Steelworkers would have realized that this strategy was risky. 
The Court might well recoil from such a liberal rule and hold that decision 
bargaining is never required. 
The Steelworkers must have known that they had the best chance to win 
the case for the workers who were laid off at the lower levels of abstraction. 
The union could try to persuade the Court to adopt Rule B(2) and, if this 
strategy succeeded, it would result in a significant right for unions across the 
country.  Yet the Steelworkers might reasonably have feared that the Court 
would hesitate to subject every employer to the obligation to engage in 
decision bargaining. 
In a realistic moment, the Steelworkers may have thought that the Court 
was most likely to take the moderate approach of ordering decision 
bargaining on a case-by-case basis.  Accordingly, their safest route to victory 
was to advocate Rule C(2) because labor costs had motivated the contracting 
out.  (The brief could have dealt with Local 1304’s recalcitrance in previous 
bargaining by stressing the difference between ordinary bargaining over 
labor costs, the downside of which is a strike or a lockout, and extraordinary 
bargaining over contracting out bargaining unit work, the downside of which 
is permanent loss of jobs.) 
 Advocating Rule C(4) was also a safe bet because everyone wants 
collective bargaining to be successful, and no one wants to waste time on 
futile bargaining; but it was uncertain how well success on this strategy 
would serve the labor movement.  On the one hand, employers who wished 
to contract out might well engage in decision bargaining in order to avoid a 
serious risk: for the small cost of a few bargaining sessions, in which nothing 
need be conceded, an employer could avoid the risk of an onerous remedy 
(reestablishment of the operation and back pay for the employees, as the 
Labor Board ordered in Shamrock Dairy258) should the Board and courts find 
that bargaining was required.  On the other hand, employers might run that 
risk if they felt that decision bargaining would compromise a good business 
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opportunity; indeed, the better the opportunity, the less the chance the Board 
or a court would hold that bargaining was required, particularly if speed or 
secrecy were important.259 
Perhaps all these considerations overwhelmed the Steelworkers’ 
advocates for, in the event, their brief moved up and down the abstraction 
ladder with abandon.  The facts stated in the brief pertained to the issue at 
lowest level of abstraction: 
 
     The work which the company “contracted out” was the 
maintenance of its production equipment and the operation of its 
power plant.  This work, of course, had to be performed as long as 
the company continued its manufacturing operations.  And it had 
to be performed at the plant site; it could not be sent out for 
performance at another location.  Nor did Fluor have any advanced 
equipment with which to perform the work more efficiently than 
Fibreboard.  Indeed, the work was to be performed with 
Fibreboard’s tools and equipment, and under Fibreboard’s general 
supervision. 
 
     In short, the sole effect of the contracting out arrangement was 
that Fibreboard’s work was to be performed on Fibreboard’s 
premises in the same way, and with the same equipment, as before 
but by Fluor’s employees instead of Fibreboard’s employees. 
 
. . . Fluor’s role was essentially that of a labor broker 
. . . . 
 
     Fibreboard agreed to reimburse all of Fluor’s costs, including 
wages, fringe benefits, payroll taxes, travel and subsistence 
expense, utilities, telephone, telegraph, stationery, Workmen’s 
Compensation insurance, permits, licenses, fees, and such tools 
and equipment as Fibreboard did not furnish. . . . 
 
     Fluor made clear in its proposal that its personnel would work 
entirely under the direction of Fibreboard’s management. . . . 
 
     The question naturally arises, if Fluor was to do the same work 
with the same equipment as Fibreboard’s employees, what was the 
source of the saving which Fibreboard hoped to gain from this 
arrangement?  The answer is that Fluor’s employees were willing 
to work at less costly terms and conditions of employment than 
had been negotiated between Fibreboard and its employees.260 
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The facts mentioned by the Steelworkers showed that the employees of Fluor 
had essentially stepped into the shoes of the employees of Fibreboard who 
had been discharged from the bargaining unit.  The facts pertained to Rule 
C(1) as the General Counsel had expressed it, for they showed that the 
contracted work would continue to be performed in the plant, that decision 
bargaining would not affect investment of capital or the scope of the business, 
that the focus of bargaining would be the usual subjects of collective 
bargaining, and, the issue being labor costs, that collective bargaining would 
have a reasonable chance of success. 
Then the Steelworkers stated what they asserted was their view of the 
issue in the case. In truth, it was only one of their views.  It led to Rule C(2), 
which existed at a considerably higher level of abstraction than the issue to 
which the preceding facts applied: 
 
     Reduced to its bare essentials, the question in this case is 
whether an employer who believes that the labor costs under his 
collective bargaining agreement are too high is required to try to 
solve his problem by bargaining with his employees’ union or 
whether he may solve it unilaterally by . . . simply terminating the 
employees and engaging a contractor whose employees are willing 
to do the same work under less costly terms and conditions of 
employment.261 
 
Virtually all of the facts which the Steelworkers had just emphasized were 
irrelevant to this statement of the issue: it did not matter that the work could 
only be performed in Fibreboard’s plant; that Fluor did not have more 
advanced equipment than Fibreboard had; that the work would be performed 
with Fibreboard’s tools; that Fibreboard’s managers would supervise the 
work of Fluor’s employees; or that Fluor would pass virtually all of its costs 
through to Fibreboard.  All that mattered in this statement of the issue was 
that the contracting out was motivated by labor costs. 
Whereupon the Steelworkers presented an argument that pertained to 
Rule B(2), well above the level of abstraction of the issue they had just stated: 
“It is at least possible that collective bargaining might have provided a 
mutually satisfactory solution that would have spared the employees their 
jobs.  At the very least, the Act requires that an effort be made to find such a 
solution before the employer may take unilateral action.”262  The 
Steelworkers were not arguing that decision bargaining is appropriate in 
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those cases in which it might succeed (Rule C(4)); rather, they were arguing 
that decision bargaining is always appropriate because it might succeed. 
Successful bargaining was a good rationale, but not good enough for 
the Steelworkers. What they really cared about was jobs: 
 
[I]n the last analysis, the chief reason why contracting out is a 
matter about which bargaining is required is that when the 
employer contracts out work, he thereby reduces the number of 
jobs or the amount of work available to employees in the 
bargaining unit. And the matter of what work, or what jobs, will 
be available to employees is plainly one of the “terms and 
conditions of employment” within the meaning of the Act.263 
 
The facts of this case no longer mattered; they were only illustrative. 
Decision bargaining is required because the bargaining unit stands to lose 
jobs.  If the Court adopted this rationale, which was the akin to one that the 
General Counsel proposed in his Warning Argument, the law would require 
bargaining not only in cases of contracting out, but in a great number of other 
cases as well (closing a plant, dropping a product, and so on). 
Rule C(3) was close to the Steelworkers’ heart—the foremost task of 
unions is to protect employees’ jobs— and so the Steelworkers would soon 
repeat the foregoing argument.  Before that, however, they returned to Rules 
C(2) and (4), making explicit the connection previously implied between 
labor costs and the possibility of successful collective bargaining: 
 
     The likelihood that bargaining would have produced a solution 
is particularly great in this case, since the sole reason for the 
contracting out was the company’s view that the existing terms and 
conditions of employment were too costly.  This is precisely the 
kind of problem which can be resolved through collective 
bargaining.264 
 
And then the brief returned to Rule C(3): 
 
     The main reason why employers are required to bargain about 
contracting out is quite simply, that whenever bargaining unit 
work is contracted out, the number of jobs which would otherwise 
be available to employees in the bargaining unit is reduced.  And 
the matter of what jobs or what work will be available to 
employees is plainly a matter within the area of “terms and 
                                                
263. Id. 
264. Id at 16. 
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conditions of employment” about which the Act requires 
bargaining.”265 
 
The Steelworkers’ brief moved carelessly among issues and levels of 
abstraction, thereby failing to present a clear and consistent view of the case. 
The brief, however, may have affected the Court, particularly Justice 
Stewart’s concurring opinion.  Of all the briefs in the case, the Steelworkers’ 
provided the most detailed and gripping description of what the company had 
done (see the quotation at n. 260 supra).  That description operated at the 
lowest level of abstraction, as did Justice Stewart’s opinion (which is 
discussed in detail infra).  Yet, given the narrow scope of that opinion, one 
may wonder whether it was a victory for the labor movement. 
 
3. Chief Justice Warren’s Opinion for the Supreme Court 
 
We have mentioned that the question on which the Supreme Court 
granted certiorari was ambiguous as to its level of abstraction; the question 
could have raised any of the issues we have discussed.  The opinion of the 
majority of the Court, written by Chief Justice Earl Warren and joined by 
Justices Hugo Lafayette Black, Byron Raymond White, William Joseph 
Brennan, Jr., and Thomas Campbell Clark, was also ambiguous, for it 
addressed, and did not distinguish between, Issues B(2) and versions of Rule 
C. 
In what we will call the introduction to the Court’s opinion 
(specifically, the paragraphs preceding section I), Chief Justice Warren 
began with a statement of the issue: 
  
     This case involves the obligation of an employer and the 
representative of his employees under §§ 8(a)(5), 8(d), and 9(a) of 
the National Labor Relations Act to “confer in good faith with 
respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of 
employment.”  The primary issue is whether the “contracting out” 
of work being performed by employees in the bargaining unit is a 
statutory subject of collective bargaining under these sections.”266 
 
The first sentence referred to “an employer,” rather than “the employer” 
or “the petitioner,” and to “the representative of his employees,” not “the 
respondent,” thereby suggesting that  the Court had in mind all employers 
and their unions, not merely the parties to the case at bar.  This suggestion 
was confirmed by the second sentence, which was a straightforward 
                                                
265. Id. at 19. 
266. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 204–05 (1964).  
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statement of Issue B(2), and a reader would naturally have assumed that 
Court intended to decide this issue. 
But then the introduction presented the facts of the case and the 
decisions of the lower tribunals.267  Chief Justice Warren stated that 
Fibreboard had been concerned about the high cost of maintenance and had 
determined that substantial savings could be realized by contracting out the 
work.  He added that Fluor had assured Fibreboard “that maintenance costs 
could be curtailed by reducing the work force, decreasing fringe benefits and 
overtime payments, and by preplanning and scheduling the services to be 
performed.”268  Then he quoted from a portion of the contract between 
Fibreboard and Fluor that indicated that the former would ordinarily furnish 
the equipment and supplies for the maintenance work and that the latter 
would be compensated on the basis of its costs plus a fixed fee.269  That the 
Chief Justice chose to state these facts indicated that he thought they were 
important to the case.  They were not important to Issue B(2), to which 
mattered only that the company had contracted out bargaining unit work 
without bargaining over the decision.  The facts were important to the issues 
at a lower level of abstraction, Issue and Rules C.  The ways to save money 
which Fluor had identified (for example, using fewer employees, which is 
analogous to laying off employees, and decreasing fringe benefits and 
overtime) were traditional subjects of collective bargaining.  At this point, 
therefore, a reader of the opinion might have changed one’s mind and 
believed that, if the Court required decision bargaining at all, it would be 
required only when labor costs were the employer’s motive for contracting 
out (or perhaps when collective bargaining might reasonably succeed in 
resolving the dispute). 
Yet the Chief Justice also mentioned that the Labor Board had twice 
adopted Rule B(2). In Fibreboard-II the Board had held that the company’s 
failure to engage in decision bargaining violated the Labor Act, and in Town 
& Country the Board had held that contracting out is a mandatory subject of 
bargaining.270 Now the reader had reason to change one’s mind again and 
guess that the Court intended to address Issue B. 
A court’s statement of facts often includes background and other 
information that is not strictly relevant to the issue sub judice, and so we 
should not infer that a court intends to address the issue in the case at a low 
level of abstraction from a detailed statement of facts (though a statement 
with few facts foreshadows an issue at a high level in which only those facts 
are pertinent).  Nonetheless, the discrepancy in the introduction between the 
levels of abstraction of the issue and of the facts reflected the pattern of the 
                                                
267. Id. at 205–08. 
268. Id. at 206. 
269. Id. at 206–07.  
270. Id. at 208. 
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rest of the opinion.  Indeed, another discrepancy in levels of abstraction 
occurred in the introduction itself, this time between the statement of the 
issue that opened the introduction (quoted above at n. 267) and the statement 
that closed the introduction: 
 
We agree with the Court of Appeals that, on the facts of this case, 
the “contracting out” of the work previously performed by 
members of an existing bargaining unit is a subject about which 
the National Labor Relations Act requires employers and the 
representatives of their employees to bargain collectively.271 
 
Without the words “on the facts of this case,” this sentence would have 
announced Rule B(2) (contracting out of bargaining unit work is a mandatory 
subject of bargaining).  But with those words, the sentence seemed to state 
Rule B(3 (contracting out is a mandatory subject in some cases, including 
this one) and implied that contracting out might not be a mandatory subject 
in other cases. 
Section I of the opinion dealt with decision bargaining.272  Chief Justice 
Warren began the section by summarizing the existing law: an employer has 
a duty under section 8(a)(5) of the Labor Act to bargain with the employees’ 
union, and the duty as defined in section 8(d) applies only to mandatory 
subjects of bargaining, as to which neither party is obligated to yield.273  Then 
he restated the issue in the case: 
 
we are concerned here only with whether the subject upon which 
the employer allegedly refused to bargain—contracting out of 
plant maintenance work previously performed by employees in the 
bargaining unit, which the employees were capable of continuing 
to perform—is covered by the phrase “terms and conditions of 
employment” within the meaning of § 8(d).274 
 
This passage, like the introduction, is difficult to interpret.  One interpretation 
is that the passage raised Issue C, foreshadowing its resolution with Rule 
C(1).  This rule had two elements: decision bargaining is required when the 
contracted workers would perform the same tasks as the bargaining unit 
employees were performing, and those tasks would be performed in the same 
workplace.  The phrase “work previously performed by employees in the 
bargaining unit” indicated that the work of the contracted workers would be 
                                                
271. Id. at 209. 
272. See id. at 215–17 (Section II addressed an issue of remedy, holding that the Board was empowered 
to order Fibreboard to resume its maintenance operations and reinstate with back pay the workers 
who were laid off.  Id. at 209 and 215.)  
273. Id. at 209–10. 
274. Id at 210. 
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identical to the work of the bargaining unit employees, and the reference to 
“plant maintenance work” indicated that the work of the contracted workers 
would be performed in the same workplace in which the bargaining unit 
employees worked. 
Another interpretation of the passage is that it addressed Rule B(2), 
which operated at a high level of abstraction that applied to any sort of work 
that might be contracted out.  Support for this interpretation comes from what 
would otherwise be a conundrum: why did the Chief Justice mention that the 
bargaining unit employees “were capable of continuing to perform” the 
work?  One possible answer is that the Chief Justice was merely stating the 
obvious: if the contracted workers performed the same work as the 
bargaining unit employees, the latter were capable of continuing to perform 
the work.  Another possible answer is that he mentioned this fact for its 
emotional impact: we sympathize with employees who lose jobs which they 
are capable of performing, and helping such employees is appealing.  A third 
possible answer is that the Chief Justice intended to lay the basis for 
distinguishing a future case in which the bargaining unit employees could not 
perform the contracted work.  Surely the argument for decision bargaining 
would be weaker in such a case.  This answer seems the most likely to us.  If 
we are right, the passage did not address Issue C.  Now, a distinction must be 
drawn against another case; here, the other case would be Fibreboard.  But 
if Court adopted Rule C(1), the distinction that Chief Justice Warren 
suggested would never have been necessary: for it is improbable that a 
subsequent case would arise in which an employer would desire to contract 
out bargaining unit work, the contracted workers would perform the same 
work that the bargaining unit employees were performing in the same 
workplace, and the latter would not be capable of continuing to perform the 
work.  Therefore, in order for the Chief Justice to have distinguished a future 
case in which bargaining unit employees could not perform the contracted 
work, he must have drawn the distinction against a rule other than Rule C(1). 
The only other rule that the passage could have addressed was Rule B(2). 
The future case would be an exception to the general rule requiring decision 
bargaining. 
These two interpretations of the passage seem equally compelling to us. 
Our guess is that either the Chief Justice was going for emotional impact or  
that he  had both Rules B(2) and C(1) in mind and did not separate them 
adequately. 
Chief Justice Warren continued section I with four arguments.  Three 
of them operated on the level of abstraction of Rule B(2), though one of these 
depended on unproven legislative facts.  The fourth argument committed an 
abstraction shift. 
The Chief Justice grounded the first argument on the text of the statute. 
Citing Railroad Telegraphers, he wrote, “The subject matter of the present 
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dispute is well within the literal meaning of the phrase ‘terms and conditions 
of employment.’”275  An agreement between an employer and a union on 
contracting out would be a condition of employment, as would be the 
resulting termination of employment.276  This argument operated on the same 
level of abstraction as Rule B(2) and supported it.  The argument applied to 
all contracting out; the argument did not even hint that contracting out might 
be a mandatory subject of bargaining in some cases but not necessarily in 
others. 
The second argument drew upon the purpose of the statute.  The Chief 
Justice stated that refusal to negotiate had been a prolific cause of industrial 
strife.  One of the primary purposes of the Labor Act is to avert strife via 
collective bargaining.  Classifying contracting out as a mandatory subject of 
bargaining would bring this “problem of vital concern to labor and 
management within the framework established by Congress as most 
conducive to industrial peace.”277  The Chief Justice’s argument, which 
seems to have been inspired by the General Counsel’s Warning Argument, 
did not go so far as the latter because the Chief Justice’s argument was 
limited to contracting out.  Nevertheless, the argument did pertain to all 
contracting out.  Thus, like the argument based on Railroad Telegraphers, 
this one operated on the same level of abstraction as Issue B(2) and was 
satisfactory. 
The third argument examined industrial experience regarding 
contracting out: 
 
While not determinative, it is appropriate to look to industrial 
bargaining practices in appraising the propriety of including a 
particular subject within the scope of mandatory bargaining. Labor 
Board v. American Nat. Ins. Co., 343 U.S.  
 
395, 408. Industrial experience is not only reflective of the 
interests of labor and management in the subject matter but is also 
indicative of the amenability of such subjects to the collective 
bargaining process.  Experience indicates that contracting out in 
one form or another has been brought, widely and successfully, 
within the collective bargaining framework.6  Provisions relating 
to contracting out exist in numerous collective bargaining 
agreements,7 and “[c]ontracting out is the basis of many 
grievances; and that type of claim is grist in the mills of the 
arbitrators.” United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 363 
U.S., 574, 584. 
                                                
275. Id. at 210. 
276. Id.  This statement refuted, intentionally or unintentionally, the argument of the majority of the 
Board in Fibreboard-I that the duty to bargain does not pertain to the question of whether the 
employment relationship will persist.  See supra text at n. 70 and n. 74. 
277. Id. at 211 (footnote 5 omitted). 
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     6 See Lunden, Subcontracting Clauses in Major Contracts, Pts. 1, 2, 84 Monthly 
Lab. Rev. 579, 715 (1961). 
    7 A Department of Labor study analyzed 1,685 collective bargaining agreements, 
which applied to approximately 7,500,000 employees (about one-half of the 
estimated work force covered by collective bargaining agreements).  Among the 
agreements studied, approximately one-fourth (378) contained some form of a 
limitation on subcontracting.  Lunden, supra, at 581.  
 
This argument, too, operated on the same level of abstraction as Issue B(2). 
The argument relied on legislative facts (the importance of the subject to 
labor and management and the outcomes of bargaining over it) that pertained 
to the entire economy, not on adjudicative facts that pertained only of the 
parties and transaction in the case at bar.  The argument did not suggest that 
decision bargaining would be mandatory only when the employer was 
motivated by labor costs or when the bargaining might succeed; the phrase 
“contracting out in one form of another” comprehended all forms of the 
phenomenon. 
Yet the argument violated Principle 10 because of the “evidence” of 
industrial experience.  Above we faulted the majority of the Labor Board in 
Fibreboard-II for relying on the study by Mr. Lunden and on the assertion of 
Arbitrator Dash cited in Warrior & Gulf,278 neither of which had appeared in 
the record and been subjected to the adversarial process, and our criticism of 
the Board in this regard applies equally to the Court.  The upshot is that the 
Chief Justice had no legitimate evidence of the legislative fact that bargaining  
over contracting out was widespread in the economy; and, therefore, to the 
extent that his argument in favor of Rule B(2) depended on information about 
industrial experience, the argument failed. 
Whereas the preceding three arguments operated on the same level of 
abstraction as Issue B(2), the fourth argument committed an abstraction shift, 
using a precedent decided on a lower level of abstraction to support a 
proposition at a higher level.  The fourth argument was based on two 
precedents, the Court’s own decision in Teamsters v. Oliver279 and the Labor 
Board’s decision in Timken Roller Bearing.280  The issue in Oliver was 
whether the Labor Act precluded the State of Ohio from applying its anti-
trust law to a clause in a collective bargaining agreement between a coalition 
of locals of the Teamsters Union and a coalition of trucking firms.  The firms 
employed two categories of drivers.  The first category was composed of 
drivers who operated vehicles which the drivers themselves owned.  These 
drivers leased their vehicles to their firms (and for this reason were called 
                                                
278. See text above following n. 193 (beginning, “The second variety was industrial experience . . .”). 
279. Local 24, Int’l Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen, and Helpers of America v. 
Oliver, 358 U.S. 283 (1959).  
280. Timken Roller Bearing Co., 70 NLRB 500 (1946), enf. den. on other grounds, Timken Roller 
Bearing Co. v. NLRB 161 F.2d 949 (6th Cir. 1947). 
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“lessor-drivers”).  A lessor-driver received wages plus a separate fee for 
leasing his vehicle.   The second category was composed of drivers who were 
employees of the firms (“employee-drivers”); they operated vehicles which 
the firms either owned or leased from other firms at (we presume) the market 
rate.  The labor agreement covered both categories of drivers and specified 
the same wage for them. 
The clause in the agreement that precipitated the lawsuit provided that 
the leasing fee must not fall below a specified minimum, which we assume 
approximated the market rate for leasing vehicles.  The reason for this clause 
was the Teamsters’ concern that the firms were paying a leasing fee that was 
less than the market rate.  We presume that the market rate reflected the cost 
of providing a vehicle and that this cost was approximately the same whoever 
owned the vehicle.  Consequently, if a firm paid a lessor-driver a leasing fee 
below the market rate, the driver sustained a loss on the lease and, in effect, 
the compensation for his labor was reduced.  As a practical matter, such a 
lessor-driver would be working for less than the contractual wage.  In purpose 
and effect, therefore, the clause in question protected the contractual wages 
of lessor-drivers, a mandatory subject of bargaining. 
Ohio claimed that the minimum-fee clause violated the state’s anti-trust 
statute, but the Supreme Court held in Oliver that federal labor law preempted 
the statute.  Concerning this holding, the Court in Fibreboard wrote: 
 
Thus, we concluded [in Oliver] that such a matter [the minimum 
leasing fee] is a subject of mandatory bargaining under § 8(d). The 
only difference between that case and the one at hand [Fibreboard] 
is that the work of the employees in the bargaining unit was let out 
piecemeal in Oliver, whereas here the work of the entire unit has 
been contracted out.  In reaching the conclusion that the subject 
matter in Oliver was a mandatory subject of collective bargaining, 
we cited with approval Timken Roller Bearing Co., where the 
Board in a situation factually similar to the present case held that 
§§ 8(a)(5) and 9(a) required the employer to bargain about 
contracting out work then being performed by members of the 
bargaining unit.281 
 
This passage explicitly adopted Rule B(2): decision bargaining is a 
mandatory subject of bargaining. 
The argument in this passage violated Principle 7 (an authority may not 
support a proposition that operates on a level of abstraction higher than the 
level on which the authority operated).  The holdings of Timken Roller 
Bearing and Oliver resolved Issue C or Issue E, not Issue B(2), but the Chief 
Justice used them in support of Rule B(2). 
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The reader will recall that in Timken Roller Bearing the Steelworkers, 
which represented employees who performed certain tasks in a plant, sought 
to bargain over the company’s practice of engaging independent contractors 
to perform other tasks in the plant.282  The Labor Board did not hold that 
decision bargaining is a mandatory subject of bargaining (Rule B(2)).  
Rather, by adopting Trial Examiner Ruckel’s recommendation, the Board 
decided the case at the level of its facts.  In Fibreboard-I Member Fanning 
had erroneously used Timken Roller Bearing to support Rule B(2),283 and 
here Chief Justice Warren made the same error.  Our point is not that Timken 
Roller Bearing was not analogous to Fibreboard.  The cases were analogous; 
and, if the Chief Justice had been addressing Issue C and had wished to use 
Timken Roller Bearing as the source of the standard for resolving the dispute 
before him, the case would have borne that weight.284  Likewise, again 
because the cases were analogous, the Chief Justice could have used Timken 
Roller Bearing as a precedent in a common law approach to Fibreboard: 
because decision bargaining was justified in the former case (bargaining unit  
jobs were jeopardized by contracted workers who performed tasks that union 
members had never performed), a fortiori decision bargaining was justified 
in the latter case (bargaining unit jobs were lost to contracted workers who 
performed the very tasks that union members had been performing).  Thus, 
Timken Roller Bearing would have been an appropriate citation if Chief 
Justice Warren had invoked Rule E(2).  Instead, however, he was addressing 
Issue B(2).  He was arguing that decision bargaining is a mandatory subject 
of bargaining, and he had just presented three arguments that operated on that 
high level of abstraction.  The citation to Timken Roller Bearing, therefore, 
was inappropriate.  A case at a lower level of abstraction does not support a 
rule at a higher level. 
As for Oliver, it did not hold that contracting out is a mandatory subject 
of bargaining. In fact, contracting out was not an issue between the parties. 
The collective bargaining agreement was silent regarding the power of a 
trucking firm to use lessor-drivers instead of employee-drivers.  The reason 
for the silence is obvious: both types of driver were in the bargaining unit. 
Thus, jobs in the unit were not affected by a firm’s use of lessor-drivers 
instead of employee-drivers or vice-versa.  Accordingly, Oliver held nothing 
about decision bargaining, but held simply that the minimum leasing fee was 
a mandatory subject of bargaining because the minimum fee protected 
drivers’ wages, which are a mandatory subject.  However, if we are mistaken 
and Oliver did pertain to contracting out, the case addressed Issue C, not Issue 
B(2).  Surely, the holding of Oliver was not that contracting out is always a 
                                                
282. See supra text beginning at n. 87 (beginning, “The first Board case on which . . .”). 
283. See supra text following n. 101 (beginning, “Let us turn now to the role . . .”) . 
284. See supra text following n. 57 (beginning, “A precedent may be cited . . .”). 
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mandatory subject (Rule B(2)); at most, the holding was that contracting out 
was a mandatory subject regarding lessor-drivers, in other words, a version 
of Rule C: decision bargaining is required when a company employs drivers 
who own their own vehicles which the firm leases.  Therefore, as precedents 
for a proposition that operated on a high level of abstraction, the Chief Justice 
improperly cited Timken Roller Bearing and Oliver, the holdings of which 
operated on lower levels. 
At this point in section I, Chief Justice Warren returned to the facts of 
the case at bar.  He began by writing, “The facts of the present case illustrate 
the propriety of submitting the dispute to collective bargaining.”285  This 
statement was consonant with Issue B(2).  An argument regarding a rule at a 
high level of abstraction may use the facts of a single case (the case at bar or 
another case), not as a reason for the rule, but as an illustration of how the 
rule will operate; the rule will do good in this case and, by extension, in 
others.  But a writer presenting such an argument must be careful not to allow 
the details of the case to become adjudicative facts that effectively lower the  
level of abstraction of the issue.  The Chief Justice was not careful enough. 
In order to support Rule B(2), he needed to show that decision bargaining 
would not have negative effects on Fibreboard’s ability to manage its 
business; that the contracting out in Fibreboard’s case was typical of 
contracting out across the nation; and, therefore, that decision bargaining 
would not interfere with most employers’ ability to manage their businesses. 
Instead, the Chief Justice wrote: 
 
The Company’s decision to contract out the maintenance work did 
not alter the Company’s basic operation.  The maintenance work 
still had to be performed in the plant.  No capital investment was 
contemplated; the Company merely replaced existing employees 
with those of an independent contractor to do the same work under  
similar conditions of employment.  Therefore, to require the 
employer to bargain about the matter would not significantly 
abridge his freedom to manage the business.286 
 
We will call this the “Management Prerogatives Passage.”  The facts in it did 
not illustrate the effect of decision bargaining across the nation; if the facts 
had illustrated this effect, they would have related back to the arguments 
which the Chief Justice had just stated in support of Rule B(2).287  Instead, 
                                                
285. Fibreboard, 379 U.S. at 213. 
286. Id. 
287. See generally id.  Those arguments were that contracting out is a term or condition of employment 
as defined in the Labor Act, that bargaining over contracting out would avert industrial strife, and 
that experience shows that bargaining over contracting out is often successful.  (We omit the 
argument based on precedent because, as we argued above, neither Oliver nor Timken Roller 
Bearing supported Rule B(2)).  If the Chief Justice had used the facts of Fibreboard to illustrate 
those arguments, he might have written something like the following: The case at bar provides an 
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the Chief Justice stated facts which no one could reasonably believe were 
typical of contracting out across the nation: Fibreboard merely replaced 
bargaining unit employees with contracted workers; the work did not change; 
the place of work did not change; investment did not change; indeed, nothing 
else about the business changed.  These facts demonstrated that decision 
bargaining was required only in the case at bar and were silent as to whether 
decision bargaining might be required in another case.  In other words, these 
facts pertained to Rule C(1).  A reader must wonder whether Chief Justice 
Warren (perhaps in response to the concurring opinion of Justice Potter 
Stewart, which is discussed below) intended the Management Prerogatives 
Passage to change the level of abstraction of the issue as well as the holding 
of the case. 
The next paragraph of the opinion turned to the cause of the labor 
dispute. 
 
The Company was concerned with the high cost of its maintenance 
operation.  It was induced to contract out the work by assurances 
from independent contractors that economies could be derived by 
reducing the work force, decreasing fringe benefits, and 
eliminating overtime payments.  These have long been regarded as 
matters peculiarly suitable for resolution within the collective 
bargaining framework, and industrial experience demonstrates 
that collective negotiation has been highly successful in achieving 
peaceful accommodation of the conflicting interests. . . [A]lthough 
it is not possible to say whether a satisfactory solution could be 
reached, national labor policy is founded upon the congressional 
determination that the chances are good enough to warrant 
subjecting such issues to the process of collective negotiation.288 
 
We will call this the “Labor Costs Passage.”  Unlike the facts in the 
Management Prerogatives Passage, the facts in the Labor Costs Passage 
operated on the right level of abstraction for justifying Rule B(2).  Fibreboard 
was dissatisfied with its high labor costs, and an independent contractor 
promised that economies could be achieved by reducing the number of 
employees, their overtime hours, and their fringe benefits.  Probably a great 
                                                
apt illustration of these principles.  The work of a bargaining unit has long been considered to be a 
term or condition of employment, and the contracting out in the case at bar reduced the work of the 
unit.  Bargaining over labor costs is “grist in the mills” of collective bargaining, and Fibreboard 
decided to contract out because of labor costs.  Bargaining over contracting out would reduce 
industrial strife because, if an agreement were reached, the union would have no cause to strike; 
and even if an agreement were not reached, the union would learn during negotiations the price at 
which substitute labor could be contracted for in the market and, knowing that strikers could easily 
be replaced, might well refrain from striking.  Although we cannot say whether Fibreboard and the 
Steelworkers would have reached an agreement, at least the union would have learned the price at 
which the company could engage contracted workers and might have realized the futility of striking. 
288. Id. at 213–14. 
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deal of contracting out is similarly motivated, and so the case at bar was an 
apt illustration for a rule of general application.  Also, the passage related its 
facts to the reasons the Chief Justice had previously given in support of Rule 
B(2).  Labor costs are terms or conditions of employment (“have long been 
regarded as matters peculiarly suitable for resolution within the collective 
bargaining framework”).  Bargaining over labor costs often succeeds 
(“collective negotiation has been highly successful”) and contributes to labor 
peace (“achieving peaceful accommodation of the conflicting interests”). 
Accordingly, the Labor Costs Passage pertained to Issue B. 
The Management Prerogatives Passage pertained to issues at a low level 
of abstraction, and the Labor Costs Passage pertained to an issue at a higher 
level.  The next passage is more difficult to analyze: 
 
The appropriateness of the collective bargaining process for 
resolving such issues was apparently recognized by the Company. 
In explaining its decision to contract out the maintenance work, 
the Company pointed out that in the same plant other unions “had 
joined hands with management in an effort to bring about an 
economical and efficient operation,” but “we had not been able to 
attain that in our discussions with this particular local.” 
Accordingly, based on past bargaining experience with this union, 
the Company unilaterally contracted out the work.  While “the Act 
does not encourage a party to engage in fruitless marathon 
discussions at the expense of frank statement and support of his 
position,” it at least demands that the issue be submitted to the 
mediatory influence of collective negotiations.  As the Court of 
Appeals pointed out, “[i]t is not necessary that it be likely or 
probable that the union will yield or supply a feasible solution but 
rather that the union be afforded an opportunity to meet 
management’s legitimate complaints that its maintenance was 
unduly costly.”289 
 
We will call this the “Union’s Opportunity Passage.” 
Before we can determine the level of abstraction at which the argument 
in the Union’s Opportunity Passage operated, we must discover its meaning. 
In particular, two terms in the passage require attention.  The first term is 
“such issues,” which we find in the opening sentence of the passage.  An 
interpretation based on form immediately springs to mind.  The Chief Justice 
had used the same term in the Labor Costs Passage, in which the term plainly 
referred to “reducing the work force, decreasing fringe benefits, and 
eliminating overtime payments.  These have long been regarded as matters 
peculiarly suitable for resolution within the collective bargaining 
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framework.”290  The Labor Costs Passage immediately preceded the Union’s 
Opportunity Passage, and the term appeared in the last sentence of the former  
passage and in the first sentence of the latter passage.  A reader would 
naturally assume that a term used in consecutive sentences of an opinion was 
intended to carry the same meaning in both sentences.  Based on form, 
therefore, “such issues” in the Union’s Opportunity Passage must have 
referred to reducing the work force, decreasing fringe benefits, and 
eliminating overtime payments, in short, labor costs. 
The second term that requires attention is “the issue,” which we 
encounter in the fourth sentence of the Union’s Opportunity Passage. 
Considering again the form of the passage, one would say that “the issue” 
was the singular version of “such issues” and, therefore, also referred to labor 
costs.  But considering the substance of the sentence in which “the issue” 
appeared, we are led to a different conclusion.  The sentence stated that, 
although the law does not require fruitless bargaining, the law “at least 
demands that the issue be submitted to the mediatory influence of collective 
negotiations.”  In this context, “the issue” could not have meant labor costs; 
no one doubted that they were mandatory subjects of bargaining.  The term 
could only have meant the issue in Fibreboard, namely, contracting out. 
Can we harmonize interpretations based on form and on substance?  
Our guess is that Chief Justice Warren conflated bargaining over labor costs 
with bargaining over contracting out.  In the context of the Fibreboard case, 
they did mean the same thing: if the company had discussed contracting out 
with the union, the discussion would have pertained to labor costs.  This 
interpretation also explains the first two sentences of the Union’s 
Opportunity Passage, which otherwise would be puzzling.  The Chief Justice 
wrote that Fibreboard recognized that contracting out was an appropriate 
subject for collective bargaining because the company had bargained 
successfully with its other unions to reduce labor costs.  Bargaining with its 
other unions over labor costs would have taught the company little about the 
possibility of successful bargaining over contracting out with the 
Steelworkers unless the issues in both sets of bargaining would have been the 
same.291 
                                                
290. Id. at 213. 
291. We say that Chief Justice Warren conflated bargaining over labor costs with bargaining over 
contracting out because we believe, for two reasons, that these phenomena overlap but are not 
congruent.  First, often the cause of contracting out is not labor costs.  For example, suppose a 
company prefers to contract out instead of replacing obsolete or broken equipment.  Second, even 
when the cause is labor costs, negotiating over reducing labor costs is not the same as negotiating 
over contracting out.  In contrast, when labor costs are the issue and contracting out does not loom 
in the background, employees know that failure to agree on reductions in labor costs might lead to 
a strike or a lockout.  The risks to employees of a strike or a lockout are losing pay for a period of 
time and, in the case of a strike, being permanently replaced; but employees also know that most 
strikes and lockouts are settled, often quickly, and many permanently replaced strikers are 
eventually recalled to their jobs.  When contracting out is the issue, employees know that failure to 
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We can now interpret the Union’s Opportunity Passage.  The first 
sentence asserted that Fibreboard recognized that bargaining with its unions 
over labor costs/contracting out was appropriate.  The second sentence 
presented evidence for the assertion in the first sentence: Fibreboard knew 
that bargaining to reduce labor costs could succeed because the company’s 
negotiations with its other unions to improve efficiency had succeeded. 
Previous negotiations with the Steelworkers had failed, said the third 
sentence, and contracting out followed.  The fourth sentence stated that, 
although the law does not require fruitless bargaining, the law does demand 
that labor costs/contracting out “be submitted to the mediatory influence of 
collective negotiations.”292  The fifth sentence made clear the obligation to 
bargain over contracting out was not contingent on the likelihood of success 
of the bargaining; rather, the union was entitled to the opportunity “to meet 
management’s legitimate complaints that its maintenance was unduly 
costly.”293 
Although we may understand the meaning of each sentence in the 
Union’s Opportunity Passage, we must make sense of the passage as a whole 
in order to determine its level of abstraction.  The first part of the passage 
(the initial three sentences) stated facts; the second part (the final two 
sentences) announced a rule of law.  Do these parts cohere into a meaningful 
argument? Three possibilities exist. 
In the usual case, facts that closely precede the announcement of a rule 
of law are legislative facts that justify the rule.  One possibility, then, is that 
the facts in the first part of the passage were legislative, offered to help justify 
the rule of law in the second part.  However, the facts were adjudicative, not 
legislative, and did not justify the rule.  The facts were that Fibreboard knew 
that bargaining over labor costs could be productive because it had bargained 
successfully over labor costs with its other unions, but bargaining with the 
Steelworkers had been unsuccessful and so the company unilaterally 
contracted out the maintenance work.  These facts were true only of the case 
at bar.  They could not justify a rule requiring all employers to engage in 
decision bargaining when the motive for contracting out is labor costs. 
As we have noted, adjudicative facts can properly be used by way of 
illustration if they are typical of the legislative facts that justify a rule of law. 
(“This case provides a good example....”)  Accordingly, a second possibility 
is that Chief Justice Warren intended Fibreboard’s successful bargaining 
with its other unions over labor costs to be an example of the legislative fact  
that labor costs are amenable to collective bargaining—a plausible 
proposition, as Fibreboard knew and other employers would also know. 
                                                
agree means that the employer will proceed with contracting out.  The risk to employees is the 
irrevocable loss of their jobs.  When risks change, bargaining changes. 
292. Id. at 214. 
293. Id. 
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However, the Chief Justice also mentioned that Fibreboard had made no 
headway in reducing labor costs via bargaining with the Steelworkers.  This 
fact exemplified the opposite of what he wanted to prove and, therefore, casts 
doubt on the second possibility. 
The third possibility is that the Chief Justice Warren intended the 
Union’s Opportunity Passage to apply law to fact.  Often, facts stated in close 
proximity to a rule of law are part of the process of applying law to fact.  On 
the one hand, two formal considerations suggest that the Chief Justice did not 
intend the Union’s Opportunity Passage to apply law to fact.  First, when law 
is applied to fact, the law is normally stated first, followed by the facts to 
which the law is applied.  This order was reversed in the Union’s Opportunity 
Passage. Second, when law is applied to fact, only the adjudicative facts that 
are material to the law are mentioned.  Extraneous facts that form the 
background are presented in another, usually earlier part of the opinion.  The 
law (stated in the fourth sentence) was that decision bargaining is mandatory 
when the reason for contracting out is labor costs.  Although the first part of 
the Union’s Opportunity Passage included the adjudicative facts that were 
material to the rule (Fibreboard contracted out bargaining unit work due to 
labor costs and did not bargain over the decision with the Steelworkers), the 
passage also included additional facts that were not material to the rule 
(Fibreboard had reduced labor costs in bargaining with its other unions and, 
therefore, the company recognized that collective bargaining was appropriate 
for reducing labor costs; but the company had failed to reduce labor costs in 
bargaining with the Steelworkers).  
On the other hand, a substantive consideration suggests that the Chief 
Justice did intend the passage to apply law to fact.  The fifth sentence, a 
quotation from Judge Burger’s opinion in the Court of Appeals, may have 
been application of law to fact: “‘[i]t is not necessary that it be likely or 
probable that the union will yield or supply a feasible solution but rather that 
the union be afforded an opportunity to meet management’s legitimate 
complaints that its maintenance was unduly costly.’”  The last five words 
may indicate that the sentence specifically addressed Fibreboard’s duty to 
bargain with the Steelworkers over the contracting out of maintenance.294 
The Union’s Opportunity Passage did not comprise legislative facts in 
support of Rule B(2), nor did the passage comprise adjudicative facts that 
exemplified the benefits of the rule.  The passage might or might not have 
been application of law to fact.  If it were application of law to fact, the 
passage was coherent; if not, it made no sense.  We prefer to conclude that it 
was coherent.  As application of law to fact, the passage adopted Rule D(2) 
(the appropriate standard requires decision bargaining in this case). 
                                                
294. See supra text following n. 219 (beginning, “The second interpretation . . .”). 
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Application of law to fact operates at a low level of abstraction because it 
applies only to the parties and the transactions in the case at bar. 
The Labor Costs Passage stated facts at a high level of abstraction, 
addressing Issue B.  The Management Prerogatives Passage stated facts at a 
low level of abstraction and therefore addressed Issue C, implying a rule that 
combined Rules C(2)and (3) (decision bargaining is required if the employer 
wants to replace bargaining unit employees with contracted workers and 
bargaining would not infringe management prerogatives).  The Union’s 
Opportunity Passage applied law to fact; the standard was Rule C(2) (labor 
costs motivated the contracting out).  Attorneys in subsequent cases, whether 
advocating a broad scope of decision bargaining or a narrow scope, would 
find ample support in these passages for conflicting arguments as to which 
issue the Court addressed and how it decided the issue. 
It seems fitting, then, that the opening paragraph of Chief Justice 
Warren’s opinion clearly stated the issue at a high level of abstraction (“The 
primary issue is whether the ‘contracting out’ of work being performed by 
employees in the bargaining unit is a statutory subject of collective 
bargaining. . .”295) and the closing paragraph of his discussion of contracting 
out just as clearly resolved the issue at a low level of abstraction: 
 
We are thus not expanding the scope of mandatory bargaining to 
hold, as we do now, that the type of “contracting out” involved in 
this case—the replacement of employees in the existing bargaining 
unit with those of an independent contractor to do the same work 
under similar conditions of employment—is a statutory subject of 
collective bargaining under § 8(d).  Our decision need not and does 
not encompass other forms of “contracting out” or 
“subcontracting” which arise daily in our complex economy.296 
 
This paragraph, also perhaps a consequence of the criticism that Justice 
Stewart leveled at the majority, resolved Issue C with Rule C(1), the standard 
at the lowest level of abstraction.  We will call such contracting out the 
“Fibreboard Model.” 
What is a reader to make of section I of the Court’s opinion in 
Fibreboard?  In the first part of the opinion, Chief Justice Warren framed the 
issue at a high level of abstraction, promising to resolve Issue B.  In the 
second part of the opinion, he moved down the abstraction ladder, albeit not 
steadily, and ended by framing the issue in the case at a lower level of 
abstraction, Issue C.  Is it possible that he intended the four arguments in the 
first part of the section to justify the standard in the second part?  The 
possibility seems unlikely.  It is true that he might have thought that 
                                                
295. Fibreboard, 379 U.S. at 204–05. 
296. Id. at 215. 
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bargaining over the Fiberboard Model, although it would probably be 
infrequent, would contribute to labor peace.  But when he argued that 
contracting out fell well within the literal meaning of the phrase “terms and 
conditions of employment,”297 he could not have expected a reader to think 
that he was referring only to the Fibreboard Model.  Also, the lesson from 
industrial experience about the success of bargaining over contracting out 
was certainly not limited to the Fibreboard Model, and not Oliver nor Timken 
Roller Bearing nor Town & Country involved that model.  We are left 
wondering whether Chief Justice Warren lacked a working understanding of 
the principles of levels of abstraction.  Did he understand them, but lose 
focus, perhaps misled by the briefs of the parties?  Did he revise his opinion 
hastily in response to Justice Stewart’s forcible concurring opinion? 
Whatever the explanation, the ambiguity of his opinion was likely to cause 
problems in the future for judges and attorneys, unions and employers. 
 
4. Justice Stewart’s Concurring Opinion 
 
Justice Stuart recognized this problem and, joined by Justices John 
Marshall Harlan and William Orville Douglas, filed a concurring opinion.298 
Justice Stewart wrote, “The Court purports to limit its decision to ‘the facts 
of this case.’  But the Court’s opinion radiates implications of such disturbing 
breadth that I am persuaded to file this separate statement of my own 
views.”299  He immediately made clear his belief that the Court did not adopt 
Rule C(3): “The Court most assuredly does not decide that every managerial 
decision which necessarily terminates an individual’s employment is subject 
to the duty to bargain.”300  He continued that the Court did not adopt Rule 
B(2): “Nor does the Court decide that subcontracting decisions are as a 
general matter subject to that duty.”301  Instead, he concluded the Court 
adopted Rule C(1), and in that decision he concurred: 
 
The question posed is whether the particular decision sought to be 
made unilaterally by the employer in this case is a subject of 
mandatory collective bargaining within the statutory phrase “terms 
and conditions of employment.”  That is all the Court decides. . . . 
Within the narrow limits implicit in the specific facts of this case, 
I agree with the Court’s decision.”302 
 
                                                
297. Id. at 210. 
298. Id. at 217–18 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
299. Id. 
300. Id. at 218. 
301. Id.  
302. Id. (footnote omitted). 
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Justice Stewart proceeded to state the facts of the case.303  Fibreboard’s 
maintenance employees were represented by the Steelworkers.304 The 
company determined that it could effect substantial savings annually by 
contracting out the maintenance work because the contractor would eliminate 
fringe benefits, adjust work schedules, and enforce stricter work quotas.305 
The company signed a contract with Fluor and refused to discuss the decision 
with the union.306  Thereafter, Fluor’s employees, ultimately supervised by 
Fibreboard’s managers, performed the maintenance and functioned “as an 
integral part of the company.”307  Fluor received a fixed monthly fee plus 
reimbursement for the cost of maintenance.308  All these facts were 
adjudicative, pertinent only to the case at bar and, therefore, only to Rule 
C(1). 
Then Justice Stewart directed two criticisms at the Chief Justice’s 
opinion.  They provide us an opportunity to state another principle of levels 
of abstraction: 
Principle 9 
 
A reply to an argument (including criticism of the argument, 
a counter-argument, and so forth) should operate on the 
same level of abstraction as the argument, or an explanation 
should be provided. 
 
How often we encounter a reply that does not seem to meet the 
argument squarely!  Many times, the reason is the argument and the reply 
operate on different levels of abstraction and leave us puzzled.  Suppose, for 
example, a critic of capital punishment argues that capital punishment is bad 
because it is murder by the state.  An advocate of capital punishment replies 
that capital punishment is good because it deters crime.  The argument and 
the reply do not respond to one another, nor do they join an issue, because 
they operate on different levels of abstraction.  The critic’s argument seeks 
to define the crime and, therefore, functions at a higher level of abstraction 
than the advocate’s reply, which assumes a (different) definition of the crime 
and pertains to its likelihood.  A more effective argument for the critic would 
make clear the argument and reply operate on different levels and address 
different issues.  Such an argument might say that the question is not whether 
capital punishment deters crime; the question is whether capital punishment 
itself is a crime.  Murder is the crime of intentionally taking a human life, 
                                                
303. Id. 
304. Id. at 218–19. 
305. Id. at 219. 
306. Id. 
307. Id. 
308. Id. 
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whoever the agent is.  Execution by the state is the intentional taking of a 
human life and, therefore, is the crime of murder.  A crime, most especially 
murder, cannot be justified by its consequences.  It follows that, even if 
capital punishment deters crime, it is itself a crime. 
Justice Stewart’s first criticism of Chief Justice Warren’s opinion was 
a model of courtesy among colleagues:  
 
data showing that many labor contracts refer to subcontracting or 
that subcontracting grievances are frequently referred to 
arbitrators under collective bargaining agreements, while not 
wholly irrelevant, do not have much real bearing, for such data 
may indicate no more than that the parties have often considered it 
mutually advantageous to bargain over these issues on a 
permissive basis.309 
 
The facts in this passage were simple; but to understand and evaluate 
Justice Stewart’s argument, we need to identify the background of law that 
he accepted, the inference he drew from the facts, and the standard that 
guided him. 
The background comprised two principles which Justice Stewart 
accepted.  The first principle was Rule A(1), which distinguished between 
mandatory and permissible subjects of bargaining.310  Without this principle,  
that is, if Rule A(2) obtained, any lawful subject on which a party wished to 
bargain would be mandatory.  The second principle was that industrial 
experience properly plays some role in defining the scope of the duty to 
bargain.311  Without this principle, the usual tools of statutory interpretation 
would control (text, purpose of the statute, and so on) and industrial 
experience would be irrelevant.312 
At this point, the question became, what is the proper role for industrial 
experience to play?  What is the standard?  Justice Stewart did not specify it, 
                                                
309. Id. at 220. 
310. Id. at 219 n. 2 (citations omitted) (“There was a time when one might have taken the view that the 
National Labor Relations Act gave the Board and the courts no power to determine the subjects 
about which the parties must bargain—a view expressed by Senator Walsh when he said that public 
concern ends at the bargaining room door.  But too much law has been built upon a contrary 
assumption for this view any longer to prevail, and I question neither the power of the Court to 
decide this issue nor the propriety of its doing so.”). 
311. Id. at 220 (”[I]ndustrial experience may be useful in determining the proper scope of the duty to 
bargain.”).   
312. Justice Stewart did not accept these principles wholeheartedly.  His statement quoted above in n. 
312 (beginning, “There was a time . . .”) expressed the view that, as the Labor Act was originally 
conceived, the choice of the subjects of bargaining should belong entirely to the parties.  This 
statement was unnecessary to his argument and suggested sympathy with the original view.  And 
although he acknowledged the Court’s precedent allowing industrial experience to play a role in 
defining the scope of the duty to bargain, he defined that role in a way that it became meaningless, 
as we show in the following text. 
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but he stated facts and drew an inference from them, thereby allowing us to 
identify his standard.  The facts were that labor agreements in America often 
cover contracting out and that the parties to those agreements take grievances 
over contracting out to arbitration.  He inferred from these facts that the Court 
could not know the parties’ opinions on whether contracting out was a 
mandatory or a permissible subject of bargaining, and this inference was 
correct.313  Why did Justice Stewart draw the inference?  He must have 
thought that the parties’ opinions were pertinent to his standard for using 
industrial experience in construing the duty to bargain, and so we can use the 
inference to identify his standard.  The data on collective bargaining were 
unhelpful, he wrote, because they did not reveal the parties’ opinions of the 
proper classification of contracting out.314  It follows that if the data did reveal 
the parties’ opinions, it would help the Court classify the topic—else why 
mention that we cannot know their opinions?  Now we know Justice 
Stewart’s standard.  The role that industrial experience plays in classifying a 
topic as mandatory or permissible is that the experience can reveal the 
parties’ opinions of the proper classification of the topic.  As it happened, the 
evidence in the case at bar did not reveal the parties’ opinions on decision 
bargaining. 
We are not convinced by Justice Stewart’s first criticism of Chief 
Justice Warren’s opinion.315  Nonetheless, the criticism operated on the right 
                                                
313. Id. at 221.  The basis of this inference may have run along the following lines: The parties bargained 
over contracting out because one of them raised the topic.  The one who raised the topic either 
thought it was a mandatory subject or thought it was a permissible subject.  Either way, this party 
must have thought that bargaining over the topic would be advantageous; otherwise, the party would 
not have raised the topic.  The counterparty agreed to bargain over the topic either in the belief that 
it was a permissible subject over which bargaining would be advantageous, or in the belief that it 
was a mandatory subject over which bargaining was required regardless of whether it seemed 
advantageous.  Thus, both parties might have thought that contracting out was a mandatory subject; 
both might have thought that contracting out was a permissible subject over which bargaining would 
be advantageous; or the parties might have disagreed on the legal classification of contracting out 
and the advantageousness of bargaining over it.  Accordingly, we cannot know from their behavior 
their opinion on the legal classification of contracting out as a subject of bargaining.  
314. Id. at 220.  
315. We find the criticism unconvincing for two reasons.  First, Justice Stewart’s standard was hollow. 
His inference that industrial experience could not reveal the parties’ opinion about how contracting 
out should be classified would be equally true of any other topic which the Labor Board and courts 
have not definitively classified.  When parties bargain over such a topic, they always believe it is 
mandatory or permissible, and we can never know, merely from the fact that they bargain over a 
topic, into which category they believe the topic falls.  The result is that, although Justice Stewart 
conceded that industrial experience properly plays some role in defining the scope of the duty to 
bargain, in his view, as a practical matter, a tribunal could never use that experience. 
      Second, even if we could know the parties’ view on whether decision bargaining is a mandatory 
or a permissible subject of bargaining, that view would be of little moment.  The opinions of lay 
persons on a legal question, even lay persons with substantial experience in the field, are rarely 
influential in court.  At least in the field of labor law, lay persons’ opinions on legal questions are 
probably governed by their lawyers’ opinions, not the lay persons’ own legal analysis.  The opinions 
of lawyers are the opinions of advocates for their clients and are far from impartial.  Therefore, even 
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level of abstraction.  The issue was whether industrial data on the extent of 
bargaining over contracting out were helpful in classifying it as a mandatory 
or a permissible subject, that is, in choosing between Rules D(1) and D(2). 
The data were at the appropriate level of abstraction because they applied to 
                                                
if knowledge of the parties’ view on this legal question could have been inferred from industrial 
experience, that view would not have mattered. 
      What, then, is the proper role for industrial experience in delimiting the duty to bargain?  Our 
answer begins with two practical considerations.  First, the issue arises only when the Labor Board 
and courts have not yet decided whether a topic is mandatory or permissible.  Second, parties 
bargain when they believe that bargaining serves their interests.  With these considerations in mind, 
we can see that a party will lay a topic on the table only if the party believes that bargaining over it 
would be advantageous.  If the party believes the topic will be classified as permissible, the party is 
free to ignore it and, therefore, will raise it only in the belief that bargaining over it would be 
advantageous.  The same is true if the party believes the topic will be classified as mandatory: not 
every mandatory subject must be (or could be) discussed, and why raise a topic that would be 
disadvantageous?  A counterparty will pick up the topic from the table if the counterparty also 
believes that bargaining would be advantageous, again regardless of whether the counterparty 
believes the topic will be classified as mandatory or permissible.  But if the counterparty believes 
that bargaining would not be advantageous, the counterparty will not pick up the topic.  Instead, the 
counterparty will decline to bargain and leave it to the other party to file an unfair labor practice 
charge.  The counterparty knows that the tribunals may well find the topic to be permissible, in 
which event the counterparty had the right to decline to bargain.  The counterparty also knows that 
the tribunals may find the topic to be mandatory, in which event the counterparty will have to 
bargain—but only after two or more years have elapsed while the case proceeds through the 
tribunals.  Thus, although we may not know whether the parties believe an unclassified topic is 
mandatory or permissible, we do know that, if they bargain over it, they believe that the bargaining 
advances their interests. 
      This knowledge bears heavily on how a topic should be classified.  We hold that a topic should 
be classified as mandatory if bargaining over it would serve the goal of the Labor Act, which, per 
§ 1 of the Act, is to promote efficiency, safety, and stability in labor relations.  Parties are in the 
best position to know what is good for themselves.  Their good ultimately coincides with the goal 
of the Act; they too want efficiency, safety, and stable labor relations.  Therefore, their views of 
what promotes their own good reveal a great deal about what actually promotes the goal of the Act. 
If they believe that bargaining over a topic is valuable, it probably is.  Unless it is clear beyond 
peradventure that a topic is mandatory (e.g., wages) or permissible (e.g., managers’ salaries), 
industrial experience should play a major role in determining whether a topic is mandatory or 
permissible. 
      Justice Stewart evidently believed that whether decision bargaining was a mandatory or 
permissible subject of bargaining was a purely legal question.  He was mistaken.  The issue was 
debatable, and its resolution should have been informed by industrial experience. 
      Chief Justice Warren held the better view: 
  Industrial experience is not only reflective of the interests of labor and 
management in the subject matter but is also indicative of the amenability of 
such subjects to the collective bargaining process. Experience illustrates that 
contracting out in one form or another has been brought, widely and 
successfully, within the collective bargaining framework. 
 Id. at 211. 
      Nevertheless, although Chief Justice Warren’s view was consistent with ours, he erred in 
applying it because he lacked findings of legislative facts (the extent and success of bargaining over 
contracting out) which were not proved by evidence in the record of the case. See supra text 
following n. 277 (beginning, “The third argument examined . . .”). 
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parties across the country, not merely to Fibreboard and the Steelworkers.316 
Similarly, Justice Stewart’s criticism of these data was at the appropriate 
level of abstraction.  He criticized them for failing to reveal the opinion of 
the parties across the country on how to classify contracting out; he did not 
criticize the data for failing to reveal the opinions of Fibreboard and the 
Steelworkers. 
Justice Stewart’s second criticism of the Chief Justice’s opinion also 
operated on the correct level of abstraction.  After commenting on the 
uselessness of the data on industrial experience, Justice Stewart wrote, “In 
any event, the ultimate question is the scope of the duty to bargain defined 
by the statutory language,”317 implying that even if the industrial data did 
reveal something worth knowing, the intent of Congress was controlling.  He 
proceeded to employ conventional tools of statutory construction.  He began 
by reviewing the text and legislative history of section 8(d).318  The central 
point was, “the words of the statute are words of limitation.”319  The Labor 
Act of 1935 had not defined the duty to bargain.320  The House bill to amend 
the Act in 1947 contained a list that named the subjects of the duty and 
excluded all others.321  Contracting out was not named and, therefore, would 
have been excluded if the House bill had been enacted.322  But the Senate bill 
was enacted, and it contained the present text of section 8(d).323  Although 
the Senate version was not so stringent as the House version, both versions 
adopted the same approach, creating a limited class of mandatory subjects.324 
Justice Stewart acknowledged that the phrase “conditions of 
employment” could be interpreted to require bargaining over any subject that 
affects whether employment will be continued (shades of Rule C(3)), and 
stated that passages in Chief Justice Warren’s opinion suggested such an 
extreme interpretation.325  But on this interpretation, Justice Stewart argued, 
any subject would be mandatory.326  Only a narrower interpretation would 
                                                
316. Id. at 211 n. 6.  Although we have argued that Chief Justice Warren should not have relied on data 
that were untested in the adversarial process, see supra text following n. 277 (beginning, “The third 
argument examined . . .”), here we assume arguendo that the data were true. 
317. Id. at 220 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
318. Id. 
319. Id. 
320. Id. 
321. Id. at 220 n. 4. 
322. Id. at 220–21. 
323. Id. 
324. Id.  The General Counsel had cited this same legislative history for the opposite conclusion, namely, 
that the terms and conditions of employment are any provisions about which either party may wish 
to bargain, see supra text accompanying n. 239 (beginning, “In his first argument following . . .”), 
and we sensed that Justice Stewart was sympathetic to this argument, see supra n. 313. 
325. Id. at 221. 
326. Id. 
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serve the statutory purpose of creating a limited class of mandatory subjects, 
and seven Circuit Courts of Appeals had taken this position.327 
Justice Stewart continued that although the Chief Justice seemed to 
argue that recognizing contracting out as a mandatory subject would promote 
industrial peace, this argument failed to take into account that, even if 
decision bargaining were not mandatory, it would still be permissible and 
parties could bargain about it if they wished.328  Also, Justice Stewart 
mentioned that economic weapons may be used to force concessions only 
regarding mandatory subjects.329  Thus (we complete his argument) 
classifying contracting out as a permissible subject would promote industrial 
peace by allowing parties to bargain over contracting out while outlawing 
strikes over it.330 
Justice Stewart added that, in common parlance, “conditions of 
employment” include the physical work environment, the hours of work and 
the amount of work expected, and safety practices, as well as even less 
tangible things such as employment security, which includes freedom from 
discriminatory discharge and seniority rights.331  But not every management 
decision that affects employment security is a mandatory subject of 
bargaining.  Advertising, product design, financing, and sales all bear on 
employment security, yet none is a mandatory subject, even though decisions 
regarding them can eliminate jobs.332  Consider, for example, a decision to 
invest in labor-saving machinery, or a decision to go out of business.333 
 
Nothing the Court holds today should be understood as imposing 
a duty to bargain collectively regarding such managerial decisions, 
which lie at the core of entrepreneurial control.  Decisions 
concerning the commitment of investment capital and the basic 
scope of the enterprise are not in themselves primarily about 
conditions of employment, though the effect of the decision may 
be necessarily to terminate employment.334 
 
Justice Stewart pitched his second criticism of the Chief Justice’s 
opinion, like the first criticism, at the appropriate level of abstraction.  His 
goal was to explicate the meaning of section 8(d), which defined the duty to 
                                                
327. Id. at 221–22. 
328. Id. at 221 n. 6. 
329. Id. 
330. Id.  The argument based on industrial peace as an end is dangerous because it can be used to justify 
restricting almost any union behavior.  The argument is constrained, however, by § 1 of the Act, 
which states that the means to this end is “encouraging the practice and procedure of collective 
bargaining.”  Justice Stewart may have lost sight of this constraint. 
331. Id. at 222. 
332. Id. at 223. 
333. Id. at 222–23. 
334. Id. at 223.  
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bargain.  This section applied to all employers and all unions covered by the 
Labor Act, and so his arguments about the meaning of the section should 
have been cast at a high level of abstraction—and they were.  The legislative 
history revealed the intent of Congress, which applies to all parties and 
transactions.  So did the meaning of terms in the statute, such as “conditions 
of employment,” and the effect on industrial peace of classifying contracting 
out as a permissible subject. 
Then, Justice Stewart applied the foregoing principles to the case at bar. 
Contracting out, he wrote, as a general matter is not a condition of 
employment, as four Circuit Courts had held.335  Nonetheless, the facts of the 
case at bar constituted a narrow exception.  Fibreboard had a duty to bargain 
over its contracting out because  
 
all that is involved is the substitution of one group of employees 
for another to perform the same task in the same plant under the 
ultimate control of the same employer.  The question whether the 
employer may discharge one group of employees and substitute 
another for them is closely analogous to many other situations 
within the traditional framework of collective bargaining. 
Compulsory retirement, layoffs according to seniority, assignment 
of work among potentially eligible groups within the plant— all 
involve similar questions of discharge and work assignment, and 
all have been recognized as subjects of compulsory collective 
bargaining.336 
 
The case at bar, in Justice Stewart’s view, was analytically similar to 
one in which an employer discharges all employees and replaces them with 
employees willing to do the same jobs in the same plant but without fringe 
benefits of the sort that were so costly to Fibreboard.337  Such a case could be 
regarded either as discrimination in violation of section 8(a)(3) or as 
unilateral action in violation of section 8(a)(5).338  Similarly, if Fibreboard 
had engaged in decision bargaining with the Steelworkers, the negotiations 
would not have concerned entrepreneurial questions about the basic scope of 
the enterprise, such as what should be produced or how capital should be 
invested.339  Rather, the negotiations would have concerned labor costs, 
which were Fibreboard’s motivation.340  By frustrating bargaining over this 
mandatory subject, Fibreboard violated section 8(a)(5).341 
                                                
335. Id. at 224 n. 11. 
336.   Id. at 224 (footnote omitted). 
337. Id.  
338. Id. 
339. Id. at 225. 
340. Id.  
341. Id. at 224–25. 
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Justice Stewart advocated Rule C(1) and applied it to the facts of the 
case to reach Rule D(2).  Application of law to fact turns on adjudicative facts 
and operates on a low level of abstraction.  Justice Stewart used the 
adjudicative facts of the case before him.  Not all or even many employers, 
but this very employer discharged its employees and contracted for other 
employees to perform the same work in the same place for lesser 
compensation.  If this employer had bargained with the union, the issue 
would have been labor costs.  Thus, Justice Stewart’s application of law to 
fact operated on the correct level of abstraction. 
Justice Stewart adhered rigorously to the principles of levels of 
abstraction.  He addressed the issue at the lowest level of abstraction that 
could do justice in the case.  Every fact and argument he presented matched 
the level of the issue to which they were addressed, and the rules that resolved  
the issues matched the levels of those issues.  Thus, his opinion stands as a 
model of how to frame an issue at the correct level of abstraction, to present 
arguments that are on the same level as the issue, and to resolve the issue 
with a rule on the same level as the issue and arguments.  The reader should 
not be surprised to learn that the opinion of Justice Stewart in Fibreboard, 
and not the opinion of the Chief Justice, has influenced the subsequent 
development of the law.342 
We reach the final principle of levels of abstraction that we shall 
discuss: 
Principle 14 
An issue or a case should be decided at the lowest reasonable 
level of abstraction. 
 
Is there a level of abstraction at which an issue or a case ought to be 
resolved?  If so, how can that level be determined?   
The answer to the first question is yes, as four examples demonstrate. 
In the first example, two couples are searching for a house in the Los Angeles 
metropolitan area, in which neither has ever lived.  One couple, A and B, talk 
with a real estate agent about the neighborhoods on which to focus.  One of 
their criteria pertains to the school that their son would attend. 
A says to the agent, “Our son has his own personality, and we want a 
school where he will fit in.” 
The agent replies, “I recommend Beverly Hills.  It has the best schools 
in the area.”   
                                                
342. See NLRB v. First Nat’l Maint. Corp., 627 F.2d 596, 599 (1980) (“Fibreboard was expressly limited 
to its facts”); id. at 604 (Kearse, J., dissenting) (“the carefully limited decision in Fibreboard”); see 
also GORMAN, supra n. 10, at 511 (“Mr. Justice Stewart delivered a concurring opinion which has 
perhaps been more influential than the opinion of the Court.”). 
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And A says, “Maybe so, but what we really need to know is what the 
children are like, what their values are.  Are they open to strangers?  How do 
they feel about disabilities?” 
The agent has addressed A’s concern at too high a level of abstraction. 
A judgment as to the “best schools” is an overall assessment, based on 
numerous criteria, whereas A and B want to base their decision on a specific 
criterion. 
The second couple, C and D, talk to the same real estate agent about 
neighborhoods.  This couple has no children yet, but they are trying. 
C says to the agent, “We want a house in a good school district.” 
The agent replies, “I recommend Beverly Hills.  It has the best schools 
in the area.” 
And C says, “Good.  Let’s begin looking there.” 
This time, the agent has addressed C and D’s concern at the appropriate 
level of abstraction.  They cannot not base their choice on the particular 
characteristics of their children; they can only base their judgment on an 
overall assessment. 
In the second example, E says to her child, F, “I can’t find my bracelet. 
Do you know where it is? 
F replies, “It’s in my room.  I’ve been playing with it.” 
E scolds, “I told you not to do that.” 
F defends, “No, you didn’t.” 
And E says, “Yes, I did.  When you took my ring last week, I told you 
not to play with my jewelry.” 
Young children often think in specifics; they do not understand general 
statements.  F understood her mother’s injunction to apply only to the ring 
that F had taken. Instead of referring to jewelry, E ought to have named the 
items—rings, bracelets, necklaces—with which the child should not play. 
In the third example, Gondwana has just seceded from Pangaea, and G 
and H are charged with writing a code of law for the new nation. 
G says, “We need a law against stealing garden hoses and a law against 
stealing long johns and a law against—” 
H replies, “That would be impracticable.  We could never name every 
item that might be stolen.  Better to outlaw stealing personalty.” 
G has addressed the issue at too low a level of abstraction.  A statute 
against theft need not specify every item that might be stolen.  Reasonable 
adults understand that a law against stealing personalty comprehends stealing 
garden hoses and long johns and so forth. 
The fourth example concerns polling prior to a presidential election.  A 
newscaster says, “Candidate X trails candidate Y by 6 percentage points,” 
meaning that 47% of likely voters say they plan to vote for X and 53% say 
they plan to vote for Y.  But this information operates on too high a level of 
abstraction.  The president of the United States is elected, not by a majority 
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of all votes cast in the nation, but by weighted voting on a state-by-state basis 
in the Electoral College.  The winner of the majority in a state receives the 
number of votes in the Electoral College equal to the number of the state’s 
representatives and senators in Congress.  Five times in American history, a 
candidate who has won the greater number of votes across the nation has lost 
the election in the Electoral College.  In 2016, for example, Hillary Clinton 
received 48% of the national vote as compared to Donald Trump’s 45.9%, 
but Mr. Trump won the election with 304 votes in the Electoral College as 
compared to Ms. Clinton’s 227 votes.343  The correct level of abstraction for 
polling results, therefore, is the state, not the nation.  The newscaster should 
have said, “X leads Y by 4 percentage points in Alabama, trails Y by 2 
percentage points in Arkansas [and so on]” or “A majority of voters in states 
with 291 votes in the Electoral College favor X and a majority in states with 
246 favor Y.” 
Thus, a correct level of abstraction exists on which to address some 
issues.  The second question is more difficult.  The correct level of abstraction 
in the foregoing examples was readily determined from the parties’ purposes, 
and purpose may similarly guide a tribunal with respect to appropriate 
evidence.  But issues vary.  We know from Principle 4 that the level of 
abstraction of an issue can affect its outcome.344  An advocate may frame an 
issue at a particular level of abstraction because of the desired outcome, but 
a tribunal must be neutral.  A tribunal should reason to an outcome, not 
choose an outcome and frame the issue at the level of abstraction that makes 
that outcome appealing.345  Accordingly, considerations more general than 
specific purposes—that is to say, principles—should guide a tribunal as it 
chooses the level of abstraction of an issue. 
What are those principles?  Our answer, on which we have reflected for 
years but which must still be considered tentative, follows from the values of 
liberty, justice, and prudence.  As an initial proposition, more liberty is better 
than less.  Sometimes, however, liberty allows injustice.  Laws may restrict 
liberty in the name of justice, but such restrictions should never be greater 
than necessary to serve the ends of justice.  Thus, a balance between liberty 
and justice must be struck.  Striking that balance requires wisdom.  The 
                                                
343. Clinton Wins Popular Vote by Nearly 2.9 Million, CHI. TRIBUNE, Dec. 22, 2016, 12:47 PM, 
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/politics/ct-clinton-popular-vote-20161222-
story.html.  
344. See supra text following n. 224 (beginning, “The level of abstraction of an issue . . .”). 
345. We suspect that tribunals are commonly unaware of the connection between the level of abstraction 
of an issue and its outcome.  They may well be unaware that they desire a particular outcome.  We 
believe a tribunal chooses to frame an issue at a particular level of abstraction because the choice 
seems “right” or “natural,” and the tribunal does not feel that its neutrality has been compromised. 
We suggest that the level may feel right because the tribunal desires the outcome to which the level 
conduces. 
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wisdom of a tribunal is limited.  Prudence, therefore, dictates that tribunals 
should make new laws with the greatest of caution. 
Liberty, justice, and prudence lead to the following general principles. 
A decision at a lower level of abstraction will restrict the liberty of fewer 
parties in fewer transactions than a decision at a higher level.  Therefore, 
presumptively, an issue should be decided at the lowest reasonable level of 
abstraction.  However, although deciding issues at a low level may do justice  
between the parties, litigation is costly and, in many cases, predictability of 
outcome serves parties’ interests satisfactorily.346  Accordingly, at some point 
an issue should be settled at a high level of abstraction.  Nonetheless, a 
tribunal should take this step hesitantly because the more the experience of 
similar transactions with which a tribunal is familiar, the more the arguments 
of interested parties by which a tribunal is informed, and the more the 
reasoning of other tribunals which is available for study, the wiser a law will 
be. 
Now let us apply these principles.  If the parties to a case frame the issue 
at a low level of abstraction, the tribunal should resolve the issue at that level. 
This proposition does not require that the parties agree on what the issue is, 
but only that their issues operate on the same level of abstraction.  This 
proposition seems uncontroversial.  In a judicial system in which the 
jurisdiction of tribunals is generally limited to cases and controversies, a 
tribunal should not manufacture issues. 
If the parties to a case frame the issue at a high level of abstraction, and 
resolution of the dispute at a lower level is not reasonable, the tribunal may 
resolve the issue at a high level—provided, of course, that the relevant 
legislative facts are proved in the record.  (If the legislative facts are not 
proved satisfactorily, the tribunal should either dismiss the case or instruct 
the parties to present additional evidence.)  For example, in Railroad 
Telegraphers the issue was whether federal courts had jurisdiction to hear the 
case, which depended on whether the railroad’s decision to close stations was 
a bargainable issue under the Railway Labor Act.347  The issue operated at a 
high level of abstraction because whether the partial closing of a business 
was bargainable applied to all employers and unions covered by the Railway 
Labor Act.  A decision at a lower level of abstraction would not have settled 
the dispute, and the Supreme Court properly resolved the issue with 
arguments based on two legislative facts, the intent of Congress, and 
practices in the industry. 
Nonetheless, a judicious tribunal should normally seek a way to decide 
a case at the lowest level of abstraction possible in order to minimize judicial 
                                                
346. “[I]n most matters, it is more important that the applicable rule of law be settled than that it be 
settled right.”  Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
347. Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Chicago & Nw. Ry. Co., 362 U.S. 330 (1960). 
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law making.  Accordingly, even though the parties desire a decision at a high 
level of abstraction, the tribunal must be free to decide the issue at a lower 
level if such a decision would resolve the dispute.  In the event of such a 
decision, the tribunal should inform the parties of its intent and allow them 
to present evidence and arguments on the issue which the tribunal intends to 
address, remanding the case to a lower tribunal if appropriate. 
Sometimes both parties frame and address an issue at two levels of 
abstraction.  Typically, the parties present the issues in the alternative, as in 
Town & Country, in which the issue was either, did the employer contract 
out the hauling of its mobile homes out of anti-union animus, or, do 
employers have a duty to bargain over the contracting out of bargaining unit 
work?  The Labor Board ruled on both issues, answering both questions 
yes.348  The latter answer operated on a high level of abstraction, overruling 
Fibreboard-I.  The former answer operated on a low level of abstraction 
because the ruling turned on the adjudicative fact of the company’s 
motivation, which involved only these two parties and one transaction 
between them.  This answer sufficed to provide relief for the employees and 
the union, and the Board did not need to rule on whether the Labor Act 
requires decision bargaining for all employers and unions.  Accordingly, we 
believe that Member Leedom, who concurred in the finding that the company 
had acted out of anti-union animus, was right to dissent from the unnecessary 
overruling of Fibreboard-I; and the Fifth Circuit, which enforced the Board’s 
order on the basis of anti-union animus, wisely pretermitted deciding whether 
the Act requires decision bargaining. 
Similarly, Justice Stewart honored this principle in his concurring 
opinion in Fibreboard (though his motivation was apparently not judicial 
restraint, but distaste for a rule requiring decision bargaining in all cases). 
His opinion in Fibreboard demonstrates that justice between the parties 
could have been done at a low level of abstraction.  The issue between the 
company and the union was the cost of labor; the company contracted out the 
maintenance work in order to reduce that cost.  The cost of labor is surely 
one of the oldest issues in American labor relations.349  Also, the nature of 
the work and the place it was performed did not change; the contracted 
workers essentially stepped into the shoes of the laid off employees.  Thus, 
Fibreboard’s action was similar to the unfair labor practice of replacing union 
workers with non-union workers at lesser pay without bargaining with the 
union.  The Labor Board and the courts could have held that decision 
bargaining is required over contracting out when the employer’s motivation 
                                                
348. Town & Country is discussed supra following n. 150. 
349. See, for example, the Philadelphia Cordwainers case (1806), 3 COMMONS AND GILMORE, A 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF AMERICAN INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY 55 (society of bootmakers held 
guilty of criminal conspiracy for refusing to work in the same shop as bootmakers who accepted 
less than the scale of prices set by the society). 
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is to reduce labor costs and the contracted workers perform the same work in 
the same place as the displaced employees, and left other cases for another 
day.  Such a holding would have provided complete relief for the 
Steelworkers and the maintenance employees, and Justice Stewart concurred 
in the judgment of the Court on this basis.350 
Not infrequently, the parties disagree about the issue in a case.  When 
the competing statements of the issue operate on different levels of 
abstraction, the tribunal should decide the case on the lowest level that will 
resolve the dispute, giving the parties sufficient notice that they can offer 
appropriate evidence and arguments. 
Cases arise, of course, in which the parties state the issue and present 
evidence and arguments at a low level of abstraction, but the tribunal is 
unsatisfied with the rule of law and wants to announce a new rule, that is, 
move the issue to a higher level of abstraction.  The tribunal should stay its 
hand.  The parties are content with the existing rule, and they have not 
presented, and probably are not prepared to present, legislative facts or 
arguments that would inform the court concerning another rule. 
We recognize, however, that a tribunal may feel a pressing need to 
resolve an issue at a high level of abstraction.  In this event, even though the 
dispute could be decided at a low level, the tribunal may decide the issue at 
a high level, provided that the tribunal informs the parties of its intent, all 
parties are willing and able, and given adequate time, to address the issue at 
a high level, and the tribunal’s opinion explains the reason why a decision at 
a lower level would be unsatisfactory.  Often the explanation will be a 
justification for a new rule of law, and the justification will rest on legislative 
facts (which should be evidence in the record of the case).  This step should 
not be taken lightly or frequently. 
III. CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this article has been to apply the concept of levels of 
abstraction to a number of aspects of legal argumentation.  We have sought 
to draw attention to these aspects, to provide a vocabulary for discussing and 
clarifying them, and, in the context of evaluating a number of opinions of 
tribunals, to derive principles that will improve argumentation. 
                                                
350. We must resist speculating on how Justice Stewart would have reacted if the General Counsel and 
the Steelworkers had framed the issue as whether decision bargaining is required when labor costs 
motivate the contracting out, and if Chief Justice Warren had answered yes.  Rule C(2) is so much 
narrower than Rule B(2) (operates at such a lower level of abstraction)  that Justice Stewart might 
have not felt the need to write separately.  But we will speculate that, if the majority of the Court 
had adopted Rule C(2), Justice Stewart’s opinion would have had less effect, and decision 
bargaining over labor costs might be required today.  
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We believe that other useful applications the concept of levels of 
abstraction may exist, and we trust that other students of the law will discover 
them.  For example, this article has not addressed absolute levels of 
abstraction, that is, the level of abstraction of an issue and its resolution as 
compared to the levels in all possible cases. Absolute levels, however, may 
merit study.  For instance, whether an issue should be assigned to a judge or 
a jury is commonly determined by applying the distinction between issues of 
law and issues of application of law to fact.  Yet this distinction is notoriously 
problematic.  The level of abstraction of an issue is perhaps a better way to 
assign the case, an issue at a high level to the judge and an issue at a low level 
to the jury. 
 
